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7PREFACE
 e rejection of the EU Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands 
in 2005 has cast doubts about the future direction of the European Union, 
including the future of one of its most successful tools – enlargement.  e link 
between widening and enlarging the European Union comes to the fore again 
and the argument that further EU expansion should be slowed down or halted 
altogether without institutional reform gains salience across the EU.
Still, the enlargement process has technically not stopped, but surely is 
going through diﬃ  cult times. Although Turkey started accession negotiations 
in October 2005, the talks almost collapsed in 2006 due to the failure to settle 
the extension of the customs union to Cyprus. Despite the existing commit-
ments of the EU to integrate the countries of Western Balkans, only Croatia is 
currently negotiating its accession and only Macedonia enjoys the candidate 
status whereas there is very little progress in sight regarding the rest of the 
region. But some positive moves can be expected with the outcome of elec-
tions in Serbia likely to produce a pro-European coalition which can lead to 
the ﬁ nal settlement of the issue of Kosovo and conclusion of Stabilisation and 
Association Agreement. Yet, the public and politicians in Europe are much less 
enthusiastic about accepting new members than ever before.
 ere is a danger that the anticlimax following the 2004 big bang enlarge-
ment, the lukewarm reception of Bulgaria and Romania and virtual halt to the 
progress of Turkish accession talks will result in the indeﬁ nite postponement 
of any further enlargement.  is would be particularly unfortunate since the 
three directions in which the Union could expand – Eastern Europe, Turkey 
and the Balkans – comprise countries that are in urgent need of anchoring 
to the EU, given a variety of challenges that they face, ranging from fragile 
geopolitical position to questions of internal cohesion and regional stability. It 
is already clear that the EU has a large part to play in the adjacent areas, and 
that enlargement has so far been the only eﬀ ective instrument for stabilizing 
and transforming the neighbouring regions of the European Union. However, 
both the success of the big accession of 2004 and the strategic choice facing the 
Union as it proceeds to deﬁ ne its limits indicates that the future of enlargement 
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is of strategic signiﬁ cance to the current members as well. While the concerns 
of the populations as well as politicians of the ‘old’ member states are given 
a lot of prominence in major European media and tend to dominate the general 
discourse on enlargement, the public opinion from the new members of the 
EU and the candidates is rarely heard, despite the fact that attitudes towards 
further EU expansion in EU-15 and EU-12 are quite diﬀ erent.
 e lack of attention to the views of the newcomers and EU hopefuls is 
inadequate on several counts. Firstly, Western Europeans’ concerns with the 
eﬀ ects of the 2004 enlargement should be contrasted with the general satisfac-
tion of the societies of the new member states. Secondly, the impression that 
‘enlargement fatigue’ is an EU-wide phenomenon is counterbalanced by the 
new members’ optimism about the prospects of further expansion. Finally, 
stirring the public interest in the new member states in the transformation and 
integration of the EU’s neighbourhood is essential for the establishment of 
people-to-people contacts across the EU’s external boundary and for bridging 
the divide between the new members and their neighbours.
 is collection of papers is an outcome of a project aiming at mapping and 
debating the attitudes towards enlargement in three newer member states (Czech 
Republic, Poland and Latvia) and in three EU hopefuls (Macedonia, Turkey and 
Ukraine).  e authors – experts from the respective countries – discuss apart 
from general attitudes towards further EU expansion particularly those countries 
that have been relatively less prominent in their respective national debates: 
Ukraine for the Czech Republic, Turkey for Latvia, and the Balkans for Poland. 
 e papers were conceived as discussion papers, aiming at putting new questions, 
issues and stakes on the table concerning given countries, and opening up a wider 
policy debate.  e project was also accompanied by a roadshow – conferences in 
three capitals of the new member states (Riga, Prague and Warsaw) discussing 
these issues.  e volume is also complementary to earlier projects and publica-
tions of the institute, namely to the publication: “Turkey and Ukraine – Wanted or 
Not?”, describing the perceptions of future EU membership aspirations of these 
two countries in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia.
We hope that this publication will stimulate substantive debate on the role 
of the EU newcomers in further enlargement and that it will lead to a better 
acquaintance of the public within the European Union with the debates in respec-
tive candidate or potential candidate countries.
David Král, 
EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy, February 2007
David Král – Ukraine and the EU Membership or Partnership? The Czech Perspective
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UKRAINE AND THE EU 
MEMBERSHIP OR PARTNERSHIP?
THE CZECH PERSPECTIVE
David Král, EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy
Introduction
 e Czech Republic, as well as the other new Member States of the Euro-
pean Union, belongs to the group of EU countries most vigorously supporting 
the future EU enlargement.  e support runs across the political spectrum 
as well as public opinion. According to the last Eurobarometer poll, as much 
as 65 % of the Czech population supports further EU enlargement. Explicit 
anti-enlargement rhetoric cannot be found in the programme of any of the 
parliamentary parties.  e strong support can be explained by relatively fresh 
accession memory, recognising the importance of the EU enlargement policy 
for creating a stable and democratic environment, but also by a genuine belief 
in the need for overcoming post-Cold War divisions in Europe, and the right 
of non-EU countries to stability and prosperity, which has changed the region 
of Central Europe in the last ﬁ  een years beyond recognition.
However, the picture becomes more complex if we look at the individual 
potential candidates. While relatively prosperous Western European coun-
tries (Switzerland, Iceland, Norway) and Croatia enjoy very high support, 
poorer countries of the Western Balkans, Turkey and Ukraine are by far not 
so well oﬀ . 
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 is chapter will look more in detail at how the EU aspirations of one 
important Eastern EU neighbour – Ukraine – are perceived in the Czech 
Republic. It will also try to provide some suggestions as to what factors might 
be a determinant of the Czech position on Ukraine and in what ways the 
Czech Republic is likely to treat Ukraine vis-à-vis its European aspirations.
Czech Attitudes Towards the EU Enlargement 
and Ukraine in Particular 
When exploring the Czech attitudes towards the “European choice” 
of Ukraine, one has to acknowledge that this country does not represent 
a priority in the general discourse on future EU enlargement.  is is despite 
the generally very warm welcome by both the political representation and 
the media of the outcome of the Orange Revolution in December 2004 and 
victory of the pro-European stream in creating the successive government. 
Despite this, the signals sent by the Czech politicians towards the Ukrainian 
political establishment were rather vague, communicating general support for 
the political and economic direction of the country but not making any clear 
signals of support to establish ﬁ rmer links with the EU, such as a roadmap 
to the EU candidacy or the enhancement of relations within the European 
Neighbourhood Policy.
As far as public opinion is concerned, compared to other countries, the 
Czech Republic is not very receptive towards the idea of seeing Ukraine 
as an EU Member State in the foreseeable future.  e latest two public 
opinion polls (Eurobarometer 64.2 and 63.4) even show a drop in support 
for Ukrainian membership in the EU; while at the beginning of 2005 46 % 
of people supported the membership of Ukraine and 45 % opposed it, in 
June 2006 only 40 % wanted Ukraine to join the EU while 49 % opposed 
it.  is trend is in sharp contrast to the public attitudes in most other new 
Member States, notably Poland (65 % in favour, 19 % against), Lithuania 
(67 % in favour, 14 % against) or Slovenia (66 % in favour, 27 % against). 
 us, the Czech public opinion towards Ukraine exhibits a pattern rather 
similar to some old EU Member States than the one identiﬁ ed among most 
of the newcomers (e.g. in Denmark the respective ﬁ gures are 41 % for and 
48 % against, in Belgium 44 % for and 52 % against or in France 38 % for 
and 48 % against).
Providing an explanation for this trend is not easy. Firstly, the support 
for Ukraine to join the EU dropped among the new EU Member States as 
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well, and in some cases it has been even more dramatic than in the Czech 
Republic. For instance in Poland (o en viewed as the primary advocate in 
recognising Ukraine as a future EU candidate), the support decreased by 
11 % between spring and autumn 2005 (while in case of the Czech Republic 
it fell “only” 6 %).  e failing support for the membership of Ukraine might 
probably be explained by a possible mistrust towards future EU enlarge-
ment following the French and Dutch “no” to the Constitutional Treaty or 
diﬃ  cult negotiations over the EU budget. However, it must be underlined 
that this might be part of a more general trend of convergence between 
the public opinion in the EU-15 and EU-10 (in terms of decreasing public 
support for further enlargement) rather than driven by motives speciﬁ c to 
the Ukrainian case. 
As far as the Czech political establishment is concerned, the rather luke-
warm attitude towards Ukraine might partially stem from the highlighted 
internal problems encountered in the EU in 2005 over the unsure fate 
of the Constitutional Treaty and future direction of the EU.  e second 
explanation is that Ukraine is not a top priority in terms of Czech views 
on the enlargement policy.  e Czech diplomacy recognises the structured 
approach to enlargement policy based on previous EU commitments, thus 
pushing for a faster approach vis-à-vis countries with a clear membership 
perspective (Turkey, Western Balkans) and only then dealing with the even-
tual membership of the EU Eastern neighbours (such as Ukraine, Moldova, 
etc.). In balancing the importance of Ukraine as a strategic priority for the 
Czech diplomacy with concerns over the settlement of internal problems of 
the EU, the latter consideration clearly seems to outweigh the former one. 
 e regional politics does not seem to bear much weight either. Despite 
the repeated calls of Poland on other EU Member States, and its Visegrád 
partners in particular, to take the Ukrainian calls for “European choice” 
more seriously, the Czech political class and diplomacy did not seem to 
respond very enthusiastically.  e only noticeable political move in terms 
of recognising the political importance of the Orange Revolution was the 
li ing of fees for Czech visas for Ukrainian citizens as a response to the 
decision of the Ukrainian government in August 2005 to li  the visas for all 
EU citizens. However, this gesture was also more reactive than pro-active. 
Poland and Hungary negotiated asymmetrical visa regimes (not charging 
fees on visas) even before the EU accession, and most of the new Member 
States in the region (such as Slovakia or the Baltic countries) responded 
with the same move. 
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Public Perceptions of the Ukrainians 
and Ukraine in the Czech Society
 e feature that seems to dominate the Czech discourse on Ukraine is that 
of Ukraine as a source of cheap labour, especially in construction, house-
hold and retail sectors. Ukrainians are notorious for migrating to the Czech 
Republic for work, lured by higher salaries, cultural closeness (language 
barriers are not as large due to the common Slavonic roots of the Czechs 
and Ukrainians) and relatively ﬂ exible conditions which make it possible for 
them to undertake jobs as self-employed individuals (although the legality 
of such a status is disputable and the system is known for being abused). 
 e Ukrainian presence in the country is far from negligible; although the 
oﬃ  cial statistics of long-term resident Ukrainians in the Czech Republic 
quote ﬁ gures of around 70,000 (including those who have already acquired 
Czech citizenship, or some repatriated people of Czech origin, such as 
the so-called Volyně Czechs), the unoﬃ  cial estimates might be as high as 
200,000.  is makes the Ukrainians the second largest migrant community 
a er Slovaks who, however, since the split of Czechoslovakia have always 
enjoyed a preferential status compared to other foreigners. 
 e data available on the public attitudes towards Ukrainians does not 
seem to give much ground for optimism. In the March 2005 poll of the 
CVVM centre, the Ukrainians received one of the worst rankings among 
the foreigners surveyed – worse marks were awarded only to Turks, Kurds, 
Afghanis, Iraqis and Palestinians (overall the survey included 24 nation-
alities). Out of the national minorities residing in the Czech Republic, the 
numbers were equally one of the worst, with only nationals of some Balkan 
countries and Romas receiving worse marks.¹ 
 e numerous and still growing Ukrainian community in the Czech 
Republic might potentially play a role in the perception of the Ukrainians 
among the Czechs, but also in the shi  of the Czech policy on Ukraine. 
Examples of other countries show that if the migrant community is well 
organised and eﬀ ective it can have an impact on policy-making processes in 
the host country. It would probably be too ambitious to expect the organisa-
tions representing Ukrainians to have an impact similar to the Israeli lobby 
with the US administration and Congress, as it has incomparable resources 
and building relations with the state institutions takes considerable time. 
1)  This sample included the following nationalities: Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, Germans, Jews, Vietnamese, Russians, Ukrainians, citizens 
of the Balkan countries and the Romas (ranked in decreasing order of popularity).
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However, smaller and less resourceful diasporas can be inﬂ uential even in 
Europe, such as for example the Armenian organisations in diﬀ erent Euro-
pean countries who have with various degrees of success lobbied the countries 
on the issue of opening EU accession negotiations with Turkey (through 
conditioning this process on the recognition of the Armenian genocide by 
Turkey).  us, depending on how well organised and goal-oriented the 
Ukrainian organisations in the Czech Republic are, they can bring the issue 
of the “European choice” of Ukraine more to the public debate. However, 
that would require a shi  from the current focus on assisting the Ukrainian 
fellow citizens with integration in the Czech society or promoting Ukrainian 
culture into more strategic, policy oriented goals. So far, this does not seem 
to be the case. Many of the Ukrainians who come to the Czech Republic do 
so solely for the purpose of improving their own economic situation and that 
of their families back home, without necessarily wanting to acquire Czech 
citizenship and thus being less inclined to intervene in Czech politics. 
 e press coverage of Ukrainians seems to foster a rather negative percep-
tion of this community.  e survey of media reporting on Ukrainians² seems 
to suggest that such coverage is mostly associated with criminality, namely 
murders and robberies. Stories on Ukrainian workers usually also point out 
cases associated with their illegal employment but also with the shortage of 
labour in some regions. It is also worth noting a group of articles which use 
the term “Ukrainian” as a parallel, synonym or idiom. For instance members 
of the ODS party used the reference to practices used in this party as those of 
the “Ukrainian maﬁ a”. Particularly the references to the “Ukrainian maﬁ a” are 
rather widespread, without explaining the meaning of this idiom. Generally, 
the connotations in which the term “Ukrainian” is used are exclusively pejora-
tive. On the contrary, references conveying rather positive attitudes towards 
Ukraine or Ukrainians, such as describing Ukrainian associations and their 
initiatives (such as celebrations of Ukrainian feasts), are fairly rare. 
Reporting on Ukraine as a country has signiﬁ cantly changed during and 
a er the Orange Revolution, with many journalists exhibiting sympathy to 
the changes there or even making parallels with the November 1989 events in 
Prague. However, the coverage of political changes was limited to serious media 
whose impact on the general Czech public opinion remains rather limited.  is 
can explain a still negative prevailing attitude to the Ukrainians and a lack of 
interest in the European future of this country within the Czech society. 
2)  Klvačová, P. and T. Bitrich (2003). “Hard to make out foreigners: How the foreigners are (not) written about in the Czech press.” 
Multikulturní centrum Praha. 
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Czech Activism towards Eastern Europe 
(the Czech “Eastern” Policy)
One could argue that the “Eastern dimension” was not the foremost focus 
of Czech foreign policy, at least since mid-1990s, certainly not compared to 
Poland or even Slovakia. Foreign policy activism focused on the NATO and 
EU accessions as prime foreign policy goals.  e improvement of relations with 
immediate neighbours, especially Germany and Austria, was next on the agenda. 
However, in general, Czech foreign policy was aimed more westward rather than 
eastward in the whole course of the EU and NATO accession processes.
Once a member of these two organisations, it seems that the ﬂ oor for refo-
cusing the Czech policy would be greater. In fact, the Czech Foreign Ministry 
discovered that there could be an added value in having special “Eastern” 
expertise which would enable the country to project Czech interests through 
the EU institutions. However, in this sense one might think that the Czech 
interest in the East emerged too late. Poland has been developing the “Eastern 
agenda” and particularly the Ukrainian agenda consistently throughout the 
1990s, and it has already made an impact at the EU level. Poland negotiated 
the postponement of the introduction of visas for Ukrainians as late as a few 
months prior to the EU accession, which made the impression in Brussels that 
this issue is really important. Polish government was one of the ﬁ rst to provide 
input into the ﬁ rst instruments underpinning the European neighbourhood 
policy. And ﬁ nally Kwaśniewski (together with Adamkus) travelled to Kiev in 
December 2004 to engage on behalf of the EU in negotiating a solution to the 
electoral impasse. 
 e Eastern policy is re-emerging in the Czech foreign policy agenda, but 
Ukraine does not seem to be a key component of it. On the contrary, it could 
be argued that two of Ukraine’s neighbours, namely Russia and Belarus, are 
gaining more attention. Russia is emerging as a new power, as an important 
player in the world energy game and as a strategic partner to Europe in many 
areas (at least in the four common spaces in which it had concluded agreements 
with the EU).  e growing awareness in Europe of this fact seems to be reﬂ ected 
in new initiatives such as the plans of the forthcoming German presidency on 
“anchoring” Russia in Europe.³ Even the Czech diplomacy recognises that the 
incoming German presidency will play a key role in shaping future relations 
between the EU and Russia, not least because a new framework agreement 
between the two will start to be negotiated during this period.  e Czech 
3)  “Germany wants to bind Russia to the EU.” EU Observer, 1 September 2006 [http://euobserver.com/9/22312/?rk=1]
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interest in Russia might further be facilitated by the fact that, unlike for other 
countries in the region (notably Poland⁴ or the Baltic countries), relations with 
Russia are short of contentious issues, underlined by the recent visit of Putin 
to Prague. On the other hand, possible contentious points can still emerge, for 
instance in connection with the US Ministry of Defence proposal to locate part 
of the US anti-missile base (radars) on the Czech territory which has already 
received a very lukewarm reception in Moscow. It can be assumed that the line 
of the current Czech government towards Russia will be somewhat harder, tak-
ing into consideration a strongly pro-US tuning of some members of cabinet, 
especially in case of Alexandr Vondra, the Vice- premier for European issues. 
 e reason for the increasing interest of the Czech Republic in Belarus is 
driven by a diﬀ erent motive, which is related to the Czech perceived expertise 
on supporting transformation know-how.  e Transformation Co-operation 
Unit (TRANS) established in July 2004 focuses on Belarus – along with 
Cuba – as a primary country of interest although recently the scope of focus 
has been extended to include countries such as Ukraine, Moldova or selected 
countries of Western Balkans (Serbia and Bosnia). Also the government has 
approved in March 2006 additional funding for the Czech NGOs co-operating 
with Belarus opposition. Similarly, the Foreign Aﬀ airs Committee of the Senate 
established a special subcommittee focused on Belarus, aiming at expanding 
support for the Belarus dissent. 
 e prevailing position of the Czech Foreign Ministry is that in the current 
state of aﬀ airs it is unrealistic to push for an explicit recognition of the Euro-
pean choice of Ukraine which would most markedly be demonstrated by the 
candidate status, although strategically the Czechs could align with the Poles 
on the issue. One can o en hear from Czech diplomats that the Czechs and 
Poles follow the same aims, only the means diﬀ er.  e key element on which the 
Czech diplomacy is focusing is the negotiation of the new EU-Ukraine agree-
ment a er the expiry of the current Partnership and Co-operation Agreement 
(PCA)⁵, which could come to force around 2008 and the negotiating mandate 
will be brought forward soon. One of the concerns is that as the EU-Ukraine 
agreement will be concluded a er the new agreement with Russia (the PCA with 
Russia expires in 2007), the content of the EU-Russia treaty will be simply be 
copied in the new agreement between the EU and Ukraine. Another concern 
4)  The evidence of very complicated relations between Poland and Russia witnessed at EU level was a recent Polish veto over the 
start of negotiating the new Partnership and Co-operation Agreement between EU and Russia because of allegedly unfounded 
restrictions on the expert of Polish meat to Russia. 
5)  Partnership and Co-operation Agreement,which came in force in 1998 and represents the basic legal framework for the relations 
between Ukraine and the EU. It will expire in 2008. 
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is that perhaps too much eﬀ ort will be devoted to the preamble to the new 
agreement, with the assumption that the Ukrainian representation (as well 
as the Polish one) will focus too much on at least some implicit recognition 
of membership aspirations, and not much attention will be paid to the real 
substance of the new treaty. 
On the other hand, quite a lot of progress can be achieved on the economic 
integration of Ukraine with the EU with the conclusion of a free trade agree-
ment and the creation of a free trade zone. Although the Czech position is still 
not clear, a swi  liberalisation of trade could possibly damage some of the 
Czech producers in areas such as steel or agriculture. Similarly, the accession of 
Ukraine to the WTO is seen as a priority which could supposedly be realistically 
achieved by the end of 2006 and the process could be easier than with Russia 
(as for Russia it will be diﬃ  cult to establish a bilateral trade deal with the US, 
for Ukraine the only contentious countries are Taiwan and Kyrgyzstan where 
the agreement could be found more easily). 
Similar importance is attached to the visa facilitation agreement with Ukraine, 
seen as one of the tangible outcomes of mutual rapprochement between the EU 
and Ukraine. However, the current wording of the agreement (initialled during 
the EU – Ukraine summit in Helsinki in October 2006) will in fact imply a less 
liberal regime applied currently by the new Member States of the EU who do 
not charge fees for visas to any category of applicants.  is possibility will have 
to be li ed with the full integration of the new Member States into the Schen-
gen area (expected to happen on 1 January 2008).  e visa issue continues to 
be of prime importance. Apart from the already mentioned li ing of fees on 
Czech visas for Ukrainian citizens, the Czech Republic decided toopen a new 
consulate-general in Donetsk in Eastern Ukraine.  is – apart from making 
life easier for visa applicants in Eastern Ukraine – illustrates the eﬀ ort of the 
Czech diplomacy to engage in less “traditional” and more pro-Russian regions 
of Ukraine, i.e.generally in the eastern part of the country. 
Ukraine is seen as an important element in the future development of the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy, European Security and Defence Policy 
and energy security in Europe. Especially for the Czech Republic Ukraine 
does matter as a transition country, as most of the supplies of gas from Russia 
run through its territory.  e attitude of Ukraine is also critical vis-à-vis the 
Transnistrian conﬂ ict, especially towards the EU Border Assistance Mission 
launched in this disputed territory. However, less alignment can be seen in 
relation to Belarus, where the Czech Republic is pushing for a harder stance 
towards the Lukashenka regime at the EU level, while Ukraine has so far kept 
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a rather cautious approach. It has not for instance joined the EU-wide travel 
ban on high-ranking representatives of the Lukashenka regime due to economic 
interests in Belarus which could possibly damage the Ukrainian business inter-
ests therein.
 e Czech Foreign Ministry proposed an action plan focusing on areas such 
as energy or the environment, but it was noted that this initiative was met with 
rather lukewarm interest on the part of the Ukrainian political representation. 
However, the situation seems to be improving, and an inter-departmental com-
mission should be established soon to help Ukraine progress on these issues. 
Some expectations can be associated with the Czech presidency of the EU 
in the ﬁ rst half of 2009. It might be that the new agreement with Ukraine will 
be concluded under the Czech presidency, which would give the country some 
additional leverage on inﬂ uencing the outcome of negotiations. Most probably, 
the negotiations will be concluded before 2009. Apart from this, the Czech 
government will have many other important issues on the agenda for its EU 
presidency, such as the EU budget reform, the preparations for the appoint-
ment for the European Parliament elections and for the appointment of the 
new European Commission, and possibly the settlement of the Constitutional 
Treaty (it is probable that another Intergovernmental Conference will proceed 
under the Czech presidency). How much space will be allotted for Ukraine is 
thus a question, and the composition of the government and who is going to 
be in charge of foreign aﬀ airs might be an important factor here. 
Internal Developments in the Czech 
Republic, the EU and in Ukraine Itself 
 ese factors are probably not speciﬁ c to the Czech attitudes towards 
the EU aspirations of Ukraine.  ey reﬂ ect an interconnection between 
the perception of continuing enlargement being complemented by ongo-
ing deepening of the EU. On this issue, the position of the Czech political 
representation is not clear. It is likely that a lot will depend on the current 
constellation of the Czech government. While the centre-le  government 
might see the deepening, mostly manifested by resolving the EU consti-
tutional crisis, as a necessary precondition for opening any EU accession 
prospects for the countries who do not currently enjoy a candidate status, 
the centre-right government might be willing to proceed with enlargement 
even if the constitutional issue is le  unsettled.  e current climate in the 
EU, however, is not very favourable – demonstrated recently by statements 
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of Jose Manuel Barroso, president of the European Commission (which has 
always been perceived as a defender of EU enlargement) proposing to halt 
further enlargement promises until the constitutional issue is settled. 
Secondly, the internal developments in Ukraine will play a crucial role, too. 
 e rather lukewarm reaction to the Orange Revolution compared to Poland 
as well as the outcome of the 2006 parliamentary elections reﬂ ect the lack of 
conviction that Ukraine has made a ﬁ nal choice. Ukraine is still very much 
perceived and portrayed as a country with deep internal divisions regarding 
its foreign policy orientation (e.g. having an “orange” west and “blue” east), 
with a strong inﬂ uence of the Kremlin and a buﬀ er zone between the EU and 
Russia.⁶ With the post-election situation with the Orange camp disintegrat-
ing and the deal between the two originally rival camps, that of Yushchenko 
and Yanukovych re-emerging, the enthusiasm for supporting Ukraine on 
its way to the EU might grow even stronger.⁷ Recent developments show 
that Yanukovych as the new prime minister might be interested in keeping 
a balanced relationship with both Moscow and Brussels and to reach some 
tangible deals with the EU such as an enhanced free trade agreement⁸ rather 
than pushing for an explicit recognition of candidate aspirations. However, 
the reaction in the Czech press to the outcome of the elections did not mark 
such negative reactions and the fact that Yanukovych was given a chance to 
form a government is actually perceived as a sign of the growing maturity 
of the young Ukrainian democracy.⁹ From the Czech perspective, however, 
it seems that Yanukovych will be forging the relations with the EU while 
his enthusiasm for Ukraine integrating more closely with NATO is seen as 
potentially posing more problems for its relations with Moscow.  is attitude 
seems to be conﬁ rmed by some recent gestures of Yanukovych. We can recall 
a harsh criticism of foreign minister Boris Tarasyuk who in January 2007 on 
the oﬃ  cial visit in Prague defended pro-European choice of Ukraine, stating 
that Ukraine should be integrated to both EU and NATO as soon as possi-
ble¹⁰. Yanukovych not only disputed legitimacy and legality of the whole visit 
(which was allegedly not approved by him) but he even blamed Tarasyuk for 
damaging the interests of Ukraine and threatened with prosecuting him. 
6)  See e.g.Robejšek, P., Ukrajina za hranicí nové Evropy (Ukraine beyond New Europe´s Boundaries), Tyden, 3 March 2006. 
[http://www.tyden.cz/text.asp?rid=8&show=text&tid=20371]
7)  Ibid
8)  Beatty, A.. “Yanukovych touts trade deal with the EU.” European Voice, Vol. 12 No. 33, September 2006.
9)  See e.g. Černý, A. “The Ukraine Has Changed.” Hospodářské noviny, 4 August 2006
10)  http://aktualne.centrum.cz/zahranici/evropa/clanek.phtml?id=332312
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Conclusions: What Might Change the Czech 
Perception of Ukraine and Make It More 
Supportive of EU Membership Aspirations?
To conclude, it is clear that the reasons why the Czech Republic could 
become more enthusiastic about supporting Ukraine on its road to the EU lie 
with the developments in the EU, in the Czech Republic and in Ukraine.
At the EU level, the basic pre-condition is overcoming what is at least 
perceived to be the major crisis, following the rejection of the Constitutional 
Treaty by two founding members. Unfortunately, the Czech Republic, also 
given quite turbulent developments internally, has almost forgotten the issue 
which was deﬁ nitely not a priority in the last year.¹¹  e political represen-
tation will have to formulate a position and discuss and suggest possible 
scenarios for solving the current deadlock, which will ultimately become 
a necessary pre-condition for continuing enlargement that seems to be so 
much supported by the political establishment. 
 e government which won the vote of conﬁ dence in January 2007 
will most probably develop a pro-active eastern policy including relations 
with Ukraine, especially through transformation co-operation which now 
focuses on Ukraine as one of the priority areas and maybe will even make 
this area on of the priorities for the Czech presidency of the EU in 2009. 
But a big question mark hangs over the fragile stability and opaque future 
of this government. 
Further on part of the Czech Republic, several additional factors will play 
a role. Firstly, the “Eastern” agenda of the Czech foreign policy is coming to 
the fore again. However, it is not clear whether it can rather act as a catalyst 
or an inhibitor of a more supportive and active Czech policy vis-à-vis Ukraine. 
 e complicated triangular relations between Russia, the EU and Ukraine 
might make the Czech Republic oscillate between the three parties, keeping 
the fragile balance rather than deciding on a confrontation. 
 e gradual emancipation of the Ukrainian community in the Czech 
Republic might mark some shi s in the Czech positions, too. So far, the 
image is predominantly negative, associated with crime (including organ-
ised crime) or illegal employment. Changing this negative stereotype can 
be precipitated by, for example, having a success story such as a Ukrainian 
immigrant achieving a high Czech political position or occupying one of 
the top positions in the Czech business. A more robust programme for the 
11)  The Czech Republic did not ratify the Constitutional Treaty and did not even set terms for the ratification. 
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integration of the largely illegal Ukrainian labour migrants could make 
a diﬀ erence as well. It will send a signal that the Czech Republic needs 
labour migration and is able to create a framework for its regulation, as 
well as for the integration of the Ukrainian migrant community.  is idea 
is already shared by some parts of public administration and politicians, 
demonstrated by the inclusion of Ukraine in the programme of managed 
labour migration by the Ministry of Labour and Social Aﬀ airs. Furthermore, 
the Ukrainian migrant community needs to become more self-conscious. 
Once it shi s from focusing on merely helping the Ukrainian expatriates 
to handle the formalities regarding their residence and labour paperwork 
or from promoting Ukrainian culture to more politically articulated stances, 
the Czech political representation and media will start to take it more seri-
ously. So far, however, it seems that the Ukrainian organisations do not 
have such ambitions. 
Business can have an impact on the Czech policy towards Ukraine, once 
Czech investment in and trade with Ukraine start to grow.  e growth of 
trade has been immense since the Czech Republic’s accession to the EU, 
growing by 50.6 % in 2005 and by as much as 80.9 % in the ﬁ rst half of 
2006,¹² and the rapidly developing Ukrainian economy has a huge poten-
tial for attracting the Czech exporters in traditionally strong areas such as 
machinery, engineering, cars, etc. Also investment is starting to attract more 
attention of Czech companies, such as the PPT group investing between 
45 to 60 million USD into the Ukrainian banking sector. Other potentially 
big investors such as CEZ (which is already making acquisitions in some 
Western Balkan countries) or Skoda might follow this example.  e busi-
nesses will have an interest in a more transparent regulatory environment, 
a more liberal trade regime, clearer rules of public procurement, etc.  e 
best way of doing this is through closer links with the EU, so the businesses 
can actually become one of the main supporters of closer links between 
Ukraine and the EU. 
One must be aware of potential dangers of this trend though. For instance 
recent proposal of the European Comission to force the car producers to 
cut down the carbon dioxide emissions was immediately interpreted by the 
Czech media as eventually leading to moving the car productions from the 
Czech Republic to the East (explicitly mentioning Ukraine) because of the 
savings incurred. Although this was an isolated statement so far, it must be 
12)  Available at: http://www.businessinfo.cz/cz/clanky/ukrajina-souhrnne-informace/obchodni-a-ekonomicka-spoluprace-s-
cr/1001236/24747/
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borne in mind that in the future even in Central Europe we can face some 
tricky debates about delocalisation and moving the production to the East 
where the cheap labour is which we recently witnessed in the EU-15.
Tourism can be an important incentive for raising the interest of the 
Czechs in Ukraine and eliminating some of the stereotypes currently present 
in the Czech milieu. Ukraine is not the most typical tourist destination, 
however, in terms of number of trips of people visiting this country it ranks 
quite high – in the 16tʰ place in terms of number of trips undertaken by 
Czechs in 2005.¹³  e statistics available do not reveal how many people 
actually visit Ukraine for leisure and how many for business. However, it 
can be assumed that a more pro-active promotion of Ukraine as an interest-
ing tourist destination could lead to a better acquaintance of the Czechs 
with Ukraine.  is results in a more positive perception of it as a “European” 
country.  is is, however, a task for the Ukrainian government and tourism 
promotion services. 
Given the current state of aﬀ airs in the EU, the Czech Republic and 
Ukraine, it cannot be realistically expected that the Czech Republic will 
become a strong advocate for recognizing Ukraine as a candidate for EU 
membership.  e Czech Republic will rather try to foster relations between 
the two entities through closer economic integration, such as supporting 
Ukraine’s accession to the WTO or forging an enhanced agreement with the 
EU, leading to a gradual establishment of a free trade zone between them. 
Although strategically it is important for the Czech Republic that Ukraine 
makes a ‘European’ rather than ‘Russian choice’, the Czech political repre-
sentation as well as diplomacy does not feel strong enough to inﬂ uence this 
decision. Moreover, the internal political situation in the Czech Republic is 
unstable and problematic following the outcome of the 2006 parliamentary 
elections. Without a strong political mandate, the Czech policy on Ukraine 
is not likely to move forward.  irdly, the same would apply to the internal 
political situation in Ukraine itself. While Yushchenko a er he took the 
presidential oﬃ  ce at the beginning of 2005 sent strong signals to the West 
that it is the primary intention of his new government to foster the pro-EU 
orientation of his country, the Yanukovych government, which emerged in 
2006, is likely to take a more cautious course, paying attention to a balanced 
relationship with both Brussels and Moscow.
13)  Available at: http://www.mmr.cz/upload/files/cestovni_ruch/060714_cr_v_cr_aktualizace.doc
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TURKISH EU MEMBERSHIP 
FROM LATVIA’S PERSPECTIVE:
WHY SHOULD WE CARE?
Dace Akule, PROVIDUS
Introduction
EU enlargement is not a topic that has caused heated discussion in Latvia. 
Moreover, similarly to the ‘big European questions’ on where the borders 
of the EU are, or what ambitions the EU should have both in regard to its 
internal performance but also to the EU’s global role, debates on further 
enlargement of the EU are almost non-existent. For example, a former 
minister has said that he cannot recall “a single discussion in the Cabinet of 
Ministers or the parliament” on Turkish EU membership bid during Novem-
ber 2002-December 2004.¹
 is could be partly explained by the assumption that Latvia as a small 
country is likely to have a minor inﬂ uence on these ‘big European questions’ 
within the EU. In addition, as a new member state, Latvia knows very well 
what an eﬀ ect EU membership can have on the development of a country. 
 us, the logic of further EU enlargement is not questioned. 
Hence Latvia supports further expansion of the European block and, 
according to oﬃ  cial statements, there seems to be no diﬀ erentiation placed 
on the potential candidates, i.e. whether Latvia supports speedy accession of 
1)  “Latvia’s Interests and Fears Regarding Turkey’s Accession to the European Union”, Ph.D. Nils Muižnieks, speech at the conference 
“Turkey in the European Union: What Does Latvia Have to Say?” organized by Baltic Forum, the European Commission Delegation 
to Latvia, and the European Parliament Information office, in Riga, Latvia, 28 April, 2006
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the Balkan countries before Turkey. Also the public opinion in Latvia – like 
in other new member states – is more favourable of further EU enlargement 
than in the EU-15. According to Eurobarometer data, 62 % of Latvians sup-
port further expansion of the EU while only 26 % are against it.²
But when it comes to possible Turkish accession, oﬃ  cial statements, politi-
cal party programs, media coverage as well as public opinion reveals that it 
is not perceived unambiguously. Turkey is the only candidate country whose 
EU integration has caused some, albeit limited, discussion. 
 e most common issues raised about Turkish EU accession in Latvia are 
the loss of EU structural funds (for EU-10) that would have to be spent in 
Turkey, in addition to the overall economic burden of Turkey’s membership 
for the EU, the immigration potential, the ‘otherness’ of Turks, and human 
rights violations in Turkey.  e need to change the EU’s common policies 
and institutional set-up is also mentioned. Summing this up, one could easily 
come to the conclusion that Turkish EU accession is not favoured in Latvia, 
or that at the moment Latvians see little justiﬁ cation for Turkish EU integra-
tion. To investigate these perceptions this paper examines the arguments that 
are used, and should be used, in the debates on how Turkish EU accession is 
considered from the perspective of the EU, and Latvia in particular.
Arguments in favour of Turkish EU 
membership from Latvia’s perspective
EU as a global actor
 ose in favour of Turkish EU accession point to Turkey’s role in increas-
ing the signiﬁ cance of the EU as a global actor.  ey say that Turkey could 
serve as a bridge to the Islamic world and be a very useful partner to help 
the EU achieve its foreign policy ambitions. 
Turkish EU accession supporters also point out that the evolution has le  
Turkey quite closely aligned with EU policies, and that Turkey has taken part 
in every EU-led military operation, except for the mission in the Republic 
of Congo. Plus, the recent decision to deploy troops in Lebanon proves that 
Turkey wants to be and has the means to be a regional player, a mediator 
and a contributor to the European response³ thus increasing the space for 
stability in the world. 
2)  Eurobarometer 64, Autumn 2005
3)  Boland, V., “Turkey claims Mideast peacekeeper role”, Financial Times, 6 September, 2006
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 e same argument can be heard in Latvia. It is believed that due to the 
size of the Turkish population, its territory, geographic location, and its 
economic, security and military potential, as well as culture and religion, 
“Turkey can signiﬁ cantly contribute in enhancing regional and international 
stability”.⁴ By having Turkey in the EU, the European block would be able 
to “secure its inﬂ uence and spread its values to regions that traditionally have 
been considered unstable, including the Middle East and the Caucasus” so 
that stability, peace, democracy and functioning market economies spread 
to these regions, as well.⁵
It is also believed that Turkish EU accession would give “Latvia and the 
EU an Islamic ally at a time when hatred against the USA and a mistrust of 
Europe dominates in Islamic countries.”⁶
Moreover, Latvian Foreign aﬀ airs minister Artis Pabriks has explicitly 
said that not admitting Turkey into the EU is not in Latvia‘s interests. “We 
have to have close relations with Turkey (…) If we don‘t, the EU’s inter-
national role will decrease, there will be less security around EU’s borders 
which will result in a negative inﬂ uence for relations with countries like 
Ukraine and Moldova. Turkey will be like a litmus test for EU policy in 
these countries”.⁷ 
However, Latvian member of the European Parliament (MEP) Inese 
Vaidere disagrees and argues in favour of a special Turkish-EU partnership. 
She admits that enhancing stability at EU borders is a “suﬃ  cient reason for 
ﬁ nding a golden middle way [compromise] in relations with Turkey”. How-
ever, she stressed that Turkey’s EU membership and the possible strengthen-
ing of the EU’s role in the world has an indirect beneﬁ t for Latvia. Moreover, 
because the “risks from Turkish EU membership are large and beneﬁ ts for 
the EU and especially for Latvia are mediated” Turkish EU accession should 
be replaced by a special partnership.⁸ 
Vaidere echoes the argumentation of the critics of Turkish EU integration 
who point out that Turkey could bring instability into the EU because it 
borders with Iraq, Iran, Syria, Georgia and Armenia. 
4)  “Turcija un Eiropas Savienība: izaicinājumi un iespējas” (Turkey and the EU: challenges and opportunities), the speech of Einārs 
Sēmanis, deputy state secretary in Latvian Foreign Affairs ministry at the conference “Towards United States of Europe: Future 
Challenges and potential Solutions” at the University of Latvia, 8-9 December, 2004
5)  Ibid.
6)  Timofejevs, P., “Turcija Eiropas Savienībā” (Turkey in the EU), DELFI, 9 October 2005, [http://www.delfi.lv]
7)  “Ārpolitika pēc saprāta un satversmes principiem” (A foreign policy according to common sense and constitution), interview with 
Artis Pabriks, Public policy portal Politika.lv, 19 July, 2005, [http://www.politika.lv/index.php?id=7942] 
8)  “Turcija – lielākā ES dalībvalsts?” (Turkey – biggest EU member state?), Inese Vaidere, Diena, 15 December, 2004
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It has to be noted here that EU’s common foreign and security policy 
(CFSP) is still decided in unanimity, but internal divisions – in particular 
relations between Cyprus and Turkey – cast a shadow of a doubt on whether 
unanimity on CFSP issues can be achieved if Turkey joins the EU.
Turkey and EU’s defence capacity 
Latvia – as a new NATO member state and an ally of the US – believes 
that Turkish EU membership would beneﬁ t not only European defence 
capacity but would also strengthen Latvia’s position on the future shape of 
the European security and defence policy (ESDP).  is is an argument that 
is speciﬁ c to the new EU member states of Central and Eastern Europe, but 
it does not come up in European debates that o en. 
As to the ﬁ rst part of the argument, the supporters of Turkish EU mem-
bership stress that Turkey has been a NATO member since 1952. Turkey’s 
army is the second largest army in NATO a er the army of the United States 
of America.⁹ In the long run, the size and quality of Turkey’s armed forces 
could be a considerable plus for Europe’s defence policy.  is is why some 
experts have said that, “when it comes to security policy, Turks believe that 
the EU needs them more than they need the EU”¹⁰. 
Latvia also attaches great importance to Turkish support in NATO regard-
ing the protection of Latvia’s air space as Turkish planes have been patrolling 
the air space over the Baltic States.¹¹
As to the second part of the argument, Latvia has a strong interest in con-
tinued EU-NATO cooperation, not in seeing the development of ESDP as 
somehow weakening NATO and transatlantic ties. Turkish EU membership 
is perceived as strengthening the cooperation between the EU and NATO 
while maintaining a strong transatlantic lobby within the EU.
 us, the 2006–2011 strategy for Latvian foreign aﬀ airs explicitly says 
that Latvia supports the strengthening of the military capacity of European 
countries and the EU, “based on the consideration that the ESDP is not 
an alternative to NATO, the ESDP’s role has to develop in harmony with 
transatlantic relations, avoiding duplication and securing a close cooperation 
9)  Turkey has approximately 800 thousand personnel in its armed forces. Source: BBC
10)  “The economics of Turkish accession”, Katinka Barysch, in “Why Europe should embrace Turkey”, Katinka Barysch, Steven Everts, 
Heather Grabbe, Centre for European Reform, September, 2005, pp.28
11)  “Latvia’s Interests and Fears Regarding Turkey’s Accession to the European Union”, Ph.D. Nils Muižnieks, speech at the conference 
“Turkey in the European Union: What Does Latvia Have to Say?” in Riga, Latvia, 28 April, 2006
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between the EU and NATO”.¹²  e document also states that Latvia and 
Turkey cooperate within NATO and have “common foreign policy interests 
in enhancing European security and stability”.¹³ Strengthening the ESDP and 
EU-NATO ties is something that Latvia “as a small country strongly stands 
for because we are not interested in a useless use of resources and we want 
both organizations to complement each other.”¹⁴
In addition to the above-mentioned arguments, some believe that having 
Turkey in the EU would diminish security risks coming from some Islamic 
countries.  is is why, according to some experts, security reasons are the 
main argument behind Latvia’s support for Turkish EU membership, i.e. it 
would give the EU a possibility for a dialogue with the Islamic world. But 
if accession negotiations with Turkey were not to start and Turkey were 
“marginalized, the question of Turkey becoming closer to Islamic block [of 
countries] would arise again” implying larger security threats to the EU.¹⁵ 
Turkey as energy security provider 
Finding energy alternatives to minimize dependency from Russia became 
a popular argument in the EU a er the energy crisis in January 2006, as 
approximately 30 % of natural gas used in the EU is imported from Russia.¹⁶ 
In addition to that, the Russian oil dispute with Belarus of January 2007 fur-
ther strengthens the perception of Russia as an unreliable energy provider. 
In this context Turkey is seen as a possible energy corridor between the 
East and the West because Turkey is situated right next to the regions that 
produce and hold huge reserves of oil and natural gas. Experts say that there 
are several conditions that have to be fulﬁ lled before Turkey can become the 
major transit country of energy that it could be.¹⁷ However, experts agree that 
Turkey has a large potential to help Europe to secure its energy imports. 
12)  “Latvijas ārpolitikas pamatnostādnes 2006-2010.gadam (Informatīvā daļa)”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005 http://www.mfa.
gov.lv/lv/Arpolitika/pamatnostadnes/ last accessed in December, 2006, pp. 11
13)  Latvia’s Foreign Ministry statement on Turkish-Latvian relations, ministry’s website http://www.mfa.gov.lv/lv/Arpolitika/divpusejas-
attiecibas/Turcija/ last accessed in December, 2006
14)  “Turcija un Eiropas Savienība: izaicinājumi un iespējas” (Turkey and the EU: challenges and opportunities), Einārs Sēmanis, in 
a speech at the conference “Towards United States of Europe: Future Challenges and potential Solutions” at the University of 
Latvia, 8-9 December, 2004 
15)  Quoting Peteris Ustubs, the foreign affairs advisor to Latvian prime minister, in “Turcijas uzņemšana apdraudēšot ES identitāti” 
(Turkish accession would endanger EU’s identity), Agnese Margēviča, Neatkarīgā Rīta Avīze, 3 October, 2005
16)  See, e.g. “Turkey opens pipeline to skirt Russia”, Reuters, 16 July, 2006
17)  See, e.g. “Consequences of Turkish membership for the EU and its neighbourhood”, Keman Kirisçi, at the conference “What next for Europe?” 
in Helsinki, 13 June, 2006, http://www.upi-fiia.fi/fin/tilaisuudet/tepsa/prof_kemal_kirisi/# last accessed in December, 2006
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 is is a widely used argument in Latvia not only because of the energy 
crisis of January 2006 but also because, due to historical reasons, a part of 
Latvia’s population is very sensitive to being dependent on Russia. Yet, Latvia 
is the most dependent on Russian energy out of the three Baltic States.¹⁸  is 
is why Ankara is o en mentioned as a way to escape that dependency from 
Moscow. For example, an article in one of the biggest Latvian dailies stressed 
that the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline “today is the only artery independent from 
Russia for transporting oil” and, according to the article, “Turkey would 
guarantee energy reserves for Europe from Central Asia if new projects for 
pipelines were implemented.”¹⁹
Turkey’s potential as an energy transit country is highly valued, with the 
need for energy security and the diversiﬁ cation of energy resources being 
mentioned even in Latvia’s foreign aﬀ airs strategies.²⁰  e Latvian prime 
minister has also explicitly said that the Turkish EU membership could 
provide energy security.²¹ 
Turkey as a possibility for EU’s economic growth 
Turkey’s economic potential is another argument o en used by those in favour 
of Turkish EU membership.  e International Monetary Fund rated the Turk-
ish economy as the 17tʰ largest in the world in 2006.²² Turkish foreign trade has 
grown and hyperinﬂ ation has been brought under control. Moreover, according 
to UN data, there were over 73 million people living in Turkey in 2005.²³  is 
means that by the time of EU accession Turkey would be larger than any other 
EU member state with a large and fast growing consumer market. 
Argumentation that Turkey is not developed enough to join the EU does 
not sound fair when one compares Turkey’s economic performance with the 
data from the new EU member states 10 years before they joined.²⁴ Turkey 
also has a strategic location for economic relations.
18)  Latvia is the only Baltic country that depends on energy imports. Up to 50 % of power consumed in Latvia comes from Lithuania, 
Estonia and Russia. Source: Latvia’s Ministry of Economy
19)  “Par ko vēl jārunā Turcijas sakarā” (What else should be talk about in the case of Turkey), Modris Ziemiņš, Latvijas Avīze, 14 October, 2005
20)  “Latvijas ārpolitikas pamatnostādnes 2006-2010.gadam (Informatīvā daļa)”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005 http://www.mfa.
gov.lv/lv/Arpolitika/pamatnostadnes/ last accessed in December, 2006
21)  “Premjers: Turcijas uzņemšana varētu nodrošināt enerģētisko drošību”, LETA, 4 October,2005
22)  Word Economic and Financial Surveys, World Economic Outlook Database, International Monetary Fund, April, 2006
23)  World Statistics Pocketbook 2005, United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Statistics in Brief (Ser. V), 
No.30, September, 2006
24)  In 2004 Turkish per capita income was less than 30 % of the EU-15 average. Poland’s per capita income in 1994 (10 years before 
accession) stood at 35 % of EU average. 
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But experts stress that Turkey’s economy currently is divided into two 
parts – a hugely ineﬃ  cient agricultural sector, and a highly modern and com-
petitive manufacturing and services sector.²⁵ In addition to that, Turkey already 
has had a customs union agreement with the EU since 1995, which is why “with 
respect to trade in goods, Turkey is almost a part of the Single Market already”.²⁶ 
 erefore, experts say that the direct impact of Turkish EU membership to other 
EU members could be small. Yet, an open market in services would mean that 
EU companies could buy Turkish businesses, for example, banks, transport, 
telecom or energy companies, thus increasing competition, lowering prices, 
boosting eﬃ  ciency, bringing beneﬁ ts to businesses and consumers, translating 
into a large beneﬁ t from Turkish EU membership to the whole EU.²⁷ 
However, this argument is not o en used in Latvia. On the contrary, local 
politicians say that from an economic perspective “Latvia has nothing to fear” 
from Turkish EU accession, because Turkey and the EU already have a free 
trade agreement and a customs union.²⁸ In fact, with the current trade agree-
ment Latvia has a negative trade balance with Turkey of around 22 million 
Euros. Turkey is only the 58tʰ largest export partner for Latvia – only 0,04 % 
of all products exported from Latvia go to Turkey.²⁹  us, economic relations 
between Latvia and Turkey are not very active and it seems that Latvian oﬃ  cials 
and businessmen don’t see Turkish EU accession as a possibility for Latvian 
companies to invest and start their businesses there. 
What is more worrying for Latvia – in economic and ﬁ nancial terms – is the fact 
that Turkey would receive a large proportion of EU structural funds, which – as 
a result – other EU members, notably Latvia, would lose.³⁰ For example, Latvian 
MEP Roberts Zile has said that Turkish EU membership would not inﬂ uence 
Latvia’s national interests in the EU but Latvia could expect less ﬁ nancial assist-
ance from EU structural funds as soon as Turkey joins the European block.³¹ 
25)  Turkey’s agricultural sector employs one third of the total labour force but generates only 12 % of GDP. Source: “The economics 
of Turkish accession”, Katinka Barysch, in “Why Europe should embrace Turkey”, Katinka Barysch, Steven Everts, Heather Grabbe, 
Centre for European Reform, September, 2005
26)  “The future of Turkish-EU Trade Relations: Deepening vs Widening”, Sinan Ülgen and Yiannis Zahariadis, CEPS EU-Turkey Working 
papers No.5, August, 2004
27)  “The economics of Turkish accession”, Katinka Barysch, in “Why Europe should embrace Turkey”, Katinka Barysch, Steven Everts, 
Heather Grabbe, Centre for European Reform, September, 2005
28)  Peteris Ustubs, the foreign affairs advisor to Latvian prime minister, in “Turcijas uzņemšana apdraudēšot ES identitāti” (Turkish 
accession would endanger EU’s identity), Agnese Margēviča, Neatkarīgā Rīta Avīze, 3 October, 2005
29)  Ministry of Foreign Affairs http://www.mfa.gov.lv/lv/Arpolitika/divpusejas-attiecibas/Turcija/, last accessed in December 2006
30)  According to International Monetary Fund estimates, in 2006 Latvia will lose the status of the poorest EU member state to Poland 
(comparing GDP per capita). Yet, Latvia still remains one of the poorest in the EU. Source: LETA, 18 September, 2006
31)  “Latvijas eiroparlamentārieši atbalsta ES priviliģēto sadarbību ar Turciju” (Latvian MEPs support a privileged cooperation between 
the EU and Turkey), BNS, 15 December, 2004
30
Bulgaria, Romania... and who next?
 e same argument goes for the application of the EU’s common agriculture 
policy in Turkey. On this Latvian oﬃ  cials have said that budgetary questions 
will be agreed on by all EU member states, including Latvia, and that, “Turkey 
will receive the ﬁ nancial support that EU budget will be able to give”.³²
Turkish immigration potential to Europe
Contrary to the demographic trends of Europe where the working age 
population and the population as a whole is shrinking and will continue 
to do so, Turkey is experiencing a completely diﬀ erent demographic trend. 
In the EU-25, according to estimates from the EU’s Economic Policy 
Committee, the population is projected to rise from 457 million in 2004 
to a peak of 470 million in 2025, and therea er decline to 454 million in 
2050, due to low fertility rates and longer life expectancy.  is reduction 
in the proportion of the working-age population is a threat to Europe’s 
standard of living. 
On the other hand Turkey, according to UN estimates, will soon have over 
80 million inhabitants and shows no sign of shrinking. Turkey’s population is 
growing at approximately 1,5 % a year.³³  at means that the economy needs 
to create 500,000–800,000 new jobs every year just to keep unemployment 
at its current level.³⁴ 
 is is something that many EU countries look at with concern, i.e. the 
push factors of Turkey’s immigration potential. In addition to the fast grow-
ing population, one has to remember that if the Turkish agriculture sector 
were modernized, it would leave a large number of workers unemployed. 
Experts also point out that two-thirds of the Turkish population has only 
a basic education, or none at all, that less than one-quarter of Turks have 
completed secondary education, and that less than 10 % have a university 
degree.³⁵  is means that Turkey has a large pool of low skilled workers that 
might want to look for better prospects in European countries. 
32)  “Turcija un Eiropas Savienība: izaicinājumi un iespējas” (Turkey and the EU: challenges and opportunities), Einārs Sēmanis, in 
a speech at the conference “Towards United States of Europe: Future Challenges and potential Solutions” at the University of 
Latvia, 8-9 December, 2004 
33)  World Statistics Pocketbook 2005, United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Statistics in Brief (Ser. V), 
No.30, September, 2006
34)  “The economics of Turkish accession”, Katinka Barysch, in “Why Europe should embrace Turkey”, Katinka Barysch, Steven Everts, 
Heather Grabbe, Centre for European Reform, September, 2005, pp.35
35)  Ibid., pp. 37
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According to the highest estimates, 4,4 million people might emigrate 
from Turkey – if there were no limits to the free movement of labour – and 
that accounts for 0,7 % of the EU-28 population of more than 570 million.³⁶ 
 is would mean that the number of Turks already living in the EU would 
at least double.³⁷
 ose in favour of Turkish EU membership see this as a positive challenge. 
 ey stress the beneﬁ ts of labour migration and how it could help alleviate 
the problems of Europe’s shrinking working age population.  e danger 
of having a crisis of pension systems and slowing growth is a reality which 
Turkey‘s growing population could help the EU to solve, while at the same 
time alleviating some future labour market shortages.³⁸
At the present time the immigration potential from Turkey is not seen as 
a beneﬁ t in Latvia but rather a large disadvantage from Turkish EU acces-
sion. Stories of the unsuccessful integration of Turks, mainly in Austria and 
Germany, deﬁ nitely have contributed to the cautious attitudes in Latvia, 
although they are not the main reason for Latvia’s concern. One has to 
understand that attitudes towards potential immigrants in general (not just 
from Turkey) are very negative due to the Soviet immigration policies.³⁹ 
In addition, “an incident in the mid-1990s when Kurdish asylum-seekers 
arrived in Latvia le  a lasting imprint on the Latvian psyche, and Kurds 
have to a certain extent become symbols of potential refugees”⁴⁰. As a result, 
around 40 % of Latvians say that they should not be allowed to live in the 
country, while 45 % would permit Kurds and Muslims in general to enter 
Latvia only as tourists.⁴¹
36)  EU-25 plus Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia. Source: “Economic aspects of Turkey’s quest for EU membership”, Daniel Gros, CEPS 
policy brief No 69, April, 2005
37)  There are already around 3 million Turkish residents in the EU, almost 80 % of whom live in Germany and most of the rest in France, 
Austria, the Netherlands and Belgium.
38)  “The economics of Turkish accession”, Katinka Barysch, in “Why Europe should embrace Turkey”, Katinka Barysch, Steven Everts, 
Heather Grabbe, Centre for European Reform, September, 2005, pp.40
39)  The USSR moved workers – mainly Russians – to the peripheral areas of the Union, like the Baltic countries to work there and 
Russianize the local populations. As a result, today approximately 35 % of Latvia’s population is Russian. 
40)  “Latvia’s Interests and Fears Regarding Turkey’s Accession to the European Union”, Ph.D. Nils Muižnieks, speech at the conference 
“Turkey in the European Union: What Does Latvia Have to Say?” in Riga, Latvia, 28 April, 2006
41)  “Etniskā tolerance un Latvijas sabiedrības integrācija” (Ethnic tolerance and integration of Latvian society), Inese Šūpule, Līga 
Krastiņa, Inguna Peņķe, Jolanta Krišāne, Brigita Zepa, Baltijas Sociālo Zinātņu Institūts, 2004
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It should come as no surprise then that immigration is a taboo for main-
stream politicians.⁴² But that does not mean that discussions on these topics 
are non-existent. An article in one of the biggest newspapers in Latvia in 
2004 implied that the potential of Turkish immigration to Latvia is very small. 
“ ose who frighten Latvia with the Turkish invasion of our country a er their 
possible EU membership should be reminded of one historical fact. A er 
the Russian-Turkish war in 1878 around 40,000 Turkish soldiers ended up 
in Russian captivity and more than 100 of them were sent to Cesis [Latvian 
city]. Not being able to get used to the raw Baltic climate, they started to 
get ill and many soon died.”⁴³ 
But Latvian MEP Inese Vaidere believes that the poverty in Turkey will 
push Turks to look for better life prospects, including in Latvia. “ ey will 
come even to the poorest country of the EU,” Vaidere believes, adding that 
even Latvia’s cold winters would not be an obstacle.⁴⁴
 is opinion is echoed in a publication by the weekly magazine “Nedēļa” 
that has interviewed the head of the Asian study program at the University 
of Latvia, Leon Gabriel Taivan. He says that Muslim immigrants would ﬂ ood 
Europe in 50, 100 years because right now the dominating force in Europe 
is a “suicidal attitude to give in” to Islam. He alleges that Turks will ﬁ ght for 
no limits to the free movement of labour and as a result Turks would come 
to Latvia because “nature does not accept emptiness and Latvia is a very 
empty land”.⁴⁵
Latvian oﬃ  cials in the meantime stress that most likely there would be 
a transition period for the freedom of labour agreed with Turkey. “In addition 
to that, the Commission’s recommendations also include a clause that every 
member state can limit the free movement of labour every time job seekers 
from Turkey seriously endanger the labour market of that EU country.”⁴⁶
42)  Some years ago Turks and Kurds were often mentioned in the campaigns of extreme left and extreme right activists. For example, 
Alfreds Rubiks (a former Communist Party leader and still active in politics) in an interview to Dienas Bizness in 2002 said that 
the EU sees Latvia’s poorest Eastern region Latgale as a convenient place for Kurds and Turks to live. In addition, a right-wing 
anti-EU non-governmental organization Klubs 415 in its website until 2004 said that they had not “the slightest desire to see the 
development of regions [in Latvia] inhabited by Turks and Kurds.” Source: “Latvia’s Interests and Fears Regarding Turkey’s Accession 
to the European Union”, Ph.D. Nils Muižnieks, speech at the conference “Turkey in the European Union: What Does Latvia Have to 
Say?” in Riga, Latvia, 28 April, 2006
43)  “Turcija – par vai pret?” (Turkey – in favour or against?), Modris Ziemiņš, Latvijas Avīze, 2 December, 2004
44)  In an interview with PROVIDUS in July, 2006
45)  “Mēs, eiropieši, esam pašnāvnieki”, Sallija Benfelde, Nedēļa, 26 September, 2005
46)  “Turcija un Eiropas Savienība: izaicinājumi un iespējas” (Turkey and the EU: challenges and opportunities), Einārs Sēmanis, in 
a speech at the conference “Towards United States of Europe: Future Challenges and potential Solutions” at the University of 
Latvia, 8-9 December, 2004 
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European identity and Turkey: Turkey, EU and 
multiculturalism: What is European and what is Turkish? 
Many Europeans think about Turkish EU accession through the lens of the 
question “is Turkey European”?  ose who have been to Turkey as tourists 
or on business o en say it is nothing like a European country, citing customs 
and fundamental values upon which the EU is based and what they did not 
ﬁ nd in Turkey, i.e. full respect for the rule of law, democracy, human rights, 
the rights of minorities, and the equality of men and women.
 ose in favour of Turkish EU membership say that EU enlargement is 
the most eﬀ ective policy tool because it is “a mechanism for extending EU’s 
values”.⁴⁷ Others have expressed their doubts on whether enough progress 
is at all possible in Turkey with regard to human rights, stressing the point 
that in Turkey the cohesion of the nation-state traditionally has taken priority 
over the rights and liberties of individuals.⁴⁸
As to the debate in Latvia, oﬃ  cials have pointed out that Turkish EU mem-
bership would enrich the multilingual and multicultural identity of the EU, and 
be a signal that the EU is not “a closed Christian club” and that the “clash of 
civilizations is not an inescapable fate of human kind”.⁴⁹ Turkish EU accession 
would give a positive signal to Muslims all around the world and would erase 
the arguments for terrorists to contra distinguish the West against the Islamic 
world “because we could prove that Europe is a place where – based on the 
values of democracy and freedom – diﬀ erent religions can co-habit.”⁵⁰ 
Other oﬃ  cials believe that “Turkey is like a bridge between Asia and 
Europe” and that Turkey is not as conservative as other Islamic countries.⁵¹
But voices outside of the oﬃ  cial domain are less optimistic. For example, 
Atis Lejins, the director of the Latvian Institute of Foreign Aﬀ airs, has said that 
the European public is concerned about an EU identity crisis that could arise 
due to the EU expanding too far out of the borders of the European culture.⁵² 
Lejins also says that Austrians are not alone in their scepticism towards Turk-
47)  “What values for Europe?”, Michael Emerson, in “Policy Perspectives: Islam and Tolerance in Wider Europe”, IPF 2006, pp. 22
48)  See “EU-Turkei: vor schwierigen Beitrittsvehandlungen”, Hainz Kramer, SWP Studie, May, 2005
49)  “Turcija un Eiropas Savienība: izaicinājumi un iespējas” (Turkey and the EU: challenges and opportunities), Einārs Sēmanis, in 
a speech at the conference “Towards United States of Europe: Future Challenges and potential Solutions” at the University of 
Latvia, 8-9 December, 2004 
50)  Ibid.
51)  Latvia’s Honorary Consul to Turkey Asli Ulukapi in an interview to Diena, “Ceļā uz Eiropu” (“On the way to Europe”), Ilze Arkliņa, 
Diena, 21 June, 2006
52)  “Turcijas uzņemšana apdraudēšot ES identitāti” (Turkish accession would endanger EU’s identity), Neatkarīgā Rīta Avīze, Agnese 
Margēviča, 3 October, 2005
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ish EU membership because of value-based reasons, and in reality other EU 
countries, too, were hiding behind the Austrian position hoping that accession 
negotiations would take forever and Turkey would never join.⁵³
To some in Latvia, Turkish EU membership is also linked with the ques-
tion of Latvian identity. “We have to count on the fact that sooner or later 
there will be a large Turkish community in Latvia, there will also be Muslims 
from other cultures. Will we – a small nation – be able to secure our identity 
or will we disappear?”⁵⁴
Apart from opinions on the general ‘European-ness’ of Turkey, Latvians 
are also concerned about human rights, in particular the Kurdish issue 
and Turkey’s attitude towards the Armenian genocide, as well as freedom 
of expression. Since Latvia suﬀ ered mass repressions during the Soviet era, 
“many identify with the Armenians. Moreover, freedom of expression was the 
ﬁ rst freedom to have been won in Central and Eastern Europe, and Latvia 
tends to adopt maximalist stances with few, if any restrictions defended”.⁵⁵ 
For example, an article in one of the biggest Internet portals in Latvia 
compares Turkey to Russia. “Today’s Turkey is a country that still does not 
acknowledge the killings and deportations of hundreds of thousands of 
minority representatives (mostly Armenians and Kurds) that happened in 
the last century in the name of the idea of a super power.”⁵⁶ 
Arguably, similar thinking can also be found in the Latvian parliament, 
which has condemned the Armenian genocide and has asked Turkey to be 
admitted to the EU only a er it recognizes the Armenian genocide. 71 depu-
ties in the 100-seat Saeima were in favour of this proposal in 2005.⁵⁷
Another article criticising the Turkish reforms on the way to EU accession 
serves as a good example that Latvians are very sensitive when it comes to limit-
ing basic freedoms: “To please Europe, Turkey has started to act in a way that 
is reminiscent of Soviet-style atheism propaganda where ones own traditions 
are broken and religious people who are not loyal to the current regime are 
haunted. (…) It all looks like a rather violent taking of the society in a direction 
where it does not want to go at all, or that the society is taken in that direction 
53)  Ibid.
54)  “Ieguvumi un zaudējumi” (Advantages and disadvantages [of Latvia’s EU membership]), Kurzemnieks, 2 May, 2006
55)  “Latvia’s Interests and Fears Regarding Turkey’s Accession to the European Union”, Ph.D. Nils Muižnieks, speech at the conference 
“Turkey in the European Union: What Does Latvia Have to Say?” in Riga, Latvia, 28 April, 2006
56)  “Pašnāvnieku saiets Luksemburgā”, (A get-together of suicides in Luxembourg), Krišjānis Kalnciems, DELFI, 29 September 2005, 
http://www.delfi.lv/archive/article.php?id=12394103 last accessed in December, 2006 
57)  The vote took place on 28 Aril, 2005, but there was no further movement on this proposal after it was handed to Saeima’s Foreign 
affairs committee. 
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at a speed that it can not stand.  e changing of traditions and political culture 
is a long process and, as political theorists say, this cannot be implemented in 
any democratic society – it has to happen in the society itself.“⁵⁸
At the same time others believe that the prospect of EU membership is a good 
instrument to improve the human rights situation of the Kurdish minority.⁵⁹ 
Turks in the EU and Latvia: happily ever after?
 ere is no data on the number of Turks living in Latvia but as the smallest 
minority recorded in Latvia are Estonians (a little over 2500 people in the 2.3-
million populated Latvia), it is safe to assume that the number of Turks living 
in Latvia is very small. 
Yet, surveys reveal that Latvians are rather intolerant to immigrants and 
diﬀ erent religions. For example, almost half of Latvia’s inhabitants (45 % of 
Latvians and 41 % of minority representatives) say they don’t want to live next 
to Muslims.⁶⁰ But 52 % of Latvians and 59 % of non-Latvians supported the 
statement that “Muslim opinions and traditions can be dangerous for Latvia’s 
population”.⁶¹ Although until now no physical violence against Muslims has 
been recorded in Latvia, local Muslims have complained about verbal assaults, 
for example, being called terrorists. Media coverage of Muslims includes state-
ments like, “there are very few Muslims in Latvia and thus they should not cause 
us any problems” or “show public disloyalty” – demonstrate that the society is 
wary, to say the least. ⁶²
A recent media discourse analysis suggests that journalists were also repro-
ducing prejudices.  is research found that stories with negative attitudes most 
o en involved Muslims, and that stories featuring Muslims very rarely contained 
positive images.⁶³
Analysing ethnic tolerance and integration patterns, researchers have found 
that in general Latvians feel and act like “the endangered majority” whereas 
58)  “Latviešu rūpes par Turcijas nākotni”, (Latvian concerns about Turkey’s future), Baiba Lulle, Neatkarīgā Rīta Avīze, 7 September, 
2005
59)  “Turcija Eiropas Savienībā” (Turkey in the EU), Pēteris Timofejevs, DELFI, 9 October, 2005 
60)  “Kāpēc latvieši nevēlas kaimiņos musulmaņus?” (Why Latvians don’t want Muslims as their neighbours?), Marina Krupņikova, 
policy analyst from the Latvian Centre for Human Rights, Public policy portal Politika.lv, May, 2005, http://www.politika.lv/index.
php?id=4833#01 
61)  “Etniskā tolerance un Latvijas sabiedrības integrācija” (Ethnic tolerance and integration of Latvian society), Inese Šūpule, Līga 
Krastiņa, Inguna Peņķe, Jolanta Krišāne, Brigita Zepa, Baltas Sociālo Zinātņu Institūts, 2004, pp.16
62)  Ibid.
63)  Only 8 % of stories featuring Muslims contained positive images, while 47 % of stories with negative attitudes involved Muslims. 
Source: “Neiecietības izpausmes un iecietības veicināšana Latvijā”, Ilze Šulmane and Sergejs Kruks, Īpašu uzdevumu ministra 
sabiedrības integrācijas lietās sekretariāts, 2006
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Russians can’t be considered as a typical minority.⁶⁴ As a result, Latvians are 
rather unsociable, they don’t communicate with the representatives of other 
nationalities. Russians, on the contrary, are more open and easily communicate 
with other nationalities.⁶⁵ 
According to experts, this precautious attitude towards immigrants and the 
opinion “that each nation should live in their homeland”⁶⁶ can be largely attrib-
uted to the feeling of being endangered as well as the consequences of Soviet 
migration policy.⁶⁷ As a result, in spite of Latvia having a multi-ethnic population 
for many decades, “many people still hold a culturally homogeneous society as 
a norm and an ideal”.⁶⁸
 is can be seen in local media coverage. For example, one of the most popular 
Internet portals published the following article: “Would you want to live next to 
a family where the husband more or less regularly rapes his wife, or where sons 
give a beating to their mother or sisters? Or maybe you would be ﬁ ne with giving 
a part of your tax money to ﬁ nancially help these fathers and sons to be more 
prosperous? Disregarding your answer, Latvian government a couple of days ago 
decided on your behalf and has expressed its support for the start of negotiations 
with Turkey about its possible accession to the EU. Turkey, for your information, 
is a country where the majority of society (at least the male society) believes and 
in their actions proves that violence against a woman is absolutely acceptable. If 
these negotiations ﬁ nish smoothly, Turkey’s non-violent and violent citizens will 
get the right to either live close to you, according to the EU’s principle of the free-
dom of movement for persons, or they will – living in their fatherland – receive 
beneﬁ ts from the co-funded projects of the EU (and thus also Latvia).”⁶⁹ 
 e article refers to the data from a 2004 Amnesty International report 
according to which every third woman in Turkey is a victim of violence in the 
family.⁷⁰  erefore, the author says that violence “is a norm in Turkish society” 
64)  Russian is mother tongue for approximately 37 % of Latvia’s inhabitants, thus knowledge of the Latvian language is not 
necessary in many spheres of social life. Many have got used to the privileged status of the Russian language that it enjoyed 
in the Soviet times. 
65)  “Etniskā tolerance un Latvijas sabiedrības integrācija” (Ethnic tolerance and integration of Latvian society), Inese Šūpule, Līga 
Krastiņa, Inguna Peņķe, Jolanta Krišāne, Brigita Zepa, Baltas Sociālo Zinātņu Institūts, 2004, pp.14
66)  Ibid.
67)  Due to Soviet migration policy, many non-Latvians were sent to live in Latvia. As a result, there is a large Russian-speaking minority 
and Latvians have for decades felt like the endangered nation. 
68)  “Etniskā tolerance un Latvijas sabiedrības integrācija” (Ethnic tolerance and integration of Latvian society), Inese Šūpule, Līga 
Krastiņa, Inguna Peņķe, Jolanta Krišāne, Brigita Zepa, Baltas Sociālo Zinātņu Institūts, 2004, pp.16
69)  “Asiņainā kandidātvalsts”, (Bloody candidate country), Krišjānis Kalnciems, DELFI, 13 December, 2004, http://www.delfi.lv/archive/
article.php?id=9790121 last accessed in December, 2006
70)  “Turkey: Women confronting family violence”, Amnesty International, 2 June, 2004 http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/
engeur440132004 last accessed in August, 2006
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which the improvement of living conditions would not be able change.  e 
author also alleges that hoping for the younger generation to live according to 
diﬀ erent values – also due to Turkish EU integration – would be “totally naïve” 
because of the “overall violent environment” in Turkey. In another article the 
same author writes, “the idea of a secular Turkish society has only existed in the 
minds of some abstract “scientists” and irresponsible politicians”.⁷¹
Replying to the above-mentioned allegations, the portal published another 
author arguing in favour of Turkish EU accession. Stressing that in Turkey the 
church is separated from the state, the author also says that nobody can forbid 
anyone to practice a religion in his or her private life, and that the religiousness 
of private individuals can not be a serious argumentation against Turkish EU 
accession.⁷²
 ose in favour of Turkish EU membership believe that “prejudices” about 
Turkey “disappear” as soon as Latvians visit Turkey “and with their own eyes 
see that it is a modern, dynamic country that develops, of course, not without 
any problems”.⁷³ 
It is interesting to note here that Turkey is one of the most popular vacation 
destinations for Latvians and that direct ﬂ ights from Riga to Istanbul go every 
other day. However, as the surveys mentioned-above reveal, the image of Turkey 
as a European country is not prevailing yet.
Local debates on Turkish EU membership 
and future enlargement of the EU
Official statements 
Bilateral relations between Latvia and Turkey are friendly.  ere have been 
numerous bilateral diplomatic visits, including at the highest level.⁷⁴ As a result, 
oﬃ  cial statements from the Ministry of Foreign aﬀ airs say that Latvia supports 
further EU enlargement towards South Eastern Europe. “From our own experi-
ence we know how important the European perspective has on the stability of 
democracy, development and increasing a nation‘s welfare. Only close coopera-
tion between states – both regional and in a European framework – can give 
71)  “Pašnāvnieku saiets Luksemburgā”, (A get-together of suicides in Luxembourg), Krišjānis Kalnciems, DELFI, 29 September 2005, 
http://www.delfi.lv/archive/article.php?id=12394103 last accessed in December, 2006 
72)  “Turcija Eiropas Savienībā” (Turkey in the EU), Pēteris Timofejevs, DELFI, 9 October, 2005 
73)  An interview with the ambassador of Latvia to Turkey, Ivars Pundurs, “Turcijas laužas uz ES” (Turkey forces itself towards the EU), 
Ināra Mūrniece, Latvijas Avīze, 28 April, 2005
74)  The president of Turkey visited Latvia in 2002, and Latvian president went to Turkey in 2004.
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them unity, regional development, security and peace. Latvia is ready to help 
these [candidate] countries in their growth because she [Latvia] is able to appre-
ciate the importance of such help in the road towards EU membership.” ⁷⁵
However, no explicit mentioning of Latvia’s support for Turkish EU mem-
bership can be found in the strategic document on Latvia’s foreign policy for 
2006–2010.⁷⁶ But when describing Latvian-Turkish relations the Latvian Min-
istry of Foreign Aﬀ airs says, “Latvia supports Turkey’s drive towards the EU”.⁷⁷ 
Latvia was also among the countries that supported the opening of accession 
negotiations between Turkey and the EU.⁷⁸ 
 is has given grounds for speculation about whether support for the Turk-
ish EU accession bid equals support for Turkish EU membership. However, 
Latvian minister of Foreign Aﬀ airs Artis Pabriks has explicitly said in the media 
that, “Latvia supports Turkish EU membership”.⁷⁹ Calling Turkey Latvia’s ally 
Pabriks has said that trading with allies – in other words not supporting Turkish 
EU accession – is not possible. 
Supporting this argument, the starting of accession negotiations was believed 
to enhance peace and stability in the region,⁸⁰ and give EU accession countries 
(not mentioning Turkey in particular) a strong motivation for implementing 
political, economic and social reforms.⁸¹
Statements of political parties
No political parties currently in the Latvian parliament mentioned whether 
they support or oppose further EU enlargement in their programmes for the 
2006 elections.⁸² Possible Turkish EU accession is also not mentioned. What 
follows is a narrative of statements indirectly linked to EU enlargement and 
the possible Turkish EU accession from politicians and parties. 
75)  Website of the Latvian Foreign Affairs ministry, http://www.mfa.gov.lv/lv/eu/ES-paplasinasanas/ last accessed in December, 2006
76)  “Latvijas ārpolitikas pamatnostādnes 2006-2010.gadam (Informatīvā daļa)”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005 http://www.mfa.
gov.lv/lv/Arpolitika/pamatnostadnes/ last accessed in December, 2006
77)  Website of the Latvian Foreign Affairs ministry http://www.mfa.gov.lv/lv/Arpolitika/divpusejas- attiecibas/Turcija/ last accessed 
in December, 2006
78)  Ibid.
79)  “Ārpolitika pēc saprāta un satversmes principiem” (A foreign policy according to common sense and constitution), interview with 
Artis Pabriks, Public policy portal Politika.lv, 19 July, 2005 http://www.politika.lv/index.php?id=7942 
80)  Website of the Latvian Foreign Affairs ministry http://www.mfa.gov.lv/lv/Jaunumi/PazinojumiPresei/2005/Septembris/29-2/ last 
accessed in December, 2006
81)  “Latvijas ārpolitikas pamatnostādnes 2006-2010.gadam (Informatīvā daļa)”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005 http://www.mfa.
gov.lv/lv/Arpolitika/pamatnostadnes/ last accessed on December, 2006, pp. 9
82)  Only the programs for elections in October 2006 and the main declarations of parties are being analysed here as the question of 
Latvia’s successful accession to the EU was dominating the agenda in earlier elections. 
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 e ruling conservative People’s Party (TP) mentions EU enlargement in 
their pre-election program for the European Parliament in 2004 where TP 
pledges support for EU accession of “countries that are friendly to Latvia”. 
Although there is no elaboration on the “friendly countries”, the TP strongly 
opposes the start of negotiations about EU accession with Russia. TP would 
also not allow “uncontrolled immigration” in Latvia and would be against 
any moves that would weaken NATO.⁸³
 e second coalition party, Christian conservative Latvia’s First Party 
(LPP) says that it supports “building more unity” within the EU.⁸⁴ LPP 
program for the European Parliament elections elaborates that “only a united 
Europe can secure Latvia’s future. At the same time, the European integra-
tion process cannot create threats for the cultural, regional, religious and 
linguistic identity of the Latvian population”. LPP also supports “a united 
and eﬀ ective common European foreign and security policy that would 
strengthen the EU’s role in the world, at the same time not allowing the 
weakening of the transatlantic ties with NATO and the establishment of twin 
security structures.”⁸⁵
Another coalition party, the Green’s and Farmer’s Union (ZZS) in its 
program for the 2006 elections only said that it supports the development 
of the EU “as a union of countries with integrated economic, monetary and 
common security systems”.⁸⁶
 e opposition party, conservative New Era (JL) has said that it supports 
the spreading of democracy, freedom, the rule of law and market economy 
to all of Latvia‘s neighbouring countries. JL also thinks that Latvia should 
cooperate with countries that have expressed their willingness to join the 
EU and NATO, sharing with them Latvia’s experience of the integration 
process.⁸⁷  e party sees the EU as a strong, capacitated and united Europe 
that has to take “a signiﬁ cant place in international politics, and in securing 
peace and stability in the world”.⁸⁸ In addition, JL supports the strengthen-
ing of NATO “that is and will remain the most signiﬁ cant security guarantee 
in Europe and the world”.  us, European security and cooperation policy 
83)  “Tautas Partijas rīcības programma darbībai Eiropas Parlamentā”, http://www.tautaspartija.lv/lat/par_ko_mes_esam/eu_
parlaments last accessed in December, 2006
84)  “Latvijas Pirmās Partijas programma 2006”, http://www.lpp.lv/new/data/file/LPP_programma_2006.doc#_Toc41898977 last 
accessed in December, 2006
85)  “LPP 4000 zīmju programma Eiropas Parlamenta vēlēšanām”, http://www.lpp.lv/new/index.php?section_id=102&article_id=315 
last accessed in December, 2006
86)  “ZZS programma”, http://www.lzs.lv/?sad=velesanas&asad=programma last accessed in December, 2006
87)  “The program – declaration of values of New Era”, http://www.jl.lv/page.php?id=2617 last accessed in December, 2006
88)  Ibid.
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should be developed “in harmony with transatlantic relations deepening 
strategic cooperation between the EU and NATO”.⁸⁹ 
Latvian MEP – elected from JL – Aldis Kuskis has said that he is against 
starting accession negotiations with Turkey because it was not in Latvia’s inter-
ests.⁹⁰ His colleague, MEP Valdis Dombrovskis has been less sceptical and has 
said that Turkish EU membership could not be ruled out if Turkey fulﬁ ls the 
criteria. Yet, he would also support the idea of a favoured partnership.⁹¹ 
 e opposition alliance For Human Rights in a United Latvia (PCTVL) in 
its program for the European Parliament elections said, “EU enlargement to 
the East and partnership with Russia must be directed towards establishing 
a common political and economic space between Vladivostok and Lisbon”. 
Only then, according to PCTVL, would Europe be able to compete with 
America and East Asia. “Europe has to globally enhance such a world order 
where mass violence, terrorism and the catastrophic poverty of large popula-
tions is not possible.”⁹² Similar wording was included in party’s program for 
the 2006 Latvian parliamentary elections.⁹³
 e nationalistic conservative party For Fatherland and Freedom/ LNNK⁹⁴ 
does not mention EU enlargement or the future of the EU in its programs. 
Yet, its member Latvian MEP Inese Vaidere has been the most active politi-
cian speaking out on the question of Turkish EU membership. She is also 
a member of EP’s Committee on Foreign Aﬀ airs. 
Vaidere prefers a special partnership between Turkey and the EU instead 
of full Turkish EU membership.⁹⁵ She believes the EU has enough problems 
to deal with and should not take up another huge project like the accession of 
Turkey. Vaidere thinks that the oﬃ  cial position of Latvia supporting Turkish 
EU membership bid is hasty. At the same time she said that behind closed 
doors there seems to be a consensus in Latvia and in some other European 
countries that is similar to Vaidere’s viewpoint, i.e., that the EU should 
be more cautious about a possible Turkish EU membership and should 
89)  Ibid.
90)  “Latvijas eiroparlamentārieši atbalsta ES priviliģēto sadarbību ar Turciju” (Latvian MEPs support a privileged cooperation between 
the EU and Turkey), BNS, 15 December, 2004
91)  Ibid.
92)  “PCTVL programma dalībai EP vēlēšanās”, http://www.pctvl.lv/?lang=lv&mode=party&submode=program&page_id=171 last 
accessed in December, 2006
93)  “PCTVL program of action”, http://www.pctvl.lv/?lang=lv&mode=party&submode=program&page_id=749 last accessed in 
December, 2006
94)  It was in opposition until the 2006 October elections. Now it is the fourth cabinet party. 
95)  Vaidere has published several opinion pieces in the national media in Latvia but the opinions described here were expressed in 
a meeting (with PROVIDUS) on July 7, 2006
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rather work on a special partnership. As to the two main risks coming with 
a possible Turkish EU membership, Vaidere named migration from Turkey 
and changes in structural fund policy towards Central and Eastern European 
EU members getting less ﬁ nancial support due to Turkey being a large and 
poor country which requires more ﬁ nancial assistance. 
Vaidere thinks that many European leaders who oﬃ  cially back Turkish 
EU membership bid are simply “willing to be the good guys” while knowing 
that the actual decision on whether or not Turkey should be accepted in the 
EU will have to be taken in 10–15 years, by a new generation of politicians. 
Speaking of future EU enlargement, Vaidere also said that it does not make 
sense for Latvia to open the doors for Turkey while keeping them closed for 
Ukraine. She was also pessimistic about the pace of the reforms in Turkey, 
especially in regard to stopping human rights violations. “ e only thing 
that happens quickly in Turkey is population growth,” she said hinting that 
necessary reforms take much more time. 
Another problem with possible Turkish EU membership is its borders – in 
particular those with Syria, Iran and Iraq – that would constitute a bridge 
to illegal migration. On top of that, Turkey was opposing the Ankara agree-
ment and public opinion in all EU states which are largely in opposition to 
Turkish EU membership. Hence, for Vaidere the only argument for why talks 
about Turkish EU membership continue was the promise that the EU made 
to Turkey in 1963. “Of course, we can not turn down Turkey”, Vaidere said, 
which is why she thinks the best way to proceed would be a special partner-
ship deal that would motivate Turkey to continue the reform process as well 
as “coming closer to European values”.⁹⁶
Another MEP and a member of TB/LNNK Roberts Zile has also said 
that he favoured Ukrainian EU membership rather than the EU member-
ship of Turkey.⁹⁷
Public opinion 
Latvians are more supportive of further EU enlargement in comparison 
to the public opinion in the old EU member states. However, the latest 
Eurobarometer poll results also reveal a signiﬁ cant decrease in support. 
96)  “I.Vaidere aicina meklēt jaunus ES paplašināšanās mehānismus” (Vaidere calls for new mechanisms of EU enlargement), Baltic 
News Agency, 15 March, 2006
97)  “Latvijas eiroparlamentārieši atbalsta ES priviliģēto sadarbību ar Turciju” (Latvian MEPs support a privileged cooperation between 
the EU and Turkey), BNS, 15 December, 2004
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According to the survey, 54 % of the respondents were in favour, 30 % against. 
In comparison, the Eurobarometer polls of Autumn 2005 showed that 62 % 
of Latvians were in favour of further expansion of the European block, and 
only 26 % were against.⁹⁸ 
Eurobarometer 64 (Autumn 2005), a more detailed analysis focusing on the 
possible EU membership of separate countries, revealed that Latvians were also 
more sceptical about Turkish EU membership than other new member states. 
Latvian data was more in line with the average parameters of the EU-25. Only 
31 % of the respondents in Latvia were in favour of Turkish EU membership 
while 51 % were against it.  e average data from the 10 new member states 
was 38 % in favour and 44 % against, in comparison to 29 % in favour and 57 % 
of the respondents in EU-15 against the Turkish EU accession. 
It is safe to assume that the favourite country for EU membership from the 
Latvian perspective is Ukraine as 57 % of Latvians supported Ukrainian EU 
membership and only 25 % were against. At the same time Croatia, the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Serbia and Montenegro got on average 
only 40 % of Latvians‘ support for the eventual EU accession. 
Returning to the Turkish accession, the latest polls also reveal that the 
Latvian support for Turkish EU membership had dropped signiﬁ cantly (by 
5 %) while the opposition to Turkish EU membership had increased (by 7 %). 
When asked whether respondents would support Turkish EU membership if 
it fulﬁ ls all EU requests in the ﬁ elds of economy and democracy which would 
most likely happen in 10–20 years time, only 28 % in Latvia said they would, 
while 41 % said they would still be against.⁹⁹ 
Similar conclusions can be made from a local survey where respondents 
were asked for their reasons to support or oppose Turkish EU accession.¹⁰⁰ 26 % 
of those who support Turkish EU accession said, “if Turkey wanted to join, it 
should” and 16 % thought all countries were equal, therefore it was Turkey’s 
right to join as well. Every tenth respondent named Turkish economic growth 
98)  Eurobarometer 65, First results, July 2006
99)  In a special Eurobarometer survey EU citizens were asked, “once Turkey complies with all the conditions set by the European 
Union, would you support/ oppose the accession of Turkey to the European Union?” 35 % of the respondents in Latvia would 
support Turkish EU membership, 47 % would be against it. These results are close to the average of EU-25 (39 % in favour, 48 % 
against). The survey also found that the majority of Europeans interviewed (52 %) see the accession of Turkey as mainly in the 
interest of the country itself. 20 % would see a mutual interest to both the EU and Turkey for its entry in the European Union. 
See “Attitudes towards European Union enlargement”, Special Eurobarometer, European Commission, July 2006 http://ec.europa.
eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_255_en.pdf
100)  SKDS and NGO think-tank the Baltic Forum conducted a three-question survey on Latvian’s attitudes towards Turkey and its possible 
EU membership in February 2006. The survey was commissioned by the Representation of the European Commission in Latvia 
and presented at the conference “Turkey in the EU: What Does Latvia Have to Say?”, organized by the Baltic Forum, the European 
Commission Delegation to Latvia, and the European Parliament Information office, in Riga, Latvia, 28 April 2006
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for his or her reason to support Turkey’s EU accession. In addition to that, 
9,2 % said they had nothing against Turkish EU membership if it fulﬁ ls the 
criteria, while 8,2 % stated that Latvia had not been developed and still was 
accepted in the EU. Only then came the argument that other countries of the 
EU would beneﬁ t from Turkish accession (6 %) and that the EU would become 
bigger and stronger (5,8 %). 3,8 % of respondents said they liked Turkey and 
Turks, while 3,1 % said Turkey was a rich and developed country.¹⁰¹
When asked about their reasons for opposing Turkish EU membership, the 
biggest pool of respondents said it was on religious grounds (31 %). One third 
of the respondents also named foreign culture and mentality as the reason for 
their opposition. Only 8,6 % said Turkey was not a European country and 8,3 % 
said there were already enough Turks (Muslims) in Europe. Paradoxically, 
concerns about human rights, women‘s rights and democracy were small – 6 % 
of respondents named that as an obstacle. Other reasons mentioned were that 
“Turks are too aggressive and unpredictable”; that Turkish EU membership 
would raise terrorism threats; that Turkish EU membership would cause prob-
lems for the EU and that Turkey was a too poor and undeveloped country. 
Only 4 % said they feared the inﬂ ow of workers from Turkey.¹⁰² 
Conclusions
One could have expected to ﬁ nd a kind of solidarity in the new EU member 
states towards all EU candidate countries because “we have been there, too”, 
i.e. we know very well how it was to wait on the doorsteps of the EU before 
accession. However, public opinion polls as well as politicians’ statements 
show that this solidarity is directed towards Ukraine, less towards the Balkan 
countries, and even less towards Turkey.  e main reason for this seems to be 
hidden in the belief that Latvians see Turkey and its development as very dif-
ferent to the development and the character of the other potential EU member 
states (Ukraine, the Balkan countries).  e “otherness” of Turkey – including 
political issues like torture, treatment of the Kurds, the Armenian question, 
and the role of the army – is certainly a reason for the cautiousness of Latvians. 
Today, for many Latvians, just like other Europeans, Turkish EU accession 
seems “a step too far – politically, geographically and psychologically”.¹⁰³
101)  SKDS, February 2006
102)  Ibid. 
103)  Grabbe, H., “From drift to strategy: the case for Turkey’s accession”, in K. Barysxh, S. Everts, H. Grabbe, Why Europe should embrace 
Turkey, Centre for European Reform, September 2005, pp.15
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In addition to that, there are many unknown variables about Turkish EU 
accession. First, there are questions about Turkey’s reform process. Second, 
there are questions about the EU’s need to change not only but also due to 
Turkish accession. Should these questions not be answered in a suﬃ  cient 
way, a special partnership between the EU and Turkey might become more 
popular not only in Germany, France, Austria and Cyprus, but also in Latvia 
and even Turkey itself.
Regarding issues that will remain of particular interest to Latvia and could 
inﬂ uence Latvian public opinion on Turkish EU membership, it is predictable 
that energy security and Turkey‘s human rights record will be the two most 
important ones. While the ﬁ rst argument is likely to make Latvians more 
supportive of closer Turkish ties with the EU, in regard to the second, events 
like court cases against writers for allegedly ‘insulting Turkishness’ are likely 
to make Latvians even more sceptic. In addition, fears of the immigration 
potential from Turkey are likely to contribute to the scepticism. On this topic, 
no major change in public opinion could be expected, given the unwilling-
ness of mainstream politicians to discuss it and the historic reasons for the 
sensitivity towards immigrants. 
Another conclusion to be drawn from the Latvian debates on possible 
Turkish EU membership could be that there is a need for more debate. As 
the arguments used in Latvia demonstrate, there is a lack of understanding 
of the reasons why Turkish EU integration was started in the ﬁ rst place. 
 is is understandable given that Latvia is a new EU member state and thus 
has not been part of Turkish-EU relations since the beginning. But this is 
a good reason for asking local politicians to explain the arguments in favour 
of Turkish EU membership from the EU’s and Turkey’s perspective, not just 
mentioning the promise that an older generation of European politicians 
made in 1963. Is Turkish EU membership needed to strengthen EU’s role 
in the world, is it needed for economic growth potential, is it needed for the 
future vision of the EU as a more diverse unity?  ese are big questions that 
should be debated. 
In Latvia one could hope for more discussions even among cabinet mem-
bers now that the party For Fatherland and Freedom/ LNNK has joined the 
coalition, with its member MEP Inese Vaidere favouring a special partnership 
between Turkey and the EU.¹⁰⁴
104)  Although there are no written statements from TB/LNNK on Turkish EU accession, MEP Inese Vaidere has said that her position on 
Turkish EU membership is in line with the party’s position. Source: Inese Vaidere speaking at a conference “Turkish accession to 
the EU: On Track or Derailed?”, organised by PROVIDUS, in Riga, 23 November, 2006 
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Explaining the reasons for Turkish EU membership is important also from 
another aspect – the fact that each member state has the right to veto the 
opening and the closure of each negotiating chapter.  is means that there 
is room for debate between the public at large, diﬀ erent stakeholders and the 
government. Should there not be enough progress made on the commitments 
by both sides – Turkey and the EU – Latvia as much as any other member 
state can use the right to slow down the process.  e EU also keeps the right 
to suspend the negotiations altogether, in the event that the Commission, or 
one third of the member states, see a “persistent breach… of the principles 
of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms 
and the rule of law” in Turkey.  us, there is still some room for control and 
a need to explain the use of this control in the negotiation process – or on 
the contrary, the continuation of negotiations in spite of everything. 
To this end, Turkish EU membership is not only a public relations exercise 
persuading EU’s citizens that Turkey is just like Europe, because Turkish 
EU accession is inevitably linked to two other questions: EU’s identity and 
legitimacy – or the fact that “a union of democracies” should not ‘impose’ 
continuing enlargement on unwilling electorates”.¹⁰⁵
Finally, if one looks at both the EU and Turkey as they are today, critics 
of Turkish EU membership anywhere in the world – not just in Europe or 
Latvia – easily could conclude that Turkish accession would be a mess.  e 
latest developments surrounding the Ankara protocol and the issue of Cyprus 
only adds to their position. But possible Turkish EU accession is many years 
away. In 10–15 years there will be a diﬀ erent Europe, a diﬀ erent Latvia and 
a diﬀ erent Turkey – something that the citizens of the new EU member states 
might understand better because they themselves have felt how a country 
can change in just 15 years.  us, if voters ask for more accountability from 
their politicians and politicians do a better job in explaining the reasons for 
Turkish EU membership, and the reform process goes on, in ten years the 
European public and Turkish citizens, as well as the sceptics of the Turkish 
EU membership idea anywhere else in the world could well have very diﬀ er-
ent material for forming their attitudes. 
105)  “An asset but not a model: Turkey, the EU and the wider Middle East”, Steven Everts, in “Why Europe should embrace Turkey”, 
Katinka Barysch, Steven Everts, Heather Grabbe, Centre for European Reform, September 2005, pp.48
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EU ENLARGEMENT TO THE 
WESTERN BALKANS FROM 
THE POLISH PERSPECTIVE
Piotr Kaźmierkiewicz, Institute of Public Affairs
An Overview of the Polish Discourse 
on Further EU Enlargement
Public Opinion
 e Poles lead European rankings of support for expanding the EU. Both 
in Eurobarometer 63 (May–June 2005) and 64 (October–November 2005) 
the Poles were second only to the Slovenes in general enthusiasm for the idea 
of enlargement, with 76 and 72 % of the respondents supporting inclusion of 
all applicants or selected states.¹ According to Eurobarometer 65, 78 % of the 
Polish respondents assented to the statement that the enlargement strengthens 
the EU, while only 11 % believed the opposite.  is level of support places the 
Polish society among the top enthusiasts: compared to 67 % Czechs in favour 
(with 25 % of an opposed view) and 62 % Latvians (and 26 % in opposition).²
A signiﬁ cant share of the Polish public is willing to see the EU extended 
without reservations. National polls conducted in 2004–2005 indicate that 
the support for an unqualiﬁ ed position is consolidating. While in November 
2004, 20 % subscribed to the view that the EU ought to expand to ‘all states 
1)  See: http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb63/eb63_en.pdf; http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/
archives/eb/eb64/eb64_en.htm
2)  QD8.2 of Eurobarometer 65.2 (255).
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willing to accede’ in the near future, in July 2005 that share rose to 30 %. 
Although the percentage of the deﬁ nite opponents increased from 12 % to 18 % 
in that period, the largest ﬂ ow could be observed away from the middle posi-
tion that in November 2004 enjoyed the support of 50 % of all respondents 
(and which was down to 36 % seven months later) – that of the integration 
of only selected states.³ 
However, a Eurobarometer poll conducted in 2006 shows that the major-
ity of Poles (64 %) are uninterested in the events taking place in the EU’s 
neighbourhood taken as a whole.  is relative lack of interest is shared by the 
respondents in other Central and East European new Member States (includ-
ing Latvia and the Czech Republic). As it will be shown below, the interest 
varies greatly when diﬀ erent states are considered: the term ‘neighbourhood’ 
is commonly used to refer to the eastern ﬂ ank of the Union. 
Support for further expansion of the EU has been generally high since the 
ﬁ rst national polls on the topic were carried out in 2002 and continued to rise 
a er accession.  e share of supporters of integrating other East European 
countries reached 68 % in December 2002 and 70 % in January 2003, and 
respectively 49 % and 51 % were in favour of Turkey’s entry.⁴ By November 
2004, a strong majority of respondents expressed support for the accession 
of the following countries: Ukraine (74 %), Turkey (68 %), Croatia (78 %) 
and Serbia and Montenegro (74 %). Lower levels of support were shown for 
Russia (54 %), Morocco (50 %) and Israel (43 %).⁵
 e enthusiasm for further enlargement, especially to include the eastern 
neighbours, characterised Poland as a candidate country and continued in the 
ﬁ rst months a er accession to mark the peak at the time of Orange Revolu-
tion in late 2004. However, the support dissipated somewhat between the 
spring and autumn of 2005 (Table 1). In the unfavourable circumstances of 
a perceived internal crisis in the EU and the absence of positive signs from 
the EU institutions and other major states, a decline was observed in support 
for both the eastern and southern direction of enlargement. One variable that 
certainly played a part in dampening the readiness to enlarge the EU was 
the recognition of a crisis within the EU spurred by the negative votes of the 
Dutch and the French during the constitutional referenda.  us, although 
the Poles remain among the champions of the enlargement, they have also 
3)  Polls were conducted by the CBOS and included in the report No. 155/2005, “Opinions on the Functioning of the European Union”, 
Warsaw, September 2005. http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2005/K_155_05.PDF
4)  Surveys were administered by the Warsaw-based Centre for Social Opinion Research (CBOS). See http://www.cbos.pl
5)  Results obtained from surveys conducted among the citizens of large EU states (TNS Sofres).
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become more aware of the need to acknowledge the concerns of other Euro-
peans about this process. Moreover, the decline could be attributed to the 
realisation that the optimism about the possibilities to realise this agenda, 
for instance in relation to Ukraine, had been unrealistic.
Table 1. Decline in Polish Support for Enlargement in 2005
March 2005 November 2005
Support for enlargement to: For Against For Against
Morocco 42 33 35 (- 7) 35 (+ 2)
Russia 46 39 34 (- 12) 45 (+ 6)
Turkey 55 28 44 (- 11) 33 (+ 5)
Ukraine 77 12 64 (- 13) 18 (+ 6)
Source: TNS Sofres, [http://www.yes-ukraine.org/en/survey/november.html]
At the same time it is worth noting that two key arguments for drawing 
the lines of enlarging the EU that reappeared in the discourse across Europe 
have not carried much weight in the Polish public since the country’s own 
accession.  e criteria for integration that could potentially exclude some 
of the candidates are mentioned by a minority of the respondents. When in 
November 2004 the question was posed as to the conditions to be met by the 
candidate states, the membership in the ‘Christian cultural milieu’ and the 
location within the geographical boundaries of Europe were cited by 11 % and 
10 % respectively. A stable democratic system was considered essential by a far 
larger share of the respondents (30 %).  e majority named two criteria that 
focused on the state of the political and economic systems of the applicants: 
a stable market economy was mentioned by over two-thirds (68 %) followed 
by the rule of law and respect for human rights.⁶
Official Position and Public Debate
An analysis of the oﬃ  cial statements of the presidential and the prime 
minister’s oﬃ  ce as well as interviews with members of the national and 
European parliament reveal the existence of a broad consensus. EU enlarge-
6)  CBOS No. 187/2004, “Opinions on Further Enlargement of the European Union”, Warsaw, December 2004, [http://www.cbos.
pl/SPISKOM.POL/2004/K_187_04.PDF]
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ment is generally in Poland’s interest; therefore Poland will not block further 
enlargement. However, given the country’s limited clout within the EU for 
realising its agenda, all eﬀ orts need to be deployed for stabilising Poland’s 
eastern neighbourhood (Belarus and Ukraine) by anchoring them in the 
Euro-Atlantic institutions (NATO and the EU). As a tactical choice, Poland 
will not play a leading role as the advocate of any Southeast European 
country to the same level that it has vowed to pull its weight behind the 
aspirations of Ukraine.
 e eastern dimension clearly takes precedence over the southern or 
southeastern vector in the activities of both Polish diplomacy and in the 
interests of both the domestic and European parliamentarians. In contrast 
to the vocal support to the cause of Ukraine in the EU, the Polish govern-
ment chose to take a similar position as other EU states, approving the 
decision to close negotiations with Bulgaria and Romania and open talks 
with Croatia and Macedonia, but it did not express any signs of strong 
enthusiasm. Moreover, as opposed to the EU integration of Ukraine, where 
Poland has proven to be a major driving force within the EU, neither the 
membership of Romania and Bulgaria nor the prospects of further expan-
sion of the Union in the Western Balkans (Croatia, Macedonia) evoked any 
debate or explicit formulation of the national position.  e relative low 
priority accorded to the issue of the accession of countries of Southeastern 
Europe or Turkey in the national public could be seen by its absence in the 
programmes of the parties for national elections and only veiled references 
to the question of further enlargement in the campaigns for the European 
Parliament.  ere were virtually no public consultations on the issue and 
the government did not run a campaign to communicate either its position 
or grounds for it.
 is contrast stems from the unequal weight that Poland has placed on 
its foreign policies to the eastern and southern vectors.  e question of leav-
ing EU membership open to Belarus and Ukraine was implicit in Poland’s 
eﬀ orts to avoid drawing new divides in Eastern Europe that could occur if 
the country’s eastern border would be a permanent frontier of the Union. 
 rough its diplomatic activities dating back to the early 1990s, Poland has 
been a committed and vocal proponent of raising the proﬁ le of its eastern 
neighbours (Belarus and Ukraine) vis-à-vis the Euroatlantic institutions, in 
particular the EU.  e Foreign Ministry’s proposal for institutionalising 
an ‘eastern dimension’ in the Union’s foreign policy foreshadowed to some 
extent the European Neighbourhood Policy.  e Orange Revolution was 
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the occasion for the Polish politicians and the public to demonstrate their 
commitment to the activist policy aiming at democratisation and opening 
Euro-Atlantic prospects to Ukraine.
In comparison with the long-standing preoccupation with the eastern 
direction of its national policy, the southeastern vector has been accorded 
far less prominence.  e main argument raised to justify Poland’s oﬃ  cial 
support for further EU enlargement in Southeastern Europe has been the 
reference made to the principle of adhering to agreements and promises made 
beforehand (pacta sunt servanda). Former President Aleksander Kwaśniewski 
pointed to the commitments that the European Union undertook as regards 
both the candidate states (Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia and Turkey) and the 
successor states of the former Yugoslavia that were given the prospects of 
gradual integration. His successor, Lech Kaczyński, echoed these sentiments 
on a number of occasions. 
 is argument is based on the conviction that ‘it is not appropriate’ that 
Poland and other new Member States that just acceded should deny accession 
to other states.  e oﬃ  cial position stresses on the one hand that the EU side 
ought to guarantee a ‘fair starting point’ and should be willing to present 
each candidate state with prospects of eventually becoming a member. On 
the other hand, it is hinted that the speed and outcome of the negotiations 
depends largely on the candidates’ state of preparations and their will to 
introduce the required reforms. 
 e IPA’s research in 2005 revealed that the Polish politicians and analysts 
do not relate the issue of accession of new candidates from Southeastern 
Europe to Poland’s interests, but rather to its impact on the direction of 
the European integration.  e fact that the potential costs to Poland were 
not contemplated at this point could be related to the commonly shared 
belief that the enlargement would not involve a negative monetary impact 
for Poland as a sure net beneﬁ ciary of EU funds for the period of the next 
two ﬁ nancial perspectives. Some respondents stressed, however, that they 
expected the issue of ﬁ nancial implications to be a more likely component of 
the debate towards the end of the negotiations when the details of the oﬀ er 
for future Member States would be known. At the same time, the proponents 
of continued enlargement were looking forward to receiving support from 
prospective new Member States in votes at the European Council and the 
Parliament. However, they note that they count more on the solidarity from 
the new members than on a genuine convergence of actual interests.
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 e issue of EU accession of the two eastern neighbours (Belarus and 
Ukraine), however, is accorded much higher priority as it is related to the 
geopolitical concerns of Poland. For these reasons, the Polish oﬃ  cials (includ-
ing consecutive governments and presidents) came to a national consensus on 
the objectives of the policy towards the two eastern neighbours, which came 
to be known as Poland’s eastern policy. As the country proceeded towards EU 
membership, the national agenda was reformulated to match the change in 
the instruments of Polish foreign policy upon the country’s accession to the 
Union. Opening the ‘European perspective’ for those states was thus consid-
ered to be an incentive and eventually an anchor for economic and political 
reforms. As such it has been regarded by all the major political groups as an 
issue that is central to national security, which is then extended to the realm 
of regional geopolitics, inﬂ uenced by the unceasing concern with the spectre 
of Russia’s inﬂ uence in the area. Rapprochement between the enlarged EU 
and Ukraine and Belarus is thus seen not only as a solution to Warsaw’s 
lingering preoccupation with its own geopolitical position vis-à-vis Moscow, 
but also as an ultimate solution to the security dilemma of the countries in 
between the EU and Russia.
Poland’s activism in the policy of ‘drawing’ Belarus and Ukraine to Europe 
is also frequently justiﬁ ed by the historical heritage of a common statehood 
with Belarus and Ukraine.  e Polish eastern policy is based on the so-called 
Giedroyć doctrine, developed in the émigré circles in the 1950s.  e geopoliti-
cal vision was laid down in the Paris-based Kultura journal and included three 
main lines of thought. Firstly, it precluded any of Poland’s territorial claims 
on its eastern neighbours. Secondly, it called for the recognition of their 
independence.  irdly, it postulated the end of the possible Russo-Polish 
rivalry for inﬂ uence over Belarus or Ukraine.
Although the geopolitical concerns underlie the agenda in Poland’s 
relations with Russia and by proxy with the current Belarusian regime, the 
country has developed a full-scope national neighbourhood policy going far 
beyond security considerations.  e territories adjacent to Poland’s eastern 
borders have been the object of activities aiming at promoting democracy and 
human rights, economic transformation, state apparatus reforms and third 
sector development.  e priority of the region of Eastern Europe is apparent 
in Poland’s oﬃ  cial democratisation eﬀ orts and development aid as well as in 
the traditional focus of non-governmental actors on seeking partnerships in 
the direct eastern neighbourhood. 
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The Polish Position on the EU Accession 
of Western Balkan States
The Place of the Region in the General 
Polish Support for Enlargement
Poles display signiﬁ cant support to enlarging the EU in all directions. 
According to both the Eurobarometer and TNS Sofres polls the majority 
of Poles would include both the countries of the Western Balkans (such 
as Croatia or Serbia and Montenegro), the CIS (with Ukraine in the ﬁ rst 
place) and the Mediterranean (in particular Turkey). Although less than the 
absolute majority would see EU membership extended to Israel, Morocco 
or Russia, the ﬁ gures, which exceed 40 %, are still much higher than those 
found for supporters of those three states elsewhere in the EU. 
 e Eurobarometer results⁷ show that, in agreement with the polls taken 
in other states, the opposition has been the lowest towards the three states 
with a higher GDP than the EU average (Iceland, Norway and Switzerland), 
and fewer than 20 % of the respondents expressed strong reservations about 
the likelihood of accession of the three Slavic states (Bulgaria, Croatia or 
Ukraine). As in other states, Albania and Turkey are listed at the bottom of 
the rankings. Signiﬁ cantly, the sequence does not follow the state of oﬃ  cial 
talks with various candidates as neither of the top choices has expressed 
interest in EU accession and the support for Ukraine, which is not even 
a candidate, is much higher than that for Turkey.
 e Poles, like the citizens of other new Member States, are most interested 
in the countries that are either wealthier or evoke positive associations on 
other grounds (for instance, a shared historical experience).  e rankings 
reﬂ ect the preoccupation of the Polish public and elite with the area that for 
centuries formed a single state and where the Polish language and culture 
were present: the western CIS, covering Belarus and Ukraine, and to a smaller 
extent European part of Russia. In that context, Southeastern Europe may 
understandably be featured far less prominently as an area outside of the 
historical zone of interest.
On the other hand, the potential factors fuelling negative attitudes 
towards the integration of Southeast European states are generally absent, 
too.  e wartime associations of the Balkans with interethnic conﬂ icts, weak, 
unstable states and general insecurity have given way to the positive images 
7)  Based on Eurobarometer No. 63, 64 and 65 of May-June 2005, November 2005 and June 2006. 
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of tourist destinations on the Adriatic and the Black Sea, investment oppor-
tunities and to the rediscovery of cultural heritage.  e economic recovery 
of many of the post-Yugoslav states has particularly appealed to the Polish 
observers who were frequent visitors to the relatively aﬄ  uent and West-ori-
ented Yugoslavia in the 1980s and later watched with dismay the dramatic 
disintegration of the once successful economy and multiethnic society. 
Such a spectacular upturn is appreciated by the Poles who themselves had 
a turbulent history and for whom European integration was an important 
anchor of security and an opportunity for consolidating the economic and 
political transition from autarchy and authoritarianism to a liberal market 
economy and pluralist democracy.
 e accession of these states appeals also to the Polish public on more 
emotional level. Unlike in the case of relations with Russia, the apprecia-
tion of common Slavic roots is not tinged by a history of political conﬂ ict. 
Moreover, the fact that Yugoslavia represented a form of a Western-oriented, 
relatively liberal version of the socialist system with elements of the market 
(including virtually non-collectivised agriculture) made it into a model 
for the generations of Poles in the period of Communism.  e area was 
a tourist and commercial destination for the Poles already in the 1980s, and 
the personal experience solidiﬁ ed the images of hospitality, informality 
and ‘kindred spirit’.  e experience of granting temporary asylum to the 
victims of the conﬂ icts in Bosnia and Kosovo was accompanied by general 
sentiments of empathy especially since the hostilities were recognised as 
major humanitarian tragedies.
Against the background of the virtual absence of references to the indi-
vidual states in the Polish national debate, the position of the European 
Commission diﬀ erentiating the states is of growing importance. Considering 
that Poland does not play a role of major advocate of any of the states of the 
region within the EU, the Commission’s assessments are generally accepted as 
accurate. Particular attention is paid in the oﬃ  cial statements and few media 
reports that are released on the issue of the co-operation of the governments 
of the states of the region with the international bodies dealing with the 
prosecution of crimes against humanity in the former Yugoslavia. It is note-
worthy that the Polish Foreign Ministry oﬃ  cials on several occasions have 
singled out the record of collaboration as a key indicator of the countries’ 
commitment to the EU course. 
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Level of Support for Different Western Balkan Countries
 e ranking of support for the accession of countries in Southeastern 
Europe remains stable among the Polish respondents and corresponds to that 
of the EU-25. Croatia is consistently the country with top support (70 %), 
followed by Macedonia (63 %), Bosnia and Herzegovina (61 %), Serbia and 
Montenegro (60 %), Albania (59 %) and Turkey (51 %).⁸
Table 2. Support Levels for the Accession of Countries of Southeastern Europe
Date Croatia Macedonia Bosnia & H. Serbia & M. Albania Turkey
EB 65.2 04/2006 70 63 61 60 59 51
EB 64.2 11/2005 70 57 55 55 48 42
EB 63.4 06/2005 74 63 62 61 56 54
Source: Eurobarometer
Only a small minority (4 %) of the Polish respondents believed that the 
accession of Western Balkan countries would be primarily in the interest of 
their own state—which is around the average for the EU-25. However, fewer 
respondents in Poland than in the EU-25 asserted that the accession would be 
mainly in the interest of the acceding states (38 % compared to 45 %), while 
relatively more believed that the accession was in the common interest of the 
EU and Western Balkan states (31 % compared to 23 %) or primarily in the 
interest of the EU (13 % compared to 9 %).
Virtually no coverage of the issue of EU enlargement to the Southeast in 
the Polish press indicates that the support levels may be unrelated to the state 
of bilateral relations or the awareness of the merits of the applicants from that 
region. Although the respondents do not claim to attribute much signiﬁ cance 
to the questions of culture or geography, personal experiences and judgments 
based on the perceived distance play a role. While the support levels remain 
far above those found in many other EU states, a similar pattern prevails in 
which the highest support is reserved for states that are perceived as clearly 
belonging to Europe in a geographic as well as the cultural sense. 
However, the absence of the debate on the desirability of EU member-
ship for either the eastern neighbours or states of Southeastern Europe that 
enjoy the highest support (Croatia or Macedonia) is striking.  is silence 
8)  QD16 of Eurobarometer 65.2 (255)
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conﬁ rms the issues of geography and religion are not among the terms that 
would be explicitly central to the debate on further enlargement to the East 
European region.  is may reﬂ ect the perception that the states of the region 
are unquestionably within the geographical boundaries of Europe and their 
shared Slavic and Christian identities are acknowledged. However, some 
correlation between the cultural distance and the weakening support for EU 
accession could be noted in the cases of Albania and Turkey, which are con-
sistently at the bottom of the rankings. Recent trends indicate a convergence 
of support for most Western Balkan states at around 60 % (with the exception 
of Croatia at 70 %), while the Turkish candidacy has seen a slippage with only 
slightly more than a half in support.
Conclusions
Several Western Balkan states have expressed hope that Poland would be 
among the champions of this enlargement. Are these expectations realistic? 
 ere are some reasons warranting optimism in this regard. Firstly, Poland 
is vitally interested in keeping the overall momentum of enlargement and 
the progress in accession negotiations of any candidate demonstrates the 
viability of the process as a whole. Secondly, given the diﬃ  cult ‘climate’ for 
enlargement in the EU, the candidacies of the smaller Balkan states are seen 
as relatively easier to accept than that of Ukraine or Turkey, so the success 
of these countries may be viewed as a way out of the recent deadlock over 
the entire issue. Finally, since the Balkan candidates are post-Communist 
European states, their accession is regarded (as was the inclusion of Bulgaria 
and Romania) to be a continuation of the process of bridging of Cold-War 
divides that represented the primary rationale for the overall EU eastern 
enlargement.
 ere are also some signs of the growing signiﬁ cance of the region for 
Polish diplomacy.  e measures that were recently adopted are symbolic: 
such was the decision to use the form the Republic of Macedonia in bilat-
eral relations with Skopje; others are practical: Warsaw waived visa fees for 
the nationals of some Balkan states, paralleling the move adopted for the 
citizens of Ukraine and Moldova.  e region is becoming an increasingly 
important area for the Polish development aid, reﬂ ecting the preoccupation 
with stabilizing the once war-torn areas and advancing the transition to liberal 
democracy and market economy through the recourse to own experience of 
transformation.
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However, Poland is likely to remain in the second line of supporters of the 
accession of this group of countries.  ere are some reasons for the low-key 
position of Warsaw. Firstly, Poland has not identiﬁ ed vital national interests 
in the area going beyond the general support for continuing enlargement and 
the wish to stabilise the EU’s neighbourhood. Secondly, no single country 
has been selected as a ‘strategic partner’ along the lines adopted towards 
Ukraine (Croatia’s candidacy has been warmly welcomed; however, Poland 
has not taken a leading position on this candidacy, either). Finally, the current 
government and president stress the need to focus on a few priority issues as 
part of Poland’s activism in the EU.
Nonetheless, another process is likely to take place. Just as it happened 
with Bulgaria and Romania, their accession increased the Polish interest in 
increasing bilateral relations.  e Balkan candidates and would-be mem-
bers will be prized by the Polish government as potential allies within the 
Union, representing the once minority view of the more market-oriented and 
Euroatlantic course for Europe.  e anchoring of the states in the EU norms 
is likely to have an appealing eﬀ ect on the level of commercial exchange and 
investment for the Polish businesses. 
Clearly, the ultimate objective for Polish diplomacy is extending the EU 
eastwards to include Belarus and Ukraine. However, the accession of south-
east European states is not seen as a detour or alternative to reaching that 
goal. In the current ‘cold climate’ for enlargement in general, the continu-
ation of the process is particularly welcome as a signal of the fundamental 
commitment to accept the qualiﬁ ed members. Although Poland will not be 
among the key champions of this direction of enlargement, it will certainly 
cheer the progress on that front, too.
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THE DEBATE ON THE EU 
MEMBERSHIP PROSPECTS 
OF UKRAINE
Olga Shumylo, International Centre for Policy Studies, Kyiv
“Noted Western analysts are still debating whether the Orange Revolution was 
a revolution per se or simply a spectacular phase in the unﬁ nished Ukrainian revo-
lution of 1991.  is question makes no sense to me because what really matters is the 
essence, not a formal deﬁ nition.  e Orange Revolution did more than rediscover 
Ukraine for the world that had forgotten all about it. Most importantly, this 
revolution discovered the Ukraine for us. We turned capable of ﬁ ghting for our 
rights, of making sacriﬁ ces, and even of showing mercy to the defeated enemy” 
Maksym STRIKHA, Ph.D., Ukrainian writer
Introduction
European integration has been on Ukraine’s agenda since its independ-
ence.  ere has been a period identiﬁ ed as ‘integration without Europeaniza-
tion’¹ during the Kuchma regime, and later on it was followed by a number of 
‘real integration’ steps (e.g. the EU-Ukraine Action Plan with clear priorities 
and monitoring procedures). Ukraine will have to make another signiﬁ cant 
step towards the EU by signing the New Enhanced Agreement.  is agree-
ment, especially its part on free trade, will go beyond the liberalisation of 
trade in goods and services between the EU and Ukraine. It will primarily aim 
1)  Wolczuk, W. (2004), Integration without Europeanization: Ukraine and its Policy towards the European Union, Working Paper, 
Robert Schumann Centre, European University Institute, Florence.
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at adjusting Ukraine’s regulatory policy and economic governance rules to 
those of the EU. Given the lack of EU membership prospects in the mid- and 
long-run, Ukraine must take as much as possible from what is being oﬀ ered 
now.  e Ukrainian oﬃ  cials and independent experts are now discussing 
the form of the future relations with the EU.  ey are trying to ﬁ nd the best 
formula for ensuring the domestic reform and instruments to modernise the 
country’s economy. However, the public debate misses the connection with 
the reality as it primarily focuses on membership prospects for Ukraine and 
does not discuss any alternative to membership. 
The Political Situation in Ukraine in the Aftermath of the 
Orange Revolution: The Context for Thinking ‘European’
 e Orange Revolution paved the way to democratic parliamentary 
elections in spring 2006.  e Party of Regions gained 184 seats out of 450 
seats, whereas the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc (BYT) and Our Ukraine party 
gained 125 and 80 seats respectively.  e coalition-building process took 
longer than it was expected in the West.  e reason behind such a delay 
was the lack of experience in building coalitions and negotiating a policy 
agenda rather than bargaining for positions within the new government. 
 e ﬁ rst attempt of coalition-building made by Our Ukraine, the Yulia 
Tymoshenko Bloc and the Socialist Party of Ukraine (SPU) failed due to 
the unwillingness of certain politicians to put the country’s interests ahead, 
as well as due to various disagreements over a number of policy issues. Our 
Ukraine stood on more economically liberal, and pro-European, and pro-
Euro-Atlantic position, whereas the SPU (and partially the BYT) advocated 
for free healthcare and education, a ban on the sale of land and abstention 
from NATO membership. 
 e collapse of the Orange coalition in July 2006 allowed for the appear-
ance of a new ‘Anti-Crisis’ Coalition that was comprised of the Party of 
Regions, the Socialist Party of Ukraine and the Communist Party of Ukraine. 
 e coalition’s agenda diﬀ ered signiﬁ cantly from the president’s agenda, 
especially in the foreign policy domain. However, a number of consultations 
between the President and diﬀ erent political parties resulted in an agreement 
of all political parties and in the signing of a Manifesto of National Unity. 
 e Manifesto re-conﬁ rmed Ukraine’s adherence to integration with the EU, 
co-operation with NATO and further domestic reform.  e document was 
perceived as a victory of the president as it allowed all forces to agree on 
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Box 1. Ukraine’s Foreign Policy Priorities
crucial issues. At the same time, its implementation remains problematic as 
the ‘anti-crisis’ coalition is making attempts to evade the implementation of 
certain points of the Manifesto (e.g. co-operation with NATO). 
 ere are a number of foreign policy priorities that have been deﬁ ned by 
the president and accepted by the new government, such as WTO accession, 
the normalisation of relations with Russia, further integration with the EU 
and co-operation with NATO². All political parties agree with these priorities; 
however, each party interprets them in its own way. 
 ese priorities are important for Ukraine’s integration into the 
world’s trade and economic systems as well as for the country’s economic 
growth and development.
WTO accession:  is process has lasted for almost 14 years. Ukraine is 
close to completing its bilateral negotiations with the members of the 
WTO working group.³  ere are no controversies on the importance of 
WTO accession for Ukraine. However, the political parties diverge on 
the terms and conditions of Ukraine’s membership. For instance, the PoR 
and the SPU proposed transition periods for the protection of domestic 
producers to be ensured in the accession documents.  e Parliament 
still has to adopt a number of important dra  laws to secure Ukraine’s 
accession.⁴ WTO membership is a pre-condition for the beginning of 
negotiations on an EU-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement.
Relations with Russia:  e previous governments (of Yulia Tymoshenko 
and Yuri Yekhanurov) have failed to develop an appropriate coherent 
policy towards Russia.  e coalition government declared the trans-
formation of relations with Russia from confrontation to ‘pragmatic
2)  However, the positions of the President Yuschenko and Prime Minister Yanukovych diverge over NATO. The President advocates for 
Ukraine’s indisputable accession to NATO, whereas the Prime Minister has a more reserved opinion. During his last visit to Brussels, 
the Prime Minister stated that Ukraine was not ready to become a member and that the citizens of Ukraine would have to make 
their choice at the referendum. As we may see public opinion is used as a tool to slow down Ukraine’s integration into Euro-Atlantic 
structures. At the same time, the government has not yet launched an information campaign on NATO/EU membership.
3)  Kyrgyzstan remains the most problematic member of the working group. It expects Ukraine to pay the Soviet-era debts
4)  It is difficult to provide an exact number of draft laws to be adopted by the Parliament as some of them are approved in first 
reading, some are adopted in the second reading, whereas there is number of draft laws that were adopted but they still have to 
be approved by the President.
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co-operation’. Many in the West perceived that as a threat to Ukraine’s 
European integration and co-operation with NATO. By and large the 
rhetoric and the temperature of statements did change. However, it nei-
ther helped the new government negotiate a better gas deal, nor did it 
provide Russia with stronger leverage for further engagement of Ukraine 
into the Single Economic Space. 
Relations with the EU: Surprisingly to many, the relations with the 
European Union remain stable. A er a number of visits to Brussels and 
other Member State capitals paid for by the Prime Minister Yanukovych, 
the EU is keeping an open mind for the coalition government. European 
politicians and bureaucrats are waiting to see a mixture of pro-Russia and 
pro-EU rhetoric lead to deeper integration with the EU and more stable 
energy relations with Russia. “ ere has been a shi  in Yanukovych [from 
his Kuchma days], not a huge shi , but a shi  nevertheless and the EU 
should keep close ties with him to encourage this,” a senior Czech diplo-
mat stated. “ ere is understanding, especially in the new member states, 
that it is hard to cut ties with the old administration too quickly.”⁵
From the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement to the 
European Neighbourhood Policy: What Is in It for Ukraine? 
The EU-Ukraine Partnership and 
Co-operation Agreement (PCA) 
Ukraine was one of the ﬁ rst former Soviet Union countries to sign 
a Partnership and Co-operation Agreement with the EU in 1994.  e agree-
ment aimed at assisting the consolidation of the country’s democracy and 
the development of its economy. It regulated the political, economic and 
cultural relations and the bilateral trade between the EU and Ukraine.  e 
PCA came into force in 1998 only, as it took the Member States’ parliaments 
almost four years to ratify the agreement.
By and large the structure of the PCA resembled the structure of the 
Europe Agreements between the EU and Central and Eastern European 
countries of the beginning of the 1990s. However, the PCA neither became 
5)  EU Observer, 22 November 2006 [http://euobserver.com/24/22930].
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a tool for modernisation of Ukraine’s economy nor did it help facilitate the 
democratic transformation.  e agreement was almost unconditional. Hence, 
it did not provide incentives for reform. A membership perspective was 
excluded, while the major PCA ‘carrot’ – a free trade area – was foreseen only 
upon full implementation of the agreement (in ten years).  e implementa-
tion has been monitored separately and the results of progress assessment dif-
fered dramatically. For instance, the European Union was accusing Ukraine 
of applying discriminatory measures aﬀ ecting EU business as well as of poor 
enforcement of PCA-related legislation; whereas the Ukrainian side reported 
the successful adoption of EU standards and norms in various spheres. 
Ukraine sought integration with the EU without Europeanisation, i.e. 
without “extensive change of domestic institutions and policies in line with 
EU’s more or less explicit targets”.⁶ Given that Ukraine’s non-compliance 
with EU requirements bore no costs, the ruling elites failed to ﬁ nd incentives 
for the implementation of the PCA as well as for pushing domestic reform. 
 e fear of ruling elites to have much more limited policy choices in the case 
of deeper integration with the EU overweighed the attractiveness of potential 
technical assistance and FDI ﬂ ows, which could spring up if Ukraine was 
put on the accession track. 
 e EU-Ukraine relations have developed from partnership of the begin-
ning of 1990s to a more advanced form of co-operation. A number of steps 
made by both sides allow us to conclude that Ukraine ﬁ nally started moving 
towards ‘real integration’.  e period of mutual dissatisfaction and disillu-
sionment seems over now.  e EU and Ukraine are concerned with larger 
problems, such as the institutional crisis, the slowdown of the economic 
growth in a number of old Member States, as well as a burden of further 
enlargement for the EU; whereas Ukraine has yet to ﬁ nd a model for its 
political and economic transformation. 
The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)
 e European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) has been developed as 
a framework policy for the relations with the whole EU neighbourhood, 
including Ukraine.  e ENP is a rather vague, albeit ﬂ exible, framework 
that stretches beyond the existing relations and oﬀ ers a possibility for 
deeper political relationship and economic integration.  e major ‘carrot’ 
6)  Wolczuk, W. (2004), Integration without Europeanization: Ukraine and its Policy towards the European Union, Working Paper, 
Robert Schumann Centre, European University Institute, Florence
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of the ENP is deﬁ ned as a stake in the EU’s Internal Market in response 
to signiﬁ cant reform on the Ukrainian side. By and large, this ‘carrot’ 
should serve as an incentive for Ukraine’s compliance with the expensive 
EU acquis. Although an accession perspective was not oﬀ ered, the ENP 
brought some positive developments, such as “light” conditionality attached 
to bilateral ENP Action Plans.⁷ It was a mutually agreed document that 
set the agenda for country’s economic and political reform with clearly 
deﬁ ned short- and medium-term priorities and a number of entry points 
for EU’s support.  e progress of implementation is being monitored by 
the European Commission on a regular basis. 
Given the short time span of the ENP, it is diﬃ  cult to assess the impact of 
its conditionality on Ukraine’s transformation. However, it holds true that 
the ENP laid the foundation for Ukraine’s deeper integration with the EU. 
 e inclusion of the political Copenhagen criterion into the AP paved the 
way for further democratisation. Regular monitoring of the Action Plan’s 
implementation in a manner similar to the Commission’s Regular Reports 
on accession countries can make the non-compliance more costly for the 
Ukrainian side. Moreover, another ENP ‘carrot’ – an EU-Ukraine Free Trade 
Agreement – may provide a tool for modernisation of country’s economy and 
its deeper integration with the EU. 
Ukrainian Public Opinion on the EU 
and Ukraine’s European Choice
Overview
A brief explanation should be given prior to the description of what 
Ukrainian politicians, non-political elites, expert community, and the public 
at large think about the EU and Ukraine’s integration with it. First of all 
it should be mentioned that the European integration is closely connected 
with the Euro-Atlantic integration in people’s minds. Moreover, many 
Ukrainians (both politicians and the public) link and contrast European 
integration with country’s relations with its Eastern neighbours, such as 
Russia and other CIS countries. Furthermore, the Ukrainian population 
perceives European integration as a foreign policy priority rather than 
a framework for domestic reform. 
7)  The EU-Ukraine Action Plan was signed in spring 2005. 
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 e opinion on Ukraine’s foreign policy priorities could be divided into 
three following categories: 
 •  those who support EU and NATO membership simultaneously,
 •  those who support EU membership but oppose NATO membership, and 
 •  those who oppose EU and NATO membership. 
At the same time, there are people who are sending mixed messages to the 
policy-makers as they support both Ukraine’s membership in the EU and 
the country’s participation in the union with Russia and Belarus (24 % of 
the population).⁸  ere is also a group of people who advocate for a neutral 
status of Ukraine (the number of such vary). With these explanatory notes 
in mind, it is easier to understand the complexity of Ukraine’s oﬃ  cial line, 
the positions of the political parties, non-political elites and the public 
opinion. 
The Official Position
 e oﬃ  cial position remains intact even a er the victory of the Party of 
Regions in the last Parliamentary elections and the formation of the ‘anti-
crisis’ coalition.  e Prime Minister Yanukovych (as well as his coalition 
partners) signed the above-mentioned Manifesto of National Unity that 
contained a statement on Ukraine’s adherence to European integration. In 
accordance with the amended Constitution, the President has a right to deﬁ ne 
foreign policy priorities. He remains the main guarantor of the continuity of 
the country’s pro-European path. 
The Political Parties 
According to political parties’ programmes there is a clear line between the 
pro-Russian Party of the Regions (PoR) and the pro-Western Our Ukraine. 
 e pre-election slogans of the PoR were based on the idea of closer ties 
with Russia, on granting the Russian language a status of a second oﬃ  cial 
language, and on abstaining from NATO membership. However, the last few 
months illustrated the inconsistency between the pre-election declarations 
and post-election actions. First and foremost, a signiﬁ cant part of the PoR 
(e.g. businessmen turned into politicians) is interested in closer ties with the 
8)  Press releases of the National Institute of Strategic Studies 
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EU. It will open a door to the EU Internal Market for Ukrainian exporters 
and grant them access to cheaper resources. 
 e opinions of the parties diverge signiﬁ cantly when it comes to the 
country’s relations with NATO. Our Ukraine party is the only party that 
fully supports Ukraine’s membership in NATO.  e Party of Regions and 
the Socialist Party advocate a referendum on NATO membership.  e 
position of the BYT is not clearly identiﬁ ed. At the same time three par-
ties out of ﬁ ve (PoR, SPU and the Communist Party) support Ukraine’s 
neutral status. 
On the one hand, all ﬁ ve parties have diﬀ erent opinions regarding 
Ukraine’s participation in the Single Economic Space (SES).⁹ However, all 
of them (except for communists) agree that ‘a free trade zone’ is the ultimate 
goal of Ukraine’s participation within the EU as it may help increase trade 
ﬂ ows with the neighbours. However, very few politicians are ready to endorse 
a customs union with Russia and CIS countries, as well as to transfer national 
power to a supranational body. 
 e results of the recent parliamentary elections led to a shi  of public 
support to le -wing parties.  e Communist Party and the SPU gained sig-
niﬁ cant support. Both parties are members of the ruling coalition. Both have 
a pro-Russian orientation and are the opponents of Ukraine’s membership in 
NATO and the EU (albeit to diﬀ erent extent). However, voters’ support of 
these parties should not be attributed to increasing support for pro-Russian 
and/or anti-NATO, anti-EU views. Such support can be explained by the 
disappointment with the economic diﬃ  culties of Ukraine’s transformation 
process.¹⁰  e centrist parties with a pro-EU orientation could get more 
votes during the last elections. However, the lack of public support could 
be attributed to the inability to come up with a solid common position and 
to form blocs with each other. 
Ukrainian Non-Political Elites 
In brief, the position of non-political elites is shi ing towards Euroscepti-
cism, which is a response to a number of events of the last few years.  e 
greatest disappointment with the EU was a lack of a response from the EU in 
9)  The SES has been initiated by Russia in order to tie its former partners to the former Soviet Union. Russia’s idea stretches from the need 
to create an EEU free trade zone, followed by a customs and monetary union. The European Union is based as a model for the EEU.
10)  The Results of Parliamentary Elections and their Possible Consequences for Ukraine’s Foreign Policy can be found at http://www.
niss.gov.ua/book/journal/Ukr2010.htm
67
Olga Shumylo – The Debate on the EU Membership Prospects of Ukraine
the immediate a ermath of the Orange Revolution.  e understanding of the 
lack of EU membership prospects in the short- and medium-term is reﬂ ected 
in debates of the elites over the future of Ukraine. Some say that Ukraine has 
no chance due to its large population and endless failures to implement the 
reform.  erefore, they expect that the European bureaucrats will oppose 
Ukraine’s membership to avoid an additional workload. Others believe that 
Europeans lost their ‘zeal’ and became inert and incapable of renewal.  us, 
there is no perspective of Europe’s further development. 
At the same time, the elites do not oﬀ er a clear and coherent strategy for 
Ukraine’s relations with the EU, Russia and the US.  e majority of experts 
agree with the formula most commonly used among the Ukrainian elite: “if 
we do not have membership prospects, we should focus on the beneﬁ ts of 
the ENP and ‘four freedoms’ promised by the EU”.
The Mass Media
 e local mass media is a primary source of any EU-related information 
for many Ukrainians (61.1 %).¹¹  e second largest source of information is 
people-to-people contacts, which accounts for 36 %.¹² However, it cannot 
be used to a full extent due to restrictions on the movement of Ukrainian 
citizens in the EU.¹³ 
Since 2005 the amount of information about the EU (e.g. the EU enlarge-
ment, the budget, the failure of the Constitution, institutional reforms, the 
accession of Turkey and the Balkans, etc.) and separate EU Member States 
(EU presidency, economic and political issues, attitude towards further 
enlargement) has increased both on television, the radio and in the printed/
electronic press.  is helps enlighten the Ukrainian public and provides 
topics for further public debate. When it comes to the EU-Ukraine relations, 
journalists primarily focus on the country’s membership prospects. Very little 
attention is devoted to the consequences of the enlargement debate within the 
EU, the EU’s current policy towards Ukraine and the assessment of possible 
beneﬁ ts of the ENP for Ukraine. 
 e Ukrainian mass media does not provide enough materials – both 
in terms of quantity and quality – for a comprehensive awareness raising 
campaign.  is can be explained by the lack of a government policy, the 
11)  An abstract from the analytical report of the Razumkov Centre at www.uceps.kiev.ua
12)  Ibid.
13)  Around 54 % of Ukrainian citizens have been abroad.
68
Bulgaria, Romania... and who next?
lack of contracts for the state-owned media, and the lack of incentives for 
the privately-owned media. Moreover, it can also be attributed to the much 
more event-rich internal politics of the last few years. Last but not least, 
Ukrainian journalists lack knowledge about the EU (e.g. its institutions, 
policies, and possibilities). 
Partially, the latter problem is being tackled with the help of the Delegation 
of the European Commission in Ukraine through the support to Ukrainian 
journalists from Ukraine-wide and regional television and radio companies, 
printed press, Internet newspapers and information agencies for their short-
term study visits to the EU institutions. However, there is a need for more 
advanced training for the Ukrainian journalists to turn them into an eﬀ ective, 
impartial transmitter of the EU-related information.
The Public Opinion
 e public debate reﬂ ects the growing euroscepticism and ‘euroindiﬀ er-
ence’ of some politicians and representatives of the non-political elite.  e 
EU is perceived as a distant partner with alien problems.  e majority of the 
Ukrainian population does not understand the EU’s problems and concerns 
(e.g. enlargement fatigue, economic slowdown); the population remains an 
outsider of the European integration process.¹⁴ 
Table 1. A Portrait of a Proponent and an Opponent 
of Ukraine’s European Integration¹⁴
Proponent Opponent
Ukrainian by nationality
Ukrainian-speaking person Ethnic Russian 
A citizen of western or central Ukraine A citizen of eastern or southern Ukraine
A citizen proud of his/her 
Ukrainian citizenship
A person who perceives him/herself 
a USSR citizen
A person from a city or village with 
a population higher than 250,000 
A person from a small village, town
A person of 20 to 40 years old 
An older person (27.6 % – 50+ years old, 
almost 23 % – in the group of 30–50 years old)
14)  The table draws heavily on the materials of the National Institute of Strategic Studies of 2005-2006
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In accordance with the Democratic Initiative Foundation (DIF), 56 % 
of Ukrainians supported EU membership in 2000 and 2001, and 25 % and 
23 % would vote for NATO membership in 2000 and 2001 accordingly. Only 
10 % and 8 % of respondents were against Ukraine’s membership in the EU; 
whereas NATO membership was opposed by 34 % and 33 % of Ukrainians 
in 2000 and 2001 accordingly.¹⁵ 
 e results of DIF opinion poll in May 2004 revealed that 56 % of Ukrain-
ians still support the country’s membership in the EU, and NATO member-
ship was supported by 27 %. However, the number of opponents of both the 
EU and NATO membership grew to 20 % and 49 % accordingly.  is could 
be explained by the debates that preceded the 2004 Presidential elections. In 
2005 the public opinion was still quite supportive of Ukraine’s membership 
in the EU. Forty-four percent of the respondents were for the EU accession, 
28 % were against and 28 % would abstain from partaking in the referendum.¹⁶ 
 e results of the opinion poll of the National Institute for Strategic Studies 
(NISS) are less optimistic: “the support for Ukraine’s membership in the EU 
decreased from 55 % in 2001, to 47 % in 2005, and 43 % in 2006”.¹⁷ 
 e public support of EU membership remains to be a quite stable vari-
able. However, the number of EU opponents is growing. Some explain this 
impact by the negative attitude towards Ukraine’s membership prospect 
within the EU Member States. However, neither the statements of EU poli-
ticians nor the negative public opinion has had impact on the perception 
of Ukrainians. Moreover, the results of various opinion polls from the EU 
Member States (see Box 2 below) provide a ‘rosy picture’ of the European’s 
attitude towards Ukrainians and the possibility of Ukraine’s accession to 
the EU in the future.
15)  Press releases of the Democratic Initiatives Foundation at www.dif.org.ua
16)  The results of the opinion poll held by the Democratic Initiative Foundation in co-operation with Kyiv International Institute of 
Sociology on 4-15 February 2005. The results could be found at www.dif.org.ua in the DIF press release.
17)  “Ukrainian society”, Sociological monitoring of the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Science of Ukraine 
(2005-2006). 
70
Bulgaria, Romania... and who next?
 
Box 2. EU Public Opinion on Ukraine’s Membership Prospects
Bertelsmann Sti ung Opinion Poll¹⁸: One in three Europeans believes 
Ukraine will be among the new members. When asked about the prospects 
for individual countries, only 37 % think that Turkey will become a full 
member and 35 % believe that Ukraine will achieve full member status. 
Only one in three Europeans, however, predict that Turkey or Ukraine 
will be among the new members.  e majority of respondents believed 
that both countries would not join the Union by 2020. Only a handful 
of the respondents from the Central and Eastern Europe could envisage 
Turkey or/and Ukraine as EU members in ﬁ  een years’ time. 
TNS Sofres Opinion Poll: A recent survey conducted by TNS Sofres 
showed that 53 % of respondents from Germany were against Ukraine’s 
accession, whereas 41 % opted for it. In contrast, only 37 % of French 
respondents were against Ukraine’s membership versus 58 % of those 
in favour.  e opinion on Ukraine’s membership diﬀ ered signiﬁ cantly 
in Poland where 77 % of those interviewed supported Ukraine’s acces-
sion to the EU and only 12 % were against. Spain and Italy represent an 
interesting case: 60 % and 62 % of the respondents (respectively) backed 
Ukraine’s membership. 
 e decline of support for Ukraine’s membership could be explained by 
the growing disappointment and disillusionment of the Ukrainian public over 
domestic institutions, political parties and separate politicians.¹⁸ 
 e public opinion is grounded on little knowledge about the EU.  e 
costs and beneﬁ ts of integration, and possible alternatives (e.g. integration 
without membership, all except institutions oﬀ ered by the EU) are not clear 
to the public. Although it is frequently advertised in the Ukrainian society, 
the idea of European integration lacks a solid basis of knowledge in order to 
be deeply rooted in public perception.  e discourse on European integration 
in Ukraine did not change in essence even with the shi  of political elites.  e 
initiatives of the EC Delegation in Ukraine, as well as the targeted activities 
18)  The Bertelsmann Stiftung survey was conducted in August and September 2006 throughout thirteen EU Member States by the 
opinion research institute tns/EMNID. It was a representative survey that polled over 10,000 people. The countries that took part 
in the survey represent 88 % of the total EU population. The survey covered all geographic regions throughout the EU and included 
old as well as new members, net contributors and net recipients. 
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of NGOs are not able to provide enough information.  e government does 
almost nothing to feel this gap. Public information campaigns have failed 
both internally and externally. 
One of the factors that did inﬂ uence public opinion was the anti-NATO 
information campaign by a number of parties during the parliamentary elec-
tions on 2006. Some political parties (SPU, the Communist Party and others) 
claimed that the EU “did not want Ukraine”. Moreover, given the perceived 
connection between NATO and EU membership, the EU accession debate 
acquired additional negative connotations. Indirectly, the results of the 
parliamentary elections reﬂ ect the shi  in public opinion; this was, however, 
more a choice driven by an internal political crisis, rather than by a shi  in 
geopolitical orientation in the minds of ordinary Ukrainians. 
The New EU Member States and Ukraine’s 
Membership Prospects 
By and large, the new EU Member States are in favour of further EU 
enlargement and Ukraine’s deeper integration with the EU. Despite rather 
similar support for Ukraine’s European aspirations in the national capitals, 
the public attitude diﬀ ers signiﬁ cantly. With the exception of Poland, the rest 
of the new Member States have not had a wide public debate on Ukraine’s 
place in the EU. Nonetheless, it is possible to identify the main patterns of 
the debate in these countries and explain the logic behind it. 
 e presence of a large Ukrainian diaspora and labour migrant group in 
the Czech Republic makes the debate over Ukraine’s future in the EU more 
intensive and controversial, whereas the debate in Slovenia (which lacks 
a Ukrainian diaspora) is quite moderate.  e introduction of a visa regime 
between the Czech Republic and Ukraine inﬂ uenced the creation of a nega-
tive public attitude among Ukrainians. As a result, the number of Ukrainian 
tourists to the Czech Republic fell dramatically mainly as a consequence 
of the above-mentioned decision. Furthermore, people-to-people contacts 
between the Czechs and Ukrainians also decreased. 
Neither the Czech Republic nor Slovenia has explicitly positioned itself as 
a regional leader in the enlarged EU (unlike Poland).  erefore, Ukrainians 
do not perceive the Czech Republic as a possible supporter or advocate of 
Ukraine’s interests in the EU. 
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Conclusions
Ukraine has already materialised on the EU’s map in the a ermath of the 
EU enlargement and the Orange Revolution.  e possibility of the accession 
of Turkey and the Western Balkan countries raises the question of Ukraine’s 
possible membership in the EU. On the other hand, Ukrainians have proven 
to adhere to democratic values, which remain the core issue in Europe. If the 
EU wants to maintain its role as an important global player and see the impact 
of its ‘transforming power’, it will have to ﬁ nd new forms of co-operation 
with Ukraine. A deep free trade between the EU and Ukraine could be the 
ﬁ rst step towards Ukraine’s real integration. 
 e debate on Ukraine’s European integration will continue. It will be 
inﬂ uenced by the domestic politics (e.g. the sustainability of the coalition, its 
ability to deliver the promises, the increase of gas prices in 2006) as well as 
by the messages sent from Brussels and other Member States’ capitals. 
Appendix:
Public Opinion on Ukraine’s Foreign 
Policy Priorities by Regions (in %)
¹⁹
Table 1. The Desirable Way of Ukraine’s Development in 1994 (in %)¹⁹
Western 
Ukraine
Central 
Ukraine
Southern 
Ukraine
Eastern 
Ukraine
Through intensiﬁ ed co-operation 
with Western counties
28 11 8 7
Through co-operation within 
the CIS 
17 42 47 50
Through orientation 
on Russia
11 18 16 20
Through use of the country’s 
own resources
23 12 12 7
19)  Abstracts from http://www.niss.gov.ua/Monitor/Monitor45/001.htm 
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²⁰
Table 2. The Desirable Way of Ukraine’s Development in 2001 (in %)²⁰
Western 
Ukraine
Central 
Ukraine
Southern 
Ukraine
Eastern 
Ukraine
Through intensiﬁ ed co-operation 
with Western counties
27 13 11 5
Through co-operation within 
the CIS 
11 18 17 18
Through orientation on Russia 2 5 8 11
Through use of the country’s 
own resources
37 20 19 11
²¹
Table 3. The Desirable Way of Ukraine’s Development in 2005 (in %)²¹
Western 
Ukraine
Central 
Ukraine
Southern 
Ukraine
Eastern 
Ukraine
Through intensiﬁ ed co-operation 
with Western counties
39 16 14 7
Through co-operation within 
the CIS 
5 11 12 14
Through orientation on Russia 2 8 11 11
Through use of the country’s 
own resources
31 23 17 10
20)  Ibid
21)  Ibid
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THE TURKISH ACCESSION 
TO THE EUROPEAN UNION:
MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL? 
MUTUALLY POSSIBLE?
Seda Domaniç
Introduction
Turkey and the EU have a more than 40-year-old contractual relationship, 
which was provided with a clear road map on December 2004 with the deci-
sion to open up accession negotiations. It is now over one year that Turkey 
and the EU have been sitting at the negotiation table yet, while the talks 
are progressing at a technical level, the political relations between the two 
partners have soured over a number of critical issues including for and most 
the question of Cyprus. 
Currently, the highly-politicized Cyprus issue is a stalemate and there 
is little hope for reaching an agreement prior to the Turkish parliamentary 
elections to take place in November 2007. Diverging from the status quo, 
the Turkish government in power since 2002 has followed a proactive and 
positive role in supporting the acceptance of a long-lasting settlement on 
the island within the framework of the latest UN plan, the so-called ‘Annan 
plan’. Turkish Cypriots too showed their approval of settlement by voting 
65 % yes in the referendum of 24 April 2004. However, the plan was voted 
down by Greek Cypriots, then assured of EU membership with or without 
a settlement. To provide some compensation, the EU made two promises 
to the Turkish Cypriots, which it then fell short of keeping: i) to provide 
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ﬁ nancial assistance worth 256 million USD and ii) to establish some direct 
trade links with the Turkish Cypriot part of the island. 
Given its constructive Cyprus policy over the last years, the Turkish 
government now feels that it has shown its good-will and it is time for both 
Greek Cypriots and the EU to reciprocate. Without meaningful reciprocation, 
Prime Minister Erdoğan states, a further move from the Turkish part can in 
no way be justiﬁ ed in the eyes of the Turkish citizens¹, who feel injustice 
has been done to the Turkish Cypriots. On the other side, for the EU, the 
opening of Turkish ports and airports to Greek Cypriot vessels and planes 
is a contractual obligation for Turkey to fulﬁ ll based on the extension of 
the Customs Union agreement between Turkey and the EU to the 10 New 
Member State; and without its fulﬁ llment, the negotiations, at least in certain 
chapters, can not proceed. 
Analysts are currently concentrating on the possibility of four scenarios²: 
i)  e optimistic case where a compromise is found on the Cyprus issue on 
the basis of concessions made to Northern Cyprus to give enough room to 
the Turkish government to open up ports and airports, ii)  e negotiations 
chapters, which directly relate to the Customs Union, are suspended, iii) 
Negotiations are slowed down, and the EU gives a ‘rendez-vous’ to revalu-
ate the status of negotiations, iv)  e EU heads of state decides on a total 
suspension of the negotiations. 
Although the last scenario is highly unlikely since the stakes are too high 
to risk, it is still interesting to observe how the issue of Cyprus can threaten 
the future of a long-lasting partnership with long-term mutual beneﬁ ts.  e 
principle of pacta sund servanda, that prior commitments must be kept, is 
a highly cherished value in Turkey as well as it is in Europe.  erefore, both 
partners need to keep up to their promises and rebuild the mutual trust 
that is necessary to keep up the momentum of integration. However, in the 
current context, trust can only be fostered if both sides can manage to shi  
their focus towards mutually beneﬁ cial aspects of this partnership and see 
the larger picture. 
In the next part of the paper, I will try to highlight the areas of mutual 
interest and point out what contribution can Turkish accession bring to the 
European Union in these ﬁ elds. 
1)  H.E. R. Tayyip Erdoğan, Speech delivered at 2nd AKP Grand Party Congress, 11 November 2006 [http://www.akparti.org.tr/] 
2)  For a detailed discussion of the possible scenarios, see Hughes, K., “Turkey and the EU: Four Scenarios: From Train Crash to Full 
Steam Ahead,” A Friends of Europe Report in association with Chatham House and the European Institute of the London School 
of Economics, September 2006
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Challenges in the EU-Turkey Relationship
Both Turkey and the EU are faced with similar global challenges, the solu-
tions to which can be better found by working together. In terms of eﬀ ective 
coping with the numerous exigencies of today’s world, three areas stand 
out where a stable partnership between the EU and Turkey would prove 
particularly fruitful: i) economic competitiveness, ii) managing diversity, 
and iii) global security.
Challenge # 1: Economic Competitiveness
At the turn of the millennium, Europe set itself an ambitious target of 
becoming the world’s most dynamic and competitive economy by 2010. 
Given Europe’s sluggish productivity and GDP growth rates in the recent 
years, especially compared to the emerging giants such as China and India, 
today Europe looks very far from reaching its objective. 
In contrast to the European economic slowdown, Turkey has made 
a remarkable progress since 2001 both in terms of sustaining high levels of 
economic growth and achieving macroeconomic stability.  e inﬂ ation rates 
have been reduced to single digits; the interest rates as well as public sector 
deﬁ cit and debt have been lowered to sustainable levels. At the same time, 
Turkish economy managed to constantly grow: 7.6 per cent in 2005 and at 
an annual average of 4.3 per cent for the last 15 years. 
Turkey did not only achieve stable and high GDP growth, but also 
improved its levels of productivity at a noteworthy pace. According to the 
recent survey of Economist Intelligence Unit presented in Global Competitive-
ness Report 2006, Turkey’s ranking in Global Competitiveness Index has been 
improved to 59 in 2006 from 71 just a year before. 
 e robust growth accompanied by macroeconomic stability contributed 
to a healthy investment environment in Turkey with a result of a historical 
high of 9.7 billion USD worth of Foreign Direct Investment ﬂ owing to 
Turkey in 2005.  is represents an amount six-fold higher than the yearly 
average of FDI received by Turkey over the previous decade. In the ﬁ rst 8 
months of 2006, the FDI ﬂ owing into Turkey has been 12.4 billion USD and 
was expected to reach 20 billion USD by the year end. Now, as UNCTAD’s 
World Investment Report 2006 indicates, Turkey is ranked 22ⁿd most attractive 
destination for FDI in the world, up from being the 35tʰ in 2005. Among the 
emerging markets, Turkey is now the 7tʰ most attractive FDI destination. 
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All these complimentary developments underline the vitality of the Turk-
ish economy and its potential for bringing much-needed dynamism to slow-
growing EU economy. Turkey now enjoys a big, growing, stable market with 
a steadily increasing GDP, an export oriented industrial economy and rapidly 
developing information society. What adds to this picture is the status of 
human capital, a crucial factor of production and growth in contemporary 
economies and Turkey has a very important comparative advantage in this 
regard. Continuous enhancement of human capital helps to provide the cur-
rent and future labor force with necessary skills and facilitates the adoption 
of new technologies, underpinning the conditions for a sustained economic 
growth.  erefore, it is now widely accepted that increases in human capital, 
achieved by correct educational and training policies accompanied by favo-
rable demographic trends, stand out as one of the most indispensable tools 
of socio-economic development. 
At the moment, roughly speaking 20 per cent of the Turkish population 
is below the age of 10 and as demographic trends show, by 2020 the percent-
age of the working age population to the rest will reach optimal levels. If 
Turkey manages to enhance this “demographic gi ” with correct educational 
policies and investments, Turkish human capital will be the driving force 
of sustained economic growth and structural change, not only domestically 
but also regionally. Increases in human capital would also facilitate a faster 
convergence with the EU. 
In comparison to ageing Europe, Turkey is not only rich in human energy, 
but it also plays a critical role for Europe with regards to natural energy 
resources. As it is well-known, the demand for energy in Europe is increas-
ing day by day. Especially the proportion of natural gas within total energy 
consumption is growing very rapidly in comparison to other energy sources. 
In fact, as one recent research shows, the European need for natural gas 
will increase by 160 % until 2030.³ Today Russia is the leading provider of 
Europe’s natural gas demands.  is over-dependence proves problematic in 
several ways: First, considering the rapid increase in demand, the Russian 
supplies emerge as increasingly inadequate. Findings reveal that while in the 
year 2000, 67 % of European gas imports come from Russia, in the year 2020 
this rate will inevitably fall down to 35 %.⁴ In this respect, the need for the 
3)  European Energy and Transport Trends to 2030 [http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/energy_transport/figures/trends_2030/1_pref_
en.pdf]
4)  Hafner, M., Future Natural Gas Supply Options and Supply Costs for Europe, [europa.eu.int/comm/energy/en/gas_single_market/
workshop_2002_11/external_commission/10.pdf] and Russian Energy Strategy in 2003 [www.mte.gov.ru/files/103/1354.
strategy.pdf]
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diversiﬁ cation of supply sources, particularly those from Central Asia and 
the Middle East, constitutes a critical concern. Second, this situation points 
to the necessity of diversiﬁ cation of transit paths to ensure safer access to 
energy. At the same time, the increasing dependence on natural gas obliges 
the search for alternative energy sources. 
Given this background, it becomes apparent that both Turkey and Europe 
share a common interest in building a closer cooperation with regards to 
the area of energy security, both in terms of diversiﬁ cation of supplies and 
access. Turkey is positioned as an energy corridor not only linking the East 
to West, but also the North to South, channeling the Caspian and the Middle 
Eastern energy to Europe and to world markets.  us, Turkey is already an 
important hub of energy distribution and its relevance is continuing to grow 
as new multinational projects, which will have geopolitical repercussions for 
decades to come, are becoming realized. 
 e newly functional Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipe-line is a telling 
case in point.  e 1,730 kilometer long pipeline transports Azeri crude oil 
to Turkey’s Ceyhan port via Georgia with an annual capacity of 50 million 
metric ton, which roughly amounts to 1 billion barrel per day. What is also 
particularly important about BTC is that it is indeed independent from the 
control of OPEC countries and Russia. 
Another signiﬁ cant multinational project, Nabucco, foresees the distri-
bution of Caspian natural gas to Europe via Turkey, linking Central Asian 
natural gas reserves with Central European countries. Nabucco Company 
Pipeline Study GmBH was founded on June 2004 and the state-owned 
gas companies of Greece and Turkey announced their interest to start the 
construction on the ﬁ rst stage of the pipeline, which will have the capacity 
to carry 31 billion cubic meters of gas annually. Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, 
Kazakhstan, Iraq, Egypt and maybe Iran are among the candidate source 
countries.⁵ One other project worth mentioning relates to the extension of 
currently active Blue Stream natural gas pipeline, now transporting Russian 
natural gas to Turkey.  e project involves the extension of the line to Greece, 
Italy and France and also building a parallel line to connect Russian gas to 
Israel city of Ashkalon.  e Blue Stream pipeline has the capacity to pump 
3.2 billion cubic meters of gas annually, and enjoys the potential to more 
than quadruple that amount.⁶ 
5)  Available at: [http://www.botas.gov.tr/eng/projects/allprojects/bulgaria.asp]
6)  Available at: [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4445158.stm]
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It is estimated that with the completion of the pipeline projects, Turkey’s 
Ceyhan port will become the new Rotterdam for transportation of energy 
resources to world markets.⁷ Hence, Turkey as a future member of the EU 
would support European energy security both in terms of diversiﬁ cation of 
supplies and access routes.
Challenge # 2: Managing Diversity
From its start, the European Union has been a visionary project of achiev-
ing ‘unity in diversity’ by bringing various nationalities and cultures to work 
together towards common objectives of peace and prosperity. While on the 
one side the European project is trying to progress by espousing the values 
of multiculturalism, on the other side our contemporary world is marked by 
an increasing tension between diﬀ erent religious and cultural world views. 
A quick glance to the current global setting suggests that one of the major 
assets of the Union is that it now stands out as the strongest candidate to set 
an example of successful coexistence. 
 e Turkish accession into the EU would further strengthen Europe’s 
global so  power and substantiate the intercultural dialogue between the 
Christian and Muslim populations. 
In return, the European Union membership would irrevocably consolidate 
Turkish democracy and refute the claim that Islam and democracy cannot 
coexist.  ere are already more than 15 million Muslims living within the 
borders of the EU and their numbers are increasing daily.  us, Islam is 
already an integral part of the European culture. Given this perspective, the 
joining of Turkey to the European family would also send a signal to Euro-
pean Muslims that their cultural values are compatible with the Union. 
 e current Turkish government has been active in promoting Turkey’s 
role to foster respect and dialogue between Islamic and Western societies. 
To this end in November 2005, the Prime Ministers of Turkey and Spain 
launched a UN-backed Alliance of Civilizations Project with an objective to 
develop instruments and platforms to reduce misunderstanding among 
Islamic and Christian cultures and to ﬁ ght extremism, intolerance and terror-
ism. Within the framework of intercultural dialogue, the successful integra-
tion of Turkey into the EU, the integration of a secular but Muslim country, 
which embraces common European values such as respect for human dignity 
7)  See the article “Ahmet Çalık: Ceyhan yeni Rotterdam olacak,” Radical, 23 June 2006 [http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.
php?haberno=190966] 
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and rights, rule of law, would set an example of peaceful co-existence in the 
divided and problematic world that we currently live in. 
Challenge # 3: Global Security
A quick glance to the regions surrounding Europe also suggests that Turk-
ish and European interests converge with regards to the security questions 
involving areas such as the Balkans, Central Asia and the Middle East. In 
a report entitled “Turkey as Bridgehead and Spearhead – Integrating EU 
and Turkish Foreign Policy”, Emerson and Tocci conclude that “Turkey 
stands to be an unequivocal asset for the EU’s external policies” based on 
a combination of ‘objective factor’s and ‘normative arguments’. ⁸ Some of 
the stated factors include ‘Turkey’s role of a geographical hub for regional 
cooperation’ and her positioning to become a ‘forward base for the EU’s 
security and defense policy, for military logistics and the credibility of the 
EU’s presence in the region.’ Emerson and Tocci’s analysis show that the 
EU and Turkish foreign policies are convergent and complimentary in the 
Balkans, the Black Sea, Central Asia, Mediterranean, Saudi Arabia and the 
Gulf regions. As for the foreign policy vis-à-vis the US and the rest of the 
Middle East, the paper argues that the Turkish and EU positions are increas-
ingly becoming convergent and complimentary. 
In fact, Turkey, a reliable NATO ally since 1952, already contributes to the 
European security and defense policy through an agreement, which allows 
for the participation of non-EU NATO allies in the European Security and 
Defense Policy (ESDP). Within this framework, Turkey has so far participated 
in all EU-led military operations, with the exception of the operation in the 
Republic of Congo. Given Turkey’s strategic location and long-standing ties 
with the neighboring countries, Turkey supports the EU eﬀ orts to stabilize 
the highly volatile regions, which indeed constitute the locus of Europe’s 
main security concerns such as terrorism and illegal traﬃ  cking of drugs, 
arms and people. 
8)  Emerson, M. , Tocci, N. (2004). “Turkey as Bridgehead and Spearhead – Integrating EU and Turkish Foreign Policy,” Center for 
European Policy Studies (CEPS) Turkey in Europe Monitor No.7, July 2004
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Turkish Perspectives on the EU Membership:
While it is very important to see the strategic implications of the Turkish 
accession into the EU in a larger global context, it is as equally important to 
try to understand why so many people both in the EU and Turkey fail to do 
so. All the recent public opinion surveys reveal that there is a declining support 
for the enlargement process in the European Union, as well as in the candidate 
countries.  e following part will address this issue in more detail:
Turkish Public Opinion and the EU Membership
Traditionally, the overwhelming majority of Turkish citizens have been 
supportive of the Turkish membership to the EU, where approval rates have 
been around 60 to 70 per cent during the period prior to 2005. In terms of 
socioeconomic positioning, the support for the EU has been higher among the 
better educated, the economically better-oﬀ  and the less religiously inclined 
segments of the Turkish population. As one analyst suggests, in a certain way, 
the objective of the EU accession has been “the glue that binds together Tur-
key’s key groups: the Muslim democrats, arch-secularists, the armed forced 
and the business.”⁹
However, as it is the case with almost all candidate countries, Turkish public 
support for the EU has been constantly declining since the start of acces-
sion negotiations on 3 October 2005. According to the Eurobarometer 65 of 
Spring 2006, the percentage of Turkish population who saw EU membership 
as a “good thing” dropped down to 44 % in 2006 comparison to 55 % in fall 
2005. In fact, a more recent survey shows that absolute support for Turkey’s 
EU membership is now down to 32.2 % from 67.5 in 2004.¹⁰ According to the 
same research, 33.3 per cent of the population is indiﬀ erent to the member-
ship, while 25.6 per cent are against (in 2002, 17.9 per cent was against the 
membership).
 e decline in the Turkish support for the EU membership for the most part 
can be attributed to a parallel fall in the trust for the Union. An overwhelming 
majority, 78 per cent of the respondents of A&G research, state that they no 
longer trust the Union and 76.5 per cent believe even tougher new precondi-
9)  Grabbe, H. “From Drift to Strategy: why the EU should start accession talks with Turkey,” http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/essay_turkey_
hg_july04.pdf
10)  The research was conducted by a Turkish research company A&G on 23-24 September 2006 in 32 Turkish provinces through face-to-
face interviews with 2408 people. The research question asked whether or not the respondent woould agree with the following 
statement: “Turkey must absolutely become an EU member.”
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tions will be put forward to block the Turkish accession.  e decline in trust 
levels is also detected in the Eurobarometer 65 survey results where there is 
a noteworthy drop in the trust felt in Turkey for the European Commission 
and the European Parliament. 
Among the reasons cited for the rise in distrust is the European position vis-
à-vis the issue of Cyprus and Armenia, as well as counterproductive anti-Turkish 
accession statements of some European decision-makers. Of course, low levels 
of information among the Turkish public on how the EU works¹¹ adds to this 
bleak picture. Due to lack of understanding of the EU structure, Turks are 
o en incapable of distinguishing between the personal or national statements 
of European leaders vs. the joint statements made on behalf of the EU. 
As the Turks feel that the EU accession negotiations so far have brought 
many more sticks than carrots, the overall image of the EU is increasingly 
weakening in Turkey, where 43 per cent declares to regard the EU positively 
in 2006 in comparison to 60 per cent in autumn 2005. For the Turkish people, 
the EU’s positive image is linked, but in lesser proportions, to three major 
reasons: economic prosperity” (35 % in spring 2006 and 41 % in autumn 2005), 
social protection (21 % in 2006 and 32 % in autumn 2005) and peace (24 % in 
2006 and 23 % in autumn 2005) to be followed by democracy (18 % in spring 
2006 and 19 % in autumn 2005) and cultural diversity (16 % in spring 2006 
and 19 % in autumn 2005). 
The Turkish Political Class and the EU Integration
 e European accession has been an indispensable objective of the Turkish 
political class, both of the le  and the right, for the last 40 years. However, it 
has been the centre-right AKP government who has shown the most decisive 
political will to undertake comprehensive reforms to the fulﬁ llment of the 
Copenhagen criteria. While the espousal of EU-related reform process has 
extended the support base of AKP to include more western-oriented citizens 
and helped them to make peace with the republican institutions, it also has 
put AKP at the centre of nationalist critiques. 
Although currently none of the major opposition parties oﬃ  cially adopt 
a Euro-rejectionist position, they nevertheless exploit the issue of accession 
negotiations to gain ground vis-à-vis the AKP.  e main parties of opposi-
tion, the centre-le  Republican People’s Party (CHP), the centre-right True 
Path Party (DYP) and the Motherland Party (ANAP), and the nationalist 
11)  As Eurobarometer 65 illustrates, only 46 per cent of the Turkish public feels that they know how the EU works. 
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Nationalist Action Party (MHP) join their forces in criticizing AKP’s Euro-
pean policies, which they judge to be too yielding to European requests. As 
survey results show, nationalist feelings are in general on the rise among the 
Turkish population due to a combination of factors such as the re-emergence 
of PKK terrorism and the recent international political maneuvers surround-
ing the issues of Cyprus and Armenia. Given the current tense setting and 
the falling public support for the European cause, AKP government, which 
is to face general elections in November 2007, has been treading a ﬁ ne line 
between continuing the negotiation process and responding to its adversar-
ies’ claims on “selling out the country.”  us, despite the fact that Turkey’s 
integration into Europe has been the longest lasting political objective of the 
Republican era, at the current conjuncture; the Turkish political scene suﬀ ers 
from a lack of leadership rallying behind the European project. 
The Business Community, Civil Society and the EU Integration
 e Turkish business community has been one of the most inﬂ uential 
players in forging a closer relationship between Turkey and the EU. From 
the initiation of association talks back in 1960s to date, the support of 
the Turkish business community to the European cause has been more 
pronounced than any other advocacy group. Turkish business associations 
were the ﬁ rst ones to try to explain both at home and abroad the beneﬁ ts of 
Turkish membership to the EU. As early as 1965, the business community 
set up Economic Development Foundation to join in their forces to foster 
a better understanding of Europe in Turkey and vice versa.  e positive 
outcome of the Customs Union between Turkey and the EU (eﬀ ective since 
the beginning of 1996) for the Turkish companies and larger conglomerates 
has further strengthened the business support for the EU integration proc-
ess, which became institutionalized through the works of leading employee 
confederations such as TÜSİAD and TOBB, as well as the principal trade 
unions such as DİSK and Hak-İş. 
 e eﬀ orts of the Turkish business community have constituted an example 
to the signiﬁ cant role that the Turkish civil society has played in facilitating 
the start of accession negotiations mainly through lobbying and informational 
activities carried out both in Turkey and in Europe. From where we are stand-
ing today, it is still the Turkish civil society led by the business community who 
are in the front line of the support for Turkish entry into the EU. 
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European Public Opinion and Enlargement
Among the European populations too is a prevalent ‘enlargement fatigue’ 
and this uneasiness becomes even more pronounced when it comes to the 
case of Turkey. According to a Special Barometer 255 entitled “Attitudes 
Towards European Union Enlargement”, the ﬁ eld work of which is con-
ducted between March-May 2006 and the results published in July 2006, 
45 per cent of the Europeans are in favor of the EU enlargement in general, 
whereas 39 per cent is in favor of Turkish accession to the EU, even if Turkey 
complies with all conditions set by the EU. 
 e European public opinion is very much divided on the issue of Turkey 
varying drastically from one country to another: Austria, Germany, Cyprus, 
Greece and Luxembourg are the leading countries of opposition, whereas 
in Spain, the UK, Sweden, Slovenia, Poland, Netherlands and Denmark the 
majorities support the Turkish accession. As a general trend, the opposition 
is higher among the old members of the Union (49 per cent) in comparison 
to the 10 New Members States (40 per cent).  e two acceding countries, 
both Bulgaria and Romania, are in favor of the Turkish membership. With 
regards to the Baltic States, the support levels also vary: In Latvia, 35 per 
cent is in favor (47 per cent against), in Lithuania 33 per cent is in favor 
(42 per cent against); while 47 per cent of Estonians are in favor and only 
23 per cent are against.
As the survey illustrates, one of the major reasons behind rather low rates 
of approval is again the lack of information: 68 per cent of the respondents 
declare that they are not well informed about enlargement, whereas only 30 
per cent feels informed. To add to the case, even if they are more informed, 
the Europeans in general (with the exception of Poland and Malta out 
of the EU-25) know and hear more about the problems associated with 
enlargement rather than the beneﬁ ts. 
Economic fears stand out as the leading stumbling block in front of 
the support for enlargement, particularly in terms of delocalization and 
labor immigration. Moreover, Europeans do not perceive enlargement 
as a beneﬁ cial tool for better managing globalization and for enhancing 
Europe’s role as a key player in global politics. In fact, many fears associated 
with the process of enlargement seem to relate to the fear of globalization 
among the European citizens. 
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Conclusions
As the above picture clearly illustrates, neither the majority of Turks 
nor the Europeans perceive enlargement as a win-win situation.  e survey 
results show that both sides ﬁ nd the membership mostly in the interest of 
the opposite party, where only 30 per cent of Turks and 20 per cent of the 
European Union citizens believe that enlargement is a mutual interest to 
both.¹² Given the insuﬃ  cient popular levels of information on the merits 
of enlargement – realized and potential, the need for better explaining the 
publics that enlargement has been part of the solution to many political and 
economic concerns much more than it has been part of the problem becomes 
even more pressing. So far, both the European and Turkish decision-makers 
failed in this regard. 
 e above-presented discussion has been a modest attempt at pointing 
out to the fact that on many fronts Europe needs Turkey as much as Turkey 
needs Europe since problems that threaten international peace and prosperity 
can be tackled much more eﬀ ectively by governance structures that function 
above the national level. Cross border problems such as terrorism, weapons of 
mass destruction, climate change, economic slowdown, ageing are all global 
risks, and mutual needs can be met only through building a stable partner-
ship between the EU and Turkey, where Turkey becomes fully integrated 
into the European structure.  e attainment of such an objective requires 
fore and most sound, prudent and visionary opinion leadership in Turkey, 
as well as in Europe, much more than before.
12)  Special Eurobarometer (2006). “ Attitudes Towards EU Enlargement,” European Commission, July 2006
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THE MACEDONIAN ACCESSION 
TO THE EUROPEAN UNION
Marija Risteska, Centre for Research and Policy Making – CRPM¹
“Europa”, as the more learned of the ancient Greeks ﬁ rst conceived it, stood in sharp 
contrast to both Asia and Libya, the name then applied to the known northern part 
of Africa. Literally, “Europa” is now thought to have meant “Mainland”, rather than 
the earlier interpretation, “Sunset”. It appears to have suggested itself to the Greeks, 
in their maritime world, as an appropriate designation of the broadening, extensive 
northerly lands that lay beyond, lands with characteristics but vaguely known; yet 
these characteristics were clearly diﬀ erent from those inherent in the concepts of Asia 
and Libya, both of which, relatively prosperous and civilized, were associated closely 
with the culture of the Greeks and their predecessors.
Source: Encyclopedia Britannica
The EU and Macedonia (Western Balkans) – State of Affairs 
EU Integration Process of Macedonia
Since 17tʰ December 2005, Macedonia has been a candidate country for 
EU accession.  is has been a great achievement for a country that faced 
many challenges on its path of acquiring the candidate status. Since its inde-
pendence Macedonia experienced a Greek embargo (1993–5), suﬀ ered losses 
due to the UN sanctions against Serbia and the Kosovo crisis of 1999. Only 
1)  Background research provided by Ms.Sanja Kostovska and Ms.Natalija Spasovska, both analysts in CRPM.
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a er the country peacefully ended an interethnic conﬂ ict in 2001 it regained 
the support of the EU. Today “Macedonia in Europe” is a goal supported by 
all ethnic communities in Macedonia. Various surveys (polls)² show that the 
EU integration is the common goal which unites all citizens of Macedonia 
regardless of their ethnicity, political orientation, social status etc.
 e Macedonian EU integration is marked by the following milestones: 
 •  Macedonia was the ﬁ rst country that signed the Stabilisation and Associa-
tion Agreement on 9tʰ April 2001 in Luxembourg (SAP); it was ratiﬁ ed by 
the Macedonian Parliament on 1st June 2001, but came into eﬀ ect on 1st April 
2004, when Member States of the EU ratiﬁ ed it³
 •  On 22ⁿd March 2004 Macedonia submitted its request for membership in 
the European Union⁴
 •  On 1st October 2004 the European Commission submitted to the Govern-
ment of Macedonia a Questionnaire⁵
 •   e Government of Macedonia returned the answers to the EC Questionnaire 
on 14tʰ February 2005 to the President of the European Commission⁶
 •  On 9tʰ November 2005 the Commission issued an opinion on the Mac-
edonian application recommending a candidate status for Macedonia⁷
 •  On 17tʰ December 2005 the EU Council granted Macedonia a candidate 
status for EU membership⁸
The Macedonian “To Do List”
 e EU opened its doors to Macedonia and the Western Balkan countries⁹ 
in 1997 when the Union established a regional approach as a basic framework 
for its relationship with the Western Balkans, which meant that besides the 
fulﬁ llment of the EU Copenhagen Criteria, the countries would have to meet 
an additional condition: an established regional co-operation. At the same time 
it was proclaimed that each country will be evaluated in accordance with its 
individual achievements.  us, while the European integration of the Balkans 
2)  http://www.sei.gov.mk/portal/mak/default.asp?id=88976; http://www.sei.gov.mk/portal/mak/default.asp?id=10
3)  Macedonia in the EU; Government of the Republic of Macedonia, pp.12, 13.
4)  Ibid, p. 13.
5)  Ibid
6)  Ibid
7)  http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/the_former_yugoslav_republic_of_macedonia/key_documents_en.htm#elarg_pck_2005
8)  http://www.vlada.mk/Informacii/Dekemvri2005/i17-12-2005.htm
9)  The Western Balkan countries are: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia (Kosovo). 
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would have to go through a regional integration ﬁ rst, the countries will become 
EU members one by one according to their success in meeting the EU criteria.
 e  essaloniki Summit in July 2003, seen as “a milestone in the Euro-
pean Union’s relations with the Western Balkans”¹⁰, gave an unambiguous 
sign to the Western Balkan countries that if all conditions are met their future 
will be a European one. At that summit a new European Partnership was 
oﬀ ered to the Balkan countries. It was, however, stressed that the framework 
set by the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) would remain central, 
and compatible with the European Partnership.
Macedonia has had the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the 
EU for six years now and its progress is evaluated on yearly basis. Since the 
ﬁ rst report produced in 2002 when Macedonia scored well only in the area 
of regional co-operation and good neighbouring relations, a trend which 
continued to be positively noticed in the other reports, the main progress 
noted in subsequent years was related to the political situation assessed as 
generally stable and successful in terms of the implementation of the 2001 
Ohrid Framework Agreement. Certain progress in the public administration 
reform, management of public ﬁ nances (noted as a priority in the previous 
reports), and the reform of the army, has been also achieved. Still, the main 
weaknesses such as the incomplete reform of the judicial system, the problems 
with the rule of law, corruption, and the economy (high level of unemploy-
ment and low investments) remained.¹¹
 e approximation of the Macedonian legislation with the EU laws is 
another priority area. For that purpose the National Programme for Approxi-
mation of Legislation was adopted in April 2003 and a Working Committee 
for European Integration was established in March 2003. A subcommittee 
for approximation to the EU legislation established Working Groups for 
Harmonisation of Legislation with the “community acquis.”¹² Moreover, 
since October 2003 a “Statement on Compliance with EU Legislation” must 
accompany each dra  of a new law or policy thus directly supporting the 
harmonisation of the Macedonian legislation and policies to the EU acquis. 
 e general assessment of the EC is that Macedonia is making progress in 
the approximation of the legislation.¹³ 
10)  http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_2444_en.htm
11)  See the Stabilisation and Association Report 2004, European Commission; Stabilisation and Association Report 2003, European 
Commission
12)  Stabilisation and Association Report 2004, European Commission
13)  Teresa Cierco, “Stabilizing Macedonia: The Key Role of the European Union”, paper presented at the annual meeting of the International 
Studies Association, Town & Country Resort and Convention Center, San Diego, California, USA, 22nd March, 2006, page 10.
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In addition to the SAA, the European Partnership¹⁴ introduced at the 
 essaloniki Summit was promoted as an additional and compatible mode 
for the realisation of the European perspective of the Balkan countries 
within the framework of the Stabilisation and Association process.  e ﬁ rst 
European Partnership with Macedonia was adopted by the Council in 2004 
and it has been updated since then with new priorities that have emerged. 
In that direction, in January 2006, an Action Plan for the European Part-
nership 2005¹⁵ was adopted promoting actions based on the Opinion of the 
European Commission and the Analytical Report for the Opinion on the 
Membership Application of Macedonia.  e organisation of the priorities 
was divided in two groups: 
 •  Short-term priorities (a one year timeline), focused on the reforms and 
organisation of the electoral process for the parliamentary elections held 
on 5tʰ July 2006.
 •  Medium-term priorities were laid down with the action plan for the Euro-
pean Partnership (on 4tʰ July 2006) referring to important and urgent 
reforms in the police sector, the rule of law, the economic environment, 
the approximation of the legislation to the EU law and standards and the 
strengthening of the administrative capacity.
 e obligation to translate the acquis should be mentioned in this context. 
 e Committee for the Translation of Legal Instruments is responsible in this 
ﬁ eld. Until now, 3500 pages have been translated with technical help received 
from the projects PRAQIII and GTZ. A future translation of another 8000 
legal instruments is planned.¹⁶  e point of this is that every country before 
its accession to the EU has to adopt some 80,000 pages of EU legislation.
The EU “Unfinished Business” in the Western Balkans
One of the main obstacles in the Europeanisation process of the Western 
Balkan countries is the EU visa regime.  is is a great limitation to travel, 
to seeing, learning and absorbing the positive experiences of the European 
Union. Although the EU is investing a lot in the reforms of these coun-
tries, it will not be enough if the citizens of these countries remain closed 
in a “Balkan ghetto.” All EU Member States have imposed a visa regime on 
14  http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&numdoc=32006D0057&model=guichett
15)  http://www.sep.gov.mk/Documents/eip/jordan-radF0E2B-1.PDF
16)  http://www.sei.gov.mk/portal/mak/default.asp?id=7
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the countries of the Western Balkans (except Croatia).  e two countries that 
joined the EU in 2007, Bulgaria and Romania, since 1st January 2007, also 
require Western Balkan citizens visas to enter.  at means that the “hoop” 
around the Western Balkans is narrowing.  e frustrations felt from the isola-
tion among the citizens of these countries are growing. Although the purpose 
of a visa regime is prevention of organised crime, law-abiding citizens of the 
Western Balkan countries are mainly those that face limitations on their travel 
opportunities to pursue education and business within the EU.
Many analysts and reports, including the most recent ones of the Interna-
tional Crisis Group¹⁷ point out that the visa regime has a negative impact on 
the motivation and the energy of these countries in the process of reforming 
trade, the economy in general, and education and might have a negative 
impact on the regional stability. Knowing this, the EU made a promise at 
the  essaloniki Summit to liberalise the visa regime for the Western Balkan 
countries.  is however, has not yet shown concrete results.  e situation 
is especially irritating to the citizens from the Western Balkans because 
the EU has started a negotiation process on visa facilitation with Russia, 
Ukraine and China. 
Positive signals on the liberalisation of the visa regime for Macedonia, 
were sent during the Finish Presidency of the EU (July -December 2006), 
as it is to be the ﬁ rst country from the Western Balkans to start negotia-
tions for visa facilitation.¹⁸ However, the liberalisation would not mean the 
elimination of the visas for the Macedonian citizens, but the introduction 
of simpler and easier procedures to obtain visas.  at is supposed to be 
the ﬁ rst step towards the abolition of the visa regime for the Macedonian 
citizens. Macedonia should fulﬁ l the following conditions in order to be 
eligible for visa facilitation: implement an integrated border administration 
and electronic management system, it should sign readmission agreements 
with all EU member states and improve the quality of passports¹⁹. Macedo-
nia has signed 13 readmission agreements until now. Four countries have 
stated that concluding such agreements with Macedonia is not necessary, 
due to the insigniﬁ cant numbers of immigrants. Readmission agreements 
with Sweden, Norway, Ukraine and Bosnia and Herzegovina are expected 
to be signed in the forthcoming period.²⁰ Regarding the integrated border 
17)  http://www.google.com/u/crisisgroup?q=visa+regime&ie=UTF-8
18)  http://www.a1.com.mk/vesti/default.asp?VestID=65644
19)  http://www.sobranie.mk/uploads/soopstenie %20Teuta.doc
20)  www.sei.gov.mk/portal/mak/bilten/MONTHLY %20PROGRES %20BRIEF_June %2006.pdf
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administration a signiﬁ cant progress has been made since the police have 
taken over the control of all the borders.  e Common Platform regarding 
the border control adopted on 22ⁿd May 2003 in Ohrid moved things towards 
bringing the new law for the control of the borders, in compliance with the 
EU standards in this area. Moreover, a new Police Law was adopted by the 
Parliament in October 2006.
 e rules of origin appear as other “unﬁ nished business” of the EU in 
the Balkans.  ese rules of origin deﬁ ne the “nationality” and the origin 
of the goods in the international trade.  ere exist two types of rules of 
origin: non preferential rules and preferential rules. In the focus of interest 
of the Western Balkan countries are the preferential rules. At present, there 
are two distinct types of EU agreements with the countries in the Western 
Balkans, granting them free access to the Community market for almost all 
products, with only a few exceptions: autonomous trade measures – ATMs 
(in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Serbia and Montenegro) 
and the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (for Albania, Croatia and 
Macedonia).  ese agreements do not regulate the system of regional and 
diagonal cummulation and thus the countries have diﬀ erent rules of origin 
regime when exporting to the EU. All the SAP countries did not succeed to 
take full advantage of the asymmetric trade liberalisation with the EU the 
reasons being besides the lack of productive capacity, the insuﬃ  cient ability 
to comply with EU quality standards, and the non-participation in Pan-Euro-
pean Diagonal Cummulation of Rules of Origin.
Macedonia and the rest of the countries in the Western Balkan region are 
not members of the Pan-European Association of Diagonal Cummulation, 
whereas Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria are.  eir products have preferential 
treatment when exported to the EU. As a result, if a Macedonian manufac-
turer imports fabrics from Serbia or Bosnia the ﬁ nal products are not being 
considered as originating in Macedonia if exported to the EU and thus 
s/he will be required to pay 12 % custom fee, as neither Serbia, Bosnia, nor 
Macedonia are members of the system for diagonal cummulation. Whereas, 
if the Macedonian manufacturer imports certain fabrics from other country 
with which Macedonia has signed Free Trade Agreement (e.g. Bulgaria) the 
ﬁ nal product can be treated as originating in Macedonia if that product is 
exported in the same country (principle of bilateral cummulation).
 erefore, the leaders of the Western Balkan countries agreed that the mem-
bership in the Pan-European association of diagonal cummulation would help 
the further development of their economies:
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“We are conﬁ dent that the full and eﬃ  cient implementation of the network of bilat-
eral free trade agreements combined with further trade liberalisation and facilitation 
measures, will contribute to sustainable economic growth in the region. Given progress 
to date, we believe that the possibility of moving to a single free trade framework should 
be fully explored. In this context, we welcome the European Commission’s proposal 
to extend the Pan-European diagonal cummulation of origin to the countries of the 
Stabilisation and Association Process in a manner consistent with all relevant Com-
munity Policies and dependent on their administrative capacity.” ²¹
Within the Pan-European system a manufacturer can use any originating 
input (raw materials or component) from the area in the manufacture of ﬁ n-
ished products, without running the risk of losing the free trade status if it is 
exported within the area. For example, a manufacturer in Macedonia would 
be able to import all materials from Bulgaria and export the ﬁ nished products 
not only back to Bulgaria, but also to all EFTA countries.  e objective of 
the system is to create an incentive for cooperation between industries and to 
promote an international division of labour. If the Western Balkan countries 
were treated as one region for the purposes of the EU rules of origin or were 
members of the Pan-European diagonal cummulation, the rules of origin 
would not be a hidden trade barrier to the Macedonian industry because 
Macedonian products would cumulate origin, when using raw materials from 
Turkey for example, and be exported to the EU without having to pay an 
additional 12 % of custom fees. 
At the  essaloniki Summit (19–20 June 2003) the leaders of the EU Mem-
ber States agreed upon the strategy of the Union towards the Western Balkan 
countries. One of the items on the  essaloniki agenda was the idea of extension 
of the system of diagonal cummulation to the Western Balkan countries:
“Only when the necessary conditions are fulﬁ lled and the administrative arrange-
ments are in place an extension of the Pan-European system of diagonal cummulation 
of origin to the Western Balkans could be envisaged, which would then further facilitate 
reaping the full beneﬁ ts of regional trade integration. If any such extension were to be 
envisaged, it should be applied in a manner, which is fully consistent with all relevant 
community policies.”22
 e Macedonian Government and the producers are aware of the need for 
the Macedonian industrial production to be improved. One of the factors 
for the upgrade to be achieved is for the country to become a member of the 
21)  See Joint Statement of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the South East European Co-operation process (SEECP), June 9th 2003, Sarajevo
22)  See The Stabilisation and Association Process for South East Europe, Second Annual Report, Commission of the European 
Communities http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UNTC/UNPAN012924.pdf, last visited 15.12.2005
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Association for Diagonal Cummulation, so that for example, the Macedo-
nian clothing will receive preferential treatment.  e Government has put 
all its eﬀ orts to build an administrative capacity for assuming this function 
and the European Commission, at the ﬁ rst meeting with the Macedonian 
authorities within the Committee for Stabilisation and Association of Mac-
edonia (held on 3rd June 2004), noted that “Macedonia fulﬁ lled the conditions 
for accession to the system which was particularly necessary for the encouragement 
of foreign investment and the increase of export.” ²³ Furthermore, the minutes of 
this meeting emphasise that “there was a delay in the implementation of this item 
of the  essaloniki Agenda, but the responsibility for the slow progress was entirely on 
the European Commission.”²⁴ 
When it was expected for the Union to initiate an extension of the sys-
tem for diagonal cummulation and invite Macedonia to become a member, 
something unexpected happened.  e European Commission recommended 
and the European Council decided on 11tʰ October, 2005 to extend the 
Pan European Association for diagonal cummulation to the Mediterranean 
countries: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia and the 
Palestinian territory – West Bank Gaza. With this a Pan-Euro-Mediterranean 
Association of Diagonal Cummulation was established, excluding the Western 
Balkan countries. Sources in the European Commission that the Center for 
Research and Policy Making consulted say that this decision was made under 
strong pressure from the diplomacies of the Mediterranean countries, as well 
as the clothing producers and the powerful European clothing retailers, who 
lobbied actively in the EU for this decision to be made. 
 is decision gives the products from the Mediterranean countries a pref-
erential treatment, whereas those coming from the Western Balkan countries, 
which traditionally belongs to Europe and has European future, will continue 
to be charged with 12 % custom fees when using raw materials from countries 
such as Turkey. As a kind of compensation to the two countries that have 
Agreements for Stabilisation and Association and are candidates to become 
EU member states, Croatia and Macedonia, the EU oﬀ ered an agreement for 
sub-regional diagonal cummulation between them. But this system will have 
little, if at all, value for Macedonia as the amount of the raw materials its 
producers source from Croatia is very small.
23)  Minutes of the 1st meeting of the European Community – the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Stabilisation and Association 
Committee, Skopje, 3 June 2004, p. 14
24)  Ibid.
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The EU and the Balkans
The EU’s Security Role In the Balkans
 e stability of the Balkans is an important goal to be achieved and 
maintained not just by the Balkan countries but also by the European 
Union.  e EU wants to deal with every potential and current threat to its 
stability, and the Balkans, since the breakdown of Yugoslavia, are seen as 
a problematic region.  e stability of the Balkan region is set as a strategic 
objective of EU.  e EU interest and involvement in the Balkans began 
since 1991 and the disintegration of former Yugoslavia.  at was also a great 
challenge for the European Union, a completely new experience for the 
EU institutions to deal with.  e involvement in the “Balkan story” did 
not only mean the EU inﬂ uence on the stability of the region grew, but it 
was also a “capacity building” lesson for the EU’s common security and 
foreign policy.
 e European Union has invested great energy and ﬁ nancial resources 
in the stabilisation of the Balkan countries.  rough its aid programs the 
EU has provided more than 6.1 billion Euros between 1991 and 2001²⁵ for 
the Balkan countries. A er the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999, the 
EU felt that a more serious and long term approach was needed for the 
Balkan challenge, and for that purpose the Stability Pact was established.²⁶ 
 e crises in the beginning of the 1990s, and the crisis in Kosovo were 
important experiences for the European Union and a key moment for EU 
to understand the situation, to adapt and perform its role as stabiliser of 
the region better.  e necessity for the EU to play a more active role that 
needs a diﬀ erent organisation and perception of the security mission on 
the Balkans grew further a er the terrorist attacks of 11tʰ September 2001 
and the withdrawal of the US troops from the region because of the new 
circumstances and the new priorities that the US faced a er that date.  e 
EU understood the importance of improvement of its crisis management 
and ﬁ nally saw the need for a military component in its approach. In that 
context, Macedonia was the test where the improved crisis management of 
EU passed with a positive grade.  at was the ﬁ rst time when the Union 
25)  See Vincze, H., “A stronger military role for the EU in the Balkans?”, in Joachim Krause et al, Unraveling the European Security and 
Defense Policy Conundrum, Peter Lang: Bern 2003, p. 149. 
26)  Ibid.
98
Bulgaria, Romania... and who next?
was proactively engaged in security aﬀ airs, covering a variety of tasks from 
policing to military intervention²⁷.
 e Yugoslav conﬂ ict exposed the main weaknesses of the EU approach 
regarding the misbalance of “hard power” (military) and “so  power” (non-
military).  e lack of necessary coherence between diplomacy, coercive 
diplomacy and the use of force, and the credible threat of the use of force, 
was stressed as a great problem of the EU.²⁸ However, it was not easy for 
the Union to achieve its more active security role in the region. It must not 
be forgotten that the European Union today has 27 Member States, and in 
that context it is hard for so many voices to be articulated into one. Some of 
the member states are not so interested the Union to have so active security 
role outside its borders, or at least have diﬀ erent views about the military 
involvement of the Union in the security tasks. 
 e gained experience from the crises in the Balkans, forced the EU to 
take more concrete measures in improving and rapidly developing its crisis 
management capacities.  e following European Council meetings: Helsinki 
(December 1999), Santa Maria da Feira (May 2000), Nice (December 2000) 
and Gothenburg (June 2001) led to signiﬁ cant changes in the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) which in part gained a legal basis by 
the Nice Treaty (TEU-N)²⁹.  e most important achievement of the Nice 
Treaty was the introduction of the mechanism of “enhanced co-operation” to 
the CFSP, a procedure that has already been used in other policy areas.  e 
main point is to allow a group of Member States to deepen their co-opera-
tion and to act without necessarily achieving a consensus among all Member 
States.  is form of co-operation is, however, limited to the implementation 
of common positions and joint actions and may not include actions with 
military implications ³⁰.  e main advantage is that it provides for a much 
easier decision-making process over some issues that need urgent decisions 
and eﬀ ective acting, without potentially blocking the process if all Member 
States were not involved. 
Consequently new institutions have been introduced in the EU, such as: 
Political and Security Committee, the EU Military Committee and many 
other sub-committees as support of the two mentioned bodies. In addition, 
the High Representative for CFSP (supported by the Policy Unit) was 
27)  See, Cierco, T., “Stabilizing Macedonia: The Key Role of the European Union”, p. 16.
28)  See, Vincze, H., op.cit., p. 152.
29)  See Schneckener, U., “Developing and applying EU crisis management: test case Macedonia,” ECMI Working Paper No.14, January 
2002, p. 16.
30)  Ibid.
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established as a key ﬁ gure of the EU crisis management; the role of the Com-
mission was also more precisely deﬁ ned in this area through the Directorate 
General for External Relations where a small unit on “Conﬂ ict Prevention 
and Crisis Management” was set up.
 e clearest sign about the interest of the EU in the Balkans is the oppor-
tunity for the European integration that the Union oﬀ ered the Balkan coun-
tries.  at decision means a great impact on the stability of the region and 
gives great energy and motivation to the Balkan countries to go forward on 
the European path to the ultimate goal of the EU membership.  at is the 
“carrot” that the EU is using to articulate the energy in these countries to 
choose a stable and prospective future, instead of some backward scenarios. 
 e Slovenian accession to the EU in 2004, the accession of Bulgaria and 
Romania in 2007, and the candidate status of Croatia and Macedonia serve as 
examples to the other Balkan countries that are trying to catch the European 
train.  at would be the right European strategy for achieving the stability 
in this region.
Macedonia – The Success Story of the EU’s CFSP
Since gaining independence Macedonia was supported by the internation-
al community in the democratisation process. In practice since 1992 Macedo-
nia has beneﬁ ted from EU assistance of approximately 728 million Euros³¹. 
During the 1990s Macedonia successfully avoided the bloody conﬂ ict some 
countries experienced a er the breakdown of Yugoslavia.  at was a period 
of time when Macedonia was trying to “sell” an image of being an “oasis 
of peace” by putting aside important issues such as the mismanagement of 
interethnic tensions and not facing the emerging minority dissatisfaction.
However, Macedonia could not escape from the crisis of 2001. Eventually 
the problems regarding the interethnic relations in Macedonia emerged to 
the surface. Various factors inﬂ uenced the war crisis of 2001 including the 
fact that the external problems that Macedonia faced with its neighbours 
since the independence have calmed down, (the improvement of the rela-
tions with Greece and post-Milosevic Yugoslavia) and as a consequence the 
internal interethnic problems could not be put aside anymore by the political 
elites; the end of the Kosovo crisis increased the opportunities for the ethic 
Albanian militants to act. 
31)  See Cierco, T., op.cit., p. 12. 
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 e role of the international community, especially the role of the Europe-
an Union, was crucial for the stabilisation of the country during and a er the 
crisis in 2001.  e initial events that have started the crisis in 2001 activated 
the EU crisis management mechanism. Essential for the successful role of the 
Union was the fact that a er the outbreak of the violence in Macedonia the 
European Union responded very quickly and, most importantly, on the basis 
of uniﬁ ed position of EU Member States. EU Member States were acting 
jointly and there were not any divisions among the countries regarding the 
position the EU should have in the Macedonia case.
 ere are some critics³² that say that the EU and the other international 
partners missed the opportunity to prevent the crisis from emerging at all, 
because warning signs were not taken into consideration, such as the reports 
that were pointing out to an increased arms trade in the Kosovo-Southern 
Serbia-Macedonia triangle. However, the European Union had an active and 
engaged role during the conﬂ ict and facilitated the negotiations for a cease 
ﬁ re through a special envoy.  e outcome of that facilitation was the signing 
of the Framework Agreement.³³ 
 e successful role of the European Union was due to several factors: (i) 
the fast and timely involvement of the crisis management; (ii) the overall 
approach that the Union had in resolving the crisis in Macedonia, by engag-
ing diﬀ erent and numerous EU actors (the Delegation of the European 
Commission, the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy-CFSP, the EUSR, the European Agency of Reconstruction-EAR, the 
EU presidency, the EU military crisis management mission Concordia, the EU 
police mission Proxima, as well as the European Union Monitoring Mission-
EUMM)³⁴ (iii) and ﬁ nally by combining various instruments, through which 
the EU was linking crisis management with long-term measures³⁵.
In this context, a very signiﬁ cant and important event for both, the EU 
and Macedonia, was the implementation of the ﬁ rst military operation of 
the EU “Concordia” with the main task to monitor the security situation in 
Macedonia and to promote a conﬁ dence building measures in a post-conﬂ ict 
32)  Ibid, p. 36. 
33)  The 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement ended the war crisis between government security forces and ethnic Albanian rebels. It 
set out a strategic agenda concerning equal representation of different ethnic groups in public life and local self-government, and 
the devolution of powers from the central government to the local government units. The expected results were having more 
opportunities for citizens in general to participate at the civil society level and better public input that enhanced the growth of 
the local communities. See for example Daskalovski, Z., Walking on the Edge, Globic: Chapel Hill, 2006.
34)  See Teresa Cierco, page 12.
35)  See “Ulrich Schneckener, page 32.
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environment.  e military mission was later replaced with the EU Police Mis-
sion Proxima, which has been assessed as one of the most eﬀ ective advisory 
mechanisms³⁶, where the work-motto of the mission “monitor, mentor and 
advise” had a great impact on Macedonia.  e mission worked closely with 
the various government agencies pressing them to work and collaborate with 
each other. In 2005 Proxima was replaced by the EU Police Advisory Team 
(EUPAT), Macedonia becoming aware that the EU’s advice was essential 
and precious for the reform of the police.
Macedonia has made great progress since 2001; it is a stable, democratic 
country that succeeded to be granted candidate status for EU membership. 
 e EU has also made a great progress during the Macedonian conﬂ ict. It 
played a key role for the stability in its backyard -- the Balkans -- and proved 
to have foreign capacity to act together in security issues important for the 
peace and stability in the region.  erefore, the conﬂ ict of 2001 was a key 
lesson for both the EU and Macedonia.
EU Membership As a Key Factor for Establishing 
a Functional Market Economy and Economic Reforms
All the external and internal circumstances that Macedonia has faced 
since its independence, diminished the already weak determination of the 
political elites for a decisive reform process and o en served as an excuse 
for the unsuccessful government work. So far, Macedonia has concentrated 
all its eﬀ orts on implementing measures that are mostly part of the political 
criteria for EU accession. Much has been done for the implementation of 
the Ohrid Agreement, improvement of inter-ethnic relations, the process of 
decentralisation, reform of the electoral system etc. During this extremely 
tense period, the only platform for unifying the divided citizenship along 
political and ethnic lines was the hope for EU membership.  erefore, 
each reform activity undertaken by the government was presented to the 
public as an obligation that must be fulﬁ lled in order to make progress 
in the EU integration process of the country.  is was particularly true in 
respect to the reforms in sensitive areas, such as the reform of the police, 
the judiciary system, and the ﬁ ght against corruption.  e fulﬁ llment of 
the above mentioned reforms will create a solid base for further growth of 
the Macedonian economy.
 
36)  See “Macedonia: Wobbling toward Europe, International Crisis Group,” Europe Briefing N°41,12 January 2006. page 8
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In this respect the most recent public opinion survey conducted by CRPM 
shows that issues related to the economy such as more job opportunities 
(32.6 %), economic development (34.8 %), poverty reduction (16.8 %) and 
combating corruption (5.1 %), are top priorities for Macedonian citizens, and 
are ranked higher than inter-ethnic relations (1.3 %), the Ohrid Agreement 
(1.5 %), peace and security (2.0 %) etc.³⁷  e results of the survey illustrate 
that the great majority of Macedonian citizens, regardless of their ethnic 
background, are interested in issues that will pave their path to Europe.
 e EU, on the other hand, should also strengthen its support to the 
country and instead of targeting it as an aid receiving country³⁸ should 
treat Macedonia as a country that needs to build its membership capacity. 
 e EU’s approach to condition the integration process with the reforms 
implemented by Macedonia has proven to be the right attitude.  e EU 
membership does not mean only the privilege to use EU public funds and 
ﬁ nancial support, but at the same time it entails the responsibility to take 
on huge obligations implied by the status of the Member State. Macedonia 
was granted a candidate status but without oﬃ  cial date for starting negotia-
tions. As the new government (in power since September 2006) accelerated 
the pace of the reforms it is expected that the negotiations will start soon. 
 e relations between the EU and Macedonia so far were based on the 
principle of partnership.  e EU consistently oﬀ ered its support over the 
last years and there is no doubt that this partnership will continue in the 
following period. 
What Does the Macedonian/Balkan 
Accession Mean for the EU?
What beneﬁ ts the Balkan countries expect to gain from the EU integra-
tion?  ese are the countries that have the EU integration as a top national 
priority.  ey are eager to join the Union hoping to achieve greater prosperity, 
greater protection (many of those countries are facing some inner problems, for 
example interethnic tensions see the EU membership as a solution and point of 
closing any question of that kind) and free movement of labour and goods. On 
37)  See CRPM survey 21st November 2006, press release available at http://www.crpm.org.mk/Papers/Surveys/KolkuGraganitegi
PoddrzuvaatNoviteVladinimerki.htm.
38)  In the previous period when the country was struggling to overcome the post-conflict period, the EU provided financial support 
through programs such as CARDS, PHARE etc. Since the country was granted a candidate status, the IPA instrument as a pre-
accession assistance will become available after January, 2007.
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the other hand, the eﬀ ect on the EU of the enlargement of the Western Balkans 
would be considerable as were the eﬀ ects of previous enlargements. ³⁹ 
Table 1: Impact of successive enlargements of the EU
(based on 1995 
data)
Increase in 
area
Increase in 
population
Increase in 
total
GDP (*)
Change in 
per capita 
GDP
Average per 
capita GDP
(EUR 6 =100)
EUR 9/EUR 6
EUR 12/EUR 9
EUR 15/EUR 12(**)
EUR 26/EUR 15
31 %
48 %
43 %
34 %
32 %
22 %
11 %
29 %
29 %
15 %
8 %
9 %
-3 %
-6 %
-3 %
-16 %
97
91
89
75
(*) in purchasing power parities (**) including the german reuniﬁ cation
Source: European Commission, Agenda 2000
 e ﬁ gures presented in the table show that besides the increase of terri-
tory a signiﬁ cant increase of the total GDP follows every enlargement process. 
Moreover, the increase of the GDP in EU member states disproves the argu-
ment of the supposedly dangerous eﬀ ects of the enlargement on the already 
integrated Member States of the EU:
Table 2: GDP per Capita, Percentage of EU Average (Purchasing Power Parity Basis)
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Greece 59.2 57.4 58.3 59.1 57.4 60.1 61.9 64.2 65.2 66.4 67.5 69.2 68.6 69.3
Ireland 60.8 62.5 63.8 66.3 71.1 74.7 78.4 82.5 90.7 96.8 96.5 96.4 102.1 105.1
Portugal 55.1 56.7 59.2 59.4 58.5 63.8 64.8 67.7 69.5 70.1 70.5 70.7 71.1 71.8
Spain 69.8 71.5 72.5 73.1 74.1 78.7 77.0 78.1 78.1 78.6 78.7 77.8 78.6 79.6
Source: John Van Oudenaren, Uniting Europe (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littleﬁ el, 2000, p. 156.
 e enlargement process is not in any case an obstacle for the development 
of the Member States of the Union. 
 e Balkan countries are quite signiﬁ cant for the EU geographically.  e 
space between Greece in the South and the rest of the Union is important 
from diﬀ erent perspectives: stability, economy, infrastructure etc. In that 
sense, it is in the interest of the Union to have the Balkan countries reformed, 
39)  Europeanisation of Central and Eastern Europe; 4 July 2006 BNE-Slovenia; Ronald Linden
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democratic and stable.  is is a process that will take a long time and accord-
ing to experts will end sometime in 2015. Macedonia expects that 2013 is a re-
alistic date for EU accession.⁴⁰ Europe was divided in two spheres, the west 
and the east for too long. Now it is time to ﬁ nalise the process by integrating 
the Balkan countries. If this strategic goal is achieved in the near future it will 
be the greatest achievement that will mark the history of Europe.
Macedonia – A Minor Financial Burden on the EU Budget
A dilemma is how big a burden Macedonia would be for the EU budget. 
Let us take a look at a brief comparison of the part the new member states⁴¹ 
have taken in the EU budget and their position and part in EU vs. the “Mac-
edonian burden” of the Union.
Graph 1: The EU budget and the recently acceded Member States in perspective
40)  Balkan Stability; 6 July 2006 BNE-Slovenia; Vladimir Gligorov
41)  Europeanisation of Central and Eastern Europe; 4 July 2006 BNE-Slovenia; Ronald Linden 
Revenues
EU-15: 96.8%
RAMS: 3.4% of which PL 1.4% RAMS: 6.9% of which PL 3.1%
RAMS: 4.7% of which PL 2.0% RAMS: 16.1% of which PL 8.3%
EU-15: 93.1%
EU-15: 95.3% EU-15: 83.9%
Expenditures
GDP Population
Data based on budgetary execution in 2004; EU-25 = 100 %
Source: DG BUDG, calculations by DG ECFIN
105
Marija Risteska – The Macedonian Accession to the European Union
Macedonia is one of the smallest countries in Europe and should not be 
a reason for worry for the European Union. Its GDP is only 0.4 % of that of 
the EU-25⁴² and its population of around 2 million people is only 0.4 % of 
the EU-25 population.⁴³ If we calculate for EU-27 including Bulgaria and 
Romania, the Macedonian share of the GDP and the population would be 
even smaller.  ese statistics reveal that the enlargement of Macedonia will 
not have signiﬁ cant consequences for the EU budget. 
 e EU budget for 2007–2013 has raised many debates. From the Mac-
edonian perspective the exclusion of Croatia and Macedonia from the EU 
budget is one of the problematic points of the budget⁴⁴. Another problem is 
that the budget for foreign policy is reduced to a signiﬁ cant extent, aﬀ ect-
ing the IPA (Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance).⁴⁵ IPA has ﬁ ve major 
components for the candidate countries and the potential candidate coun-
tries.  e diﬀ erence between these two categories of countries is that the 
candidates have access to all parts of the components, whereas the potential 
candidate countries have pre-access to only the ﬁ rst two components. IPA 
is a ﬁ nancial assistance agreement for 7 years starting with 1st January 2007. 
In order to start to use the ﬁ nancial assistance Macedonia needs to establish 
a specialised Payment Operation Agency that will be responsible to conduct 
and coordinate the IPA⁴⁶. In addition to that, it is important to mention that 
IPA is based on the capacity of the public institutions to apply for founds 
with own projects. Many doubt the capacity of the Macedonian administra-
tion for that task, since until now a very small percent the funding for which 
Macedonia was eligible has been used.⁴⁷ 
All in all, IPA is about 2 billion Euros, which is less than expected⁴⁸. It 
would be good if the current candidate countries get the same amount of 
money as the previous candidates, which means at least 27 Euros per capita. 
In the mid of 2008–2009 a revision of the EU budget is expected. Some 
of the critics point out the importance of the revision of the budget for the 
further enlargement and the impossibility to negotiate membership with 
Macedonia without fundamental budgetary reform in EU. ⁴⁹ 
42)  http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=156&document_ID=73
43)  The total EU-25 population is 456 million people, epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/3-31082004-BP/EN/3-31082004-
BP-EN.PDF 
44)  http://www.seetv-exchanges.com/code/navigate.php?Id=214
45)  http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=156&document_ID=73
46)  Interview with Gabriela Konevska Trajkovska http://www.dnevnik.com.mk/?itemID=2A6D089EB4D78148B50CD44F2D125BA4
47)  Ibid.
48 http://www.seetv-exchanges.com/code/navigate.php?Id=229 
49)  http://www.seetv-exchanges.com/code/navigate.php?Id=214
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The Macedonian Accession and the Public Opinion
The Macedonian Accession and the European Public Opinion
 e great project of creating the European Union started with the idea 
of eliminating war form the continent, as a result of the trauma of the Sec-
ond World War.  e traditional rivals France and Germany realised their 
common interest that would bring economic prosperity for the European 
nations. During the process of unifying the continent, both political leaders 
and common citizens shared a sense of optimism for the future of Europe, 
which culminated with the fall of the Iron Curtain and the uniﬁ cation of 
Germany. As the process continued to evolve, the Union became much more 
than a free-trade zone.  e major overturn on the scale for support of EU 
enlargement was the big bang eﬀ ect in 2004, with the accession of the ten 
new members, which completely changed the map of Europe. 
Graph 2: Support to the further enlargement of the European Union – EU25
 e comparison of the results from the public opinion survey made in 
autumn 2005 and the one in September 2006, illustrates a decrease in the 
overall support by 4 % and at the same time an increase in those who are not 
in favour of the enlargement.  e 25-point diﬀ erence, regarding support for 
enlargement between the old and new members illustrates the high diversity 
of the European public opinion.  e support is larger among the new mem-
bers than among the richer states⁵⁰. 
50)  Eb65_first_en.pdf, pg 26.
DK 12%
Against 39%
For 49%
DK 13%
Against 42%
For 45%
EB 64 – Aut. 2005 EB 65 – Sp. 2006
EU15: 41 %
NMS: 66 %
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 e fact that the majority of the EU citizens (45 %) think that the accession 
of the Balkan countries is primarily in the interest of these countries rather 
than mutual interest (23 %), indicates the low level of public awareness for 
the long-term goals of the Union. 
Graph 3:  According to you, European Union accession of the Western Balkan 
countries would be... ?
 e public opinion survey of Eurobarometer indicates relatively positive 
attitude towards the future accession of Macedonia once the required condi-
tions are fulﬁ lled.  e table above shows that as the country moves forward 
in the integration process the public attitude is increasing gradually in favor 
of that country. Likely enough, this trend is due to the individual improve-
ments made by each country. 
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
45%
Primarily in the
interest of the
Westen Balkan 
countries
Primarily in the
interest of the
European Union
Primarily in the
interest of my
own country
In the interest
of other
international
players (e.g.
USA, Russia,
China, etc.)
In the interest
of no one
(spontaneous)
DKIn the mutual
interest of both
the European 
Union and the
Westen Balkan 
countries
23%
9%
EU 25
5%
2%
4%
12%
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Graph 4:  Once each of the foloowing countries with all conditions set by the European 
Union, would you be strongly in favour, fairly in favour, fairly opposed or 
strongly opposed to the accession of each of them to the Eauropean Union
For instance, Croatia at present is undergoing negotiations with the EU, 
and at the same time enjoys the highest level of public support compared to 
the rest of the Western Balkan countries.  e position of Macedonia as the 
second most preferable country for accession reﬂ ects the progress made in the 
integration process up to now.  is generally positive attitude towards Mac-
edonia should be further improved by fulﬁ lment of all conditions required 
and at the same time presenting the results and achievements made in the 
integration process to the European public. 
The Macedonian Public Opinion on Accession 
 e EU integration of Macedonia is a strategic objective of every gov-
ernment and all political elites. Moreover, there is a great support of the 
European Union membership for Macedonia by the Macedonian citizens, 
which gives solid and legitimate grounds for the reforms that have to be 
taken in the process of accession to the European Union.  e support of 
the Macedonian membership in the European Union, in the period June 
2002 – December 2004⁵¹ has been exceptionally, high, 93 % in 2002, and 97 % 
51)  http://www.sei.gov.mk/portal/mak/default.asp?id=88976
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in 2004.  e opinion polls regarding the potential outcome of a referendum 
on the accession of Macedonia in the European Union, taken in diﬀ erent 
periods between 2003 – 2005, show a signiﬁ cant percentage of the citizens 
that would vote ‘yes’.⁵²  e support has never been under 88 %, reaching 92 % 
support of the potential referendum in December 2005 when Macedonia was 
granted the candidate status.
Macedonian Image in the EU and the EU Image in 
Macedonia: the Role of the New Member States
 e Western Balkan countries have no other foreign policy strategic goal 
except the Euro-Atlantic integration. Yet, at the moment the Balkans have 
a negative image – a black hole on the map of Europe. It is completely 
understandable why the European public have negative or skeptical opinion 
towards the possibility to integrate the Balkans within the Union.  e Balkan 
countries still face problems like corruption, weak economic development, 
organised crime, traﬃ  cking in women and are located in the main corridor 
for drug smuggling into Western Europe.  is status is neither good for 
the Balkans nor for Europe.  erefore the enlargement of the Union and 
the positive impact it brings to the acceding countries (in terms of reforms) 
should continue in the Balkans because it is in both the interest of the EU 
and othe Balkans.  e enlargement process means exporting stability instead 
of importing insecurity. 
 e accession to the European Union is the goal that unites all Macedo-
nian citizens regardless of their ethnic background, education, age or political 
preferences.  e accession to the European Union is perceived by most of 
the Macedonian citizens as a fulﬁ lment of the dream of a stable, prosperous 
and wealthy Macedonia. An opinion poll⁵³ shows a large percentage (more 
than 80 %) of the citizens who believe that the European integration has and 
would have a signiﬁ cant and positive impact on the reform of the economy, 
foreign direct investments, stability, human rights and visa regime.  e high-
est percent of the Macedonian citizens believe that in the process of European 
integration Macedonia has to put the greatest eﬀ orts on the economic issues, 
but they are also hoping that the EU integration will contribute greatly to 
the improvement of the economy.
52)  http://www.sei.gov.mk/portal/mak/default.asp?id=10
53)  http://www.sei.gov.mk/portal/mak/default.asp?id=10 
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On the other hand, Macedonia has gained the “aﬃ  nity” of the EU citizens 
a er the peaceful solution to the war crisis of 2001 and the implementation 
of the Ohrid Framework Agreement.  e image of Macedonia in the EU 
is also inﬂ uenced by the reports of international organisations. Here the 
Government needs to put some extra eﬀ orts as the reports are written by 
individuals resident in London, New York etc. who do not know all the rel-
evant information about Macedonia, so the information they provide is not 
evidence-based but o en biased. A good example on how a report by IGO or 
ﬁ nancial institution could negatively aﬀ ect the country is the EBRD strategy 
paper of 2004, which states that investment in Macedonia is risky, when on 
the other hand reports by the World Bank state the opposite. However, the 
EBRD strategy for 2004 is the ﬁ rst document that pops up on the Google 
search on “foreign direct investment in Macedonia.” 
 e situation in Macedonia is presented not so brightly by some parts of 
the EU reports and diﬀ erent statistics and analyses made by relevant inter-
national institutions that have great inﬂ uence on the established perception 
of Macedonia. Macedonia is not in a position to boast with its 103rd place 
in the 2005 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index,⁵⁴ 
which has taken into consideration 158 countries in the world. Regarding 
the economic conditions Macedonia ranks 92 on the list presented in 2006 
by the World Bank⁵⁵, where although the Macedonian progress in the cat-
egory “registration of ﬁ rm” is recognised, still much work has to be done 
especially in the areas where Macedonia lags behind the other countries 
of the region.
Promoting Macedonia as a safe place to invest and do business in is 
a role that the EU Member States could play with signiﬁ cant investments 
in Macedonia. Slovenia is the country that has oﬀ ered an unambiguous 
support for Macedonia on multilateral and on bilateral level, in the areas 
of economy, police, legal approximation, etc.⁵⁶ Slovenia is one of the 
major investors in Macedonia and in this context around 100 Slovenian 
companies participate with investments in the Macedonian economy and 
many other have announced their future investments into the Macedonian 
market, assessing the economic conditions in Macedonia as favourable and 
especially secure.⁵⁷
54)  http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0781359.html
55)  http://www.kanal5.com.mk/ShowNews.aspx?ItemID=15314&mid=1500&tabId=1&tabindex=0
56)  http://www.a1.com.mk/vesti/default.asp?VestID=67476
57)  http://www.a1.com.mk/vesti/default.asp?VestID=67476
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In addition, other new Member States have announced support to Mac-
edonia’s European integration ambitions. Such is the case of the Czech 
Republic⁵⁸.  e Czech Republic has expressed its readiness to advise and 
help Macedonia in its accession process.  ere are eﬀ orts for more intensive 
economic co-operation, which was the aim of the Macedonian-Czech Busi-
ness Forum.  e trade between Macedonia and the Czech Republic was US$ 
29.3 million in 2005, but the Macedonian part in that exchange was quite 
modest – only 6 million, a situation that needs to improve.
Lobbying for the Balkan’s and in this respect Macedonia’s accession to the 
EU, might be an important factor that will increase the visibility and participa-
tion of the new Member States in the decision-making processes of the Union. 
 ese would, on the other hand, inﬂ uence and contribute to faster reform in 
Macedonia in that direction.  is opportunity is recognised in most of the new 
Member States, which, learning from their own experience, are the greatest 
supporters of the further enlargement. Public opinion in these countries has 
shown exactly that – support for Macedonia to became a full Member State of 
the European Union. Macedonia needs to use this opportunity, build coalitions 
with the new Member States and work in the mutual interest. 
Macedonia and Poland: A Possible Partnership
Since 1989, independent Poland has enjoyed rapid economic growth, 
a large free press, and developed and a rather inﬂ uential civil society and 
interest groups. Poland’s desire to reintegrate with Europe was realised 
in May 2004 when it joined the European Union. Today, Poland, with 
a population of 38.6 million, is the sixth-largest EU member.  e addition 
of 10 new members in 2004 changed the character and political dynamics of 
the EU and highlighted the importance of revising the EU Constitution; an 
issue in which Poland played an active role. In this respect the Polish Foreign 
Minister has recently suggested that Poland can both mediate in the row over 
the EU budget, and serve as a new engine for the bloc at a time of disarray 
over the dra  Constitutional Treaty. 
 is attitude should reassure the Polish citizens that their nation is large⁵⁹ 
and in terms of votes rather powerful in the EU. Poland will become a “big 
country that counts” in Europe, said Poland’s new Prime Minister Jarosław 
58)  http://www.turkishweekly.net/news.php?id=29471
59)  Public opinion polls show that Polish citizens think of themselves as a “small nation”, when geographically it is large and very 
powerful.
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Kaczyński. His new regime promises a stronger voice in Europe, pushing 
more conservative values within the EU. A stronger role for Poland in EU 
decision-making is to be welcomed – because of its size, the number of votes 
it has in the European parliament and its geo-strategic position between 
Western Europe and Russia. However the challenge for Poland is to “work 
out how to have a positive inﬂ uence in Europe.”
One of the ways is to actively work for EU enlargement, and to “really 
participate, not just formal participation (of new Member States) in all decision-
making mechanisms”.⁶⁰ Poland also sees itself as a natural spokesman for the 
eight Central European and Baltic states, which joined the EU in May 2004, 
because it is by far the largest state among them. It sought to represent their 
interests in a battle over the reform of voting rules in 2003 and it believes it 
can do the same in the years to come.
Having in mind the present situation within the Union, regarding the 
negative atmosphere for enlargement, the implementation of Copenhagen 
criteria will simply not be good enough for candidate countries such as Mac-
edonia. Knowing that in the past a decision for accession was o en made for 
geo-strategic reasons, obtaining political support is an even more important 
factor for the Macedonian accession to the EU.  erefore, Macedonia should 
rely on Poland as a partner that will support its accession to the European 
Union and should make Poland a true Macedonian lobbyist. Macedonia 
needs such a partner. At the moment Macedonian oﬃ  cials count on the 
support of Slovenia, Greece, Bulgaria, but they count on Germany most. In 
this respect the German presidency is seen as the period when Macedonia 
should receive a date to start the EU negotiations. However, Germany is 
more of a partner to Croatia (due to historical reasons) than to Macedonia. 
 erefore, Macedonia should start looking for strategic partners among the 
new Member States and Poland, being the largest; the most powerful and in 
favour of further enlargement of the EU, should be seriously considered.⁶¹ 
Why Poland?  e explanation is more than simple. Up to now, Poland 
stands as one of only a few EU member states that recognised Macedonia 
under its constitutional name.⁶²  is support for Macedonia will hopefully 
produce similar decisions among other member states. Another positive 
impulse in the bilateral relations between the two countries is the Polish 
60)  Jarosław Kaczyński, July 2006
61)  According to last public survey made by Eurobarometer, 72 % of the Polish public opinion have positive attitude towards 
enlargement
62)  Poland as EU Member State has recognised Macedonia under its constitutional name in August 2005.
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decision to liberalise the visa regime with Macedonia. Polish visas are issued 
free of charge for Macedonian citizens who stay in Poland not longer than 
three months.⁶³ 
In terms of economy, investments from Poland in our country add up 
to 68 million dollars⁶⁴, which ranks Poland at the bottom on the list of our 
economic partners. However, the situation with the trade exchange in com-
parison to the rest of the new members is in favour of Poland⁶⁵.  e amount 
of Polish products imported in the country is second largest a er Slovenia, 
while Macedonia virtually has no exports to Poland. Unfortunately, the eco-
nomic cooperation is less developed than the political and cultural relations 
between the two countries, and must be improved in the near future.
63)  http://www.mfa.gov.mk/ministerstvo.asp?idMeni=9&idKategorija=14&idSodrzina=19 
64)  http://www.nbrm.gov.mk/WBStorage/Files/Tabela_50.pdf 
65 http://www.mchamber.org.mk/default.asp?tId=25&lan=mk&edit=1 
